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This thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of the development and 
significance of anti-colonial nationalism within Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
between 1953 and 1964. Reappraising the work of David Mulford and Robert 
Rotberg, the thesis will focus upon the means by which Kenneth Kaunda’s United 
National Independence Party and Hastings Banda’s Malawi Congress Party came to 
dominate the national agenda in the 1950s and 60s. Emphasis will be placed upon 
the extent to which African politicians successfully mobilised the African people 
against the Federation, translating complex political arguments and winning 
support for their own, exclusive, national ideal. 
Galvanised by the imposition of the Central African Federation, the political 
elite embarked upon an ambitious programme to politically educate the African 
masses. The initial objective was to win African advancement within the Federal 
context in the hope that this might eventually translate into African majority 
government. When such changes were not forthcoming, and when the Nyasaland 
and Northern Rhodesian governments embarked upon a campaign to suppress 
African political parties in 1959, nationalist objectives subsequently changed. As the 
British appeared blind to African politicisation, political leaders turned away from 
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Britain as the supposed ‘protector’ of African interests and instead came to call for 
African self-government in an independent Zambia and Malawi. In so doing they 
drew upon the support of powerful pan-African, and international, allies who 
encouraged MCP and UNIP politicians to accept nothing less than their desired goal 
of independence and helped to place pressure upon the British government to 
resolve an increasingly untenable situation in Central Africa.  
The thesis will contribute to the historiography in two principal ways. In the 
first instance, the thesis will seek to contemporise accounts of the rise of 
nationalism that emerged in the immediate post-independence period, proposing 
that the rise of UNIP and the MCP was not always as inevitable as such accounts 
would imply. Rather, it depended upon the initiative, foresight, and abilities of 
African politicians in winning the confidence and support of the African masses. It 
depended also, after 1959, upon the ability of nationalist leaders to forge links 
between party and nation and, crucially, upon an expanding network of pan-African 
and international anticolonial allies. It is here that the thesis will hope to make an 
original contribution to the prevailing historiography by demonstrating that the 
development of nationalism did not solely occur within an exclusively Zambian-
Malawian context. The success of mobilisation campaigns, and indeed the 
independence struggle, rested heavily upon the support of external allies who 
proved vital in both pressuring the British and lending moral and financial support 
to African politicians. By such means, it is hoped that the thesis will go some way to 
emphasising the importance of extending the study of Zambian and Malawian 
independence beyond the traditional metropolitan-peripheral axis. 
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The Central African Federation (1953-1964) was one of the most ambitious imperial 
experiments ever undertaken by the British government. It joined together the 
white, self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia and the British protectorates of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, effectively placing over six million Africans 
under the governmental authority of just over two-hundred-thousand European 
settlers.1 Justifying plans for Federation, the Conservative government promised 
greater opportunities for African socio-economic and political advancement that 
would, it was hoped, establish a precedent for the development of multi-racial 
‘partnership’ between Africans and Europeans. The scheme, they argued, would go 
some way to fulfilling Britain’s long-term declared aim of ‘guiding’ Africans towards 
self-government, at the same time ameliorating chronic difficulties inherent in the 
Central African polity arising from the co-existence of two competing racial groups.  
When the Federation came into being on 1 August 1953, it was greeted with 
a chorus of African opposition in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that was not to 
abate. Not only did Africans object to the proposals, which they alleged established 
the basis for the spread of discriminatory Southern Rhodesian native legislation 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis ‘Northern Rhodesia’ will be used refer to colonial Zambia and ‘Nyasaland’ to 
refer to colonial Malawi. 
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northwards, but the imposition of the scheme, in spite of African objections, 
alienated Africans from the outset. By the late-1950s, African antipathy had 
reached an unprecedented scale. The series of riots that broke out in Nyasaland in 
1959, accompanied by the scaling up of anti-Federation protest in Northern 
Rhodesia, not only revealed that Federation was unlikely to gain African 
acceptance, but that frustrations over the failure to achieve immediate 
constitutional concessions was beginning to manifest in widespread revolt against 
the colonial state. By mid-1962, the British government recognised that the 
situation was beyond redemption and by the end of the year both Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia had African majority governments. Once the Federation had 
been officially dissolved in December 1963, the path was subsequently cleared for 
independence, achieved by Nyasaland (henceforth called Malawi) on 6 July 1964 
and by Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) three months later, on 24 October. Federal 
idealism had crumbled on the rocks of African nationalism.  
By 1964 African politicians had succeeded in winning independence from 
Federation, an altogether remarkable achievement given that genuine African 
nationalist sentiment was considered ‘non-existent’ by Federal and British 
authorities in 1953.2 There is an extensive literature on the development of 
nationalism in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia that focuses precisely on how, and 
why, nationalists were able to achieve new nationhood in such a relatively short 
period. But despite this large and expanding historiography, there remain aspects 
of the development of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
respectively that still warrant greater attention. What factors brought Kenneth 
                                                 
2
 Mulford, D., Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957-1964 (Oxford, 1967). Rotberg, R., The Rise 
of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, 1965). 
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Kaunda’s United National Independence Party [UNIP] and Hastings Banda’s Malawi 
Congress Party [MCP] to power in 1964? How did nationalist sentiment—that is, a 
collective adherence among vast swathes of the indigenous people to a shared 
vision of African socio-economic advancement and eventual self-government—
come to be so widespread, and why was it that UNIP and the MCP came to 
dominate the political agenda in their respective territories? Assuming a trans-
national approach, the intention of this thesis is to answer some of these 
fundamental questions in order to account for the rise and development of African 
nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, identifying the ways and means 
by which a small cohort of politically-minded Africans were able to politicise the 
African masses, mobilising them against Federation and later winning support for 
their vision of a new Zambian and Malawian nation. Part of the reason lay in the 
ability of UNIP and MCP activists to construct a vision of all-African unity which 
came to be performed through mass rallies, protests, stories, ceremonies and 
symbols. The thesis shall refer to these issues in greater depth in chapters one, two, 
four and five. 
This thesis intends to focus exclusively upon Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, rather than Southern Rhodesia, largely because both territories 
followed a similar political trajectory, achieving independence in 1964. Unlike 
Southern Rhodesia, which fell under the remit of the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, the northern Federal territories were under the joint supervision of the 
Colonial Office. Subsequently, they possessed similar internal political dynamics 
and, as such, developments in either territory almost certainly exercised a 
significant effect on the other. Although the progress of Africans in Northern 
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Rhodesia and Nyasaland undoubtedly impacted upon Southern Rhodesia, its 
political trajectory was quite distinct. Having been effectively self-governing since 
1923, the fate of Africans lay predominantly with its powerful European settler 
cohort. As such, African nationalist sentiment has been seen historiographically as 
developing much later, the issue of Southern Rhodesia’s independence rising to the 
fore after the end of the Central African Federation.3  
 
Historiography 
As will be discussed in chapter one, literature written from the British perspective 
about nationalism in Central Africa is primarily concerned with the origins of the 
Federation and the shift in British policy away from the Federation in the early 
1960s rather than the development of nationalism.4 Literature written by those 
concerned primarily with the African perspective, however, is far more extensive. 
As illustrated by Robert Rotberg’s The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, and 
David Mulford’s hugely influential study, Zambia: The Politics of Independence 
1957-1964, historical accounts of the immediate post-independence period tended 
to mirror the trajectory of nationalist politics on the spot. The triumph of UNIP and 
the MCP was seen as inevitable from the outset, their victory a natural 
consequence of the opposition posed to the Federation before its imposition upon 
                                                 
3
 To concur with Terence Ranger, the foremost scholar on Southern Rhodesian nationalism, it is 
crucial to note that the foundations for mass African nationalism in the territory took root long 
before the end of the Federation. UNIP and MCP branches, for instance, played a leading role in 
stimulating nationalist protest elsewhere. See for instance Ranger, T.O., Are We Not Also Men? The 
Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-1964, (London, 1995). 
4
 The most comprehensive account to date is Philip Murphy’s contribution to the British Documents 
on the End of Empire Series. See Murphy, P., ‘Central Africa: Part I: Closer Association 1945-1958’ 
British Documents on the End of Empire Series (London, 2005), see ‘introduction’, pp.i-liii. 
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Africans.5 The result is that for many years very little was said to question the UNIP 
and MCP narrative, that their dominance of nationalist politics was not only 
justified but very popular. But whilst both studies went some way towards 
accounting for the rise of UNIP and the MCP, the internal dynamics and struggles 
encountered by nationalist politicians in their attempts to politicise the masses was 
assigned marginal significance. Moreover, little consideration was given to the role 
played by political activists outside the African educated elite.6  
Historians writing in the 1970s attempted to redress this imbalance. In 
‘Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation’, Denoon and Kuper implored scholars 
to take a broader approach to African history. Nationalism was not just a political 
phenomenon; the character of independence movements emerging in the 1950s 
was shaped by socio-economic developments at the local, territorial and 
metropolitan levels and, as such, the issue ought to be approached from the 
viewpoint of ‘ordinary’ Africans rather than the vantage point of the politically 
conscious elite.7 Others responded to the challenge tracing African political 
development within economic and social institutions. In Zambia’s case, historians 
such as J. Meynaud, A. Salah-Bey, Thomas Rasmussen and Elena Berger began to 
emphasise the importance of the trade union movement as a breeding for the 
stimulation of national consciousness.8 In the case of Malawi, emphasis was placed 
                                                 
5
 Mulford, Zambia; Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. 
6
 These trends were later apparent in Fagan, B.M. (ed.). A Short History of Zambia from the Earliest 
Times until A.D.1900. (London, 1968), Van Velson, J., ‘Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi’, in 
Stokes, E., Brown, R., (eds.) Studies in Central African History (Manchester, 1966) pp. 376-412, both 
of which emphasised the role of the educated elite in stimulating nationalist politics. 
7
 Denoon, D., Adam Kuper, A., ‘Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' 
in Dar es Salaam’, African Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 277 (Oct., 1970), pp. 329-349. 
8
 The former argued that the roots of mass nationalism lay predominantly in trade union militancy, 
expressed predominantly in the labour strikes of the 1930s. Elena Berger disagreed, suggesting that 
the trade union movement was generally apolitical, Meynaud, J., Salah-Bey, A., Trade Unionism in 
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on the role of religious separatism and missions. Studies such as those by Ian Linden 
and John McCracken, which emphasised the centrality of the Church of Central 
Africa Presbyterian missions at Blantyre and Livingstone in politicising Africans, 
were typical of the ideas circulating at this time.9  
Running concurrent to, and influencing, these trends was the rise of 
anthropological scholarship, carried out under the aegis of the Rhodes-Livingstone 
Institute.10 As the work of Peter Harries-Jones, J.F. Holleman and S. Biesheuvel, and 
notably A.L. Epstein indicates, many scholars observed that socio-economic change 
at the local-level exercised a profound and lasting impact upon African 
development.11 As such, their studies focussed predominantly upon the ways in 
which ‘national’ politics were played out at the local level, providing a unique 
perspective on the role played by local party activists who interpreted, and thus 
shaped, the ‘national’ vision translated to them by the political elites.12 These rich 
insights gleaned from the study of elite mobilisation strategies at grass roots 
demonstrated, above all, that the study of nationalism ‘from below’ was equally as 
                                                                                                                                          
Africa (London, 1967) see also Rasmussen, Thomas. 'The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest'. In 
Tordoff, W., (ed.) Politics in Zambia, (Manchester, 1974), pp. 40-6. Berger, E.L., Labour, Race, and 
Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence (Oxford, 1974). 
9
 McCracken, J., Politics and Christianity in Malawi I875-1940. The impact of the Livingstonia Mission 
in the Northern Province. (Cambridge, 1977). See also McCracken, J., 'Underdevelopment in Malawi: 
the missionary contribution'. African Affairs, 76:303 (1977), 195-209. Linden, I., Catholics, Peasants 
and Chewa Resistance in Nyasaland, 1889-1939 (Berkley, 1974). Some of these concepts were 
initially raised in the publication of the first major collection of works to emerge on Malawi, see 
MacDonald, R.J., (ed) From Nyasaland to Malawi: Studies in Colonial History, (Nairobi, 1975). 
10
 Founded in 1938, the Rhodes Livingstone Institute was the first local anthropological research 
facility in Africa. Designed to allow for easier study of the local cultures of Northern Rhodesia, it 
became the base of operations for a number of leading anthropologists of the time. 
11
 See Harries-Jones, P., Freedom and Labour: Mobilization and Political Control on the Zambian 
Copperbelt (Oxford, 1975), Holleman, J.F., Biesheuval, S., White mine workers in Northern Rhodesia 
1959-1960 (Leiden, 1973), Epstein, A.L., Politics in an African urban community (Manchester, 1958), 
and Hortense Powdermaker’s earlier study, Copper Town: Changing Africa, The Human Situation on 
the Rhodesian Copperbelt (New York, 1962). 
12
 Gewald, J-B., Hinfelaar, M., Macola, G., (eds.) Living the End of Empire, Politics and Society in Late 
Colonial Zambia, (Leiden, 2011), ‘Introduction’, p.5. 
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valuable as the ‘high political’ focus of studies produced hitherto.13 Arguably the 
most influential study to emerge was Andrew Roberts’ History of Zambia. Published 
in 1976, Roberts not only rejected the single-minded emphasis on African 
resistance taken by his contemporaries, but attempted to show that the study of 
‘the nation’ stretched far beyond the period of colonial rule and the boundaries 
imposed by British politicians and administrators that had been advocated in 
previous works focussing solely on the period 1953-64.  
 Significant development in nationalist historiography remained relatively 
static until the early 1990s.14 Whilst taking into consideration the role of the elite, 
academics recognised the need to draw together the ‘high political’ and ‘local’ 
arguments produced in earlier decades. Studies such as Owen Kalinga’s ‘Mass 
Nationalism in Colonial Malawi’ made a compelling case for incorporating the 
studies of anthropologists into the historical narrative in order to better appreciate 
the role played by peasants and the urban working classes in the fight against 
colonialism.15 Kalinga argued that given the ample evidence of increasing anti-
colonial unrest in rural communities and also the different forms of hidden 
struggles in the workplace, there was need to re-examine the relationship between 
Nyasaland’s African political leaders on the one hand and that of the peasants and 
                                                 
13
 The intention here has not been to analyse in great depth the contributions of the Rhodes 
Livingstone Institute to our understanding of Zambia and Malawi’s history. Richard Werbner 
provides a more detailed account in Werbner, R.P., ‘The Manchester School in South-Central Africa’, 
Annual Review of Anthropology, 1984, 13, pp.157-85. 
14
 This is not to suggest, of course, that scholars writing in the 1980s had little to contribute to the 
discussion. See for instance Ranger, T.O., Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe 
(London, 1985), pp.1-17, and Vaughan, M., ‘Famine Analysis and Family Relations: 1949 in 
Nyasaland’, Past and Present, 108 (1985), both of which sought to refocus attention on the 
periphery rather than the metropole.  
15
 Kalinga, O.J.M., ‘Résistance, Politics of Protest, and Mass Nationalism in Colonial Malawi, 1950-
1960. A Reconsideration’, Cahiers d'études africaines. Vol. 36 No., 143, (1996), pp. 443-454. 
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workers whom they claimed to represent on the other.16 That such a revision was 
possible owed much to the liberalisation of the political climate in Malawi and 
Zambia by the end of one-party rule in each country in 1994 and 1991 respectively. 
New witnesses came forward to dispute the authority of the MCP and UNIP whilst 
those once part of the one-party state, who had for many years enforced its 
dominance through suppression of dissenting voices, now became less inclined to 
perpetuate one-party supremacy. 
In the new political climate, the most significant studies to emerge on 
Malawi in this period were produced by John McCracken, whose work played an 
important role in illuminating the local dynamics to the building of Malawian 
nationalism.17 McCracken’s most important contribution was his seminal article 
‘Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The Case of Malawi’.18 
Accounting for the growth of authoritarianism in Malawian nationalism, McCracken 
traced its roots to the nature of nationalist organisation developing during the 
1950s which emphasised Hastings Banda’s indispensability in the national struggle. 
McCracken’s work rejuvenated the study of African nationalism. In an attempt to 
find the hidden voices of the Malawian independence struggle that had been 
suppressed by the Banda-centred narrative that had hitherto dominated the 
                                                 
16
 An example of such a study may be seen, for instance in Charles Ambler’s work on local protest 
and the beerhall boycotts in Northern Rhodesia in the late 1950s. Ambler, C., ‘Alcohol, Racial 
Segregation and Popular Politics in Northern Rhodesia’, The Journal of African History, Vol. 31, No. 2 
(1990), pp. 295-313. 
17
 See for instance, McCracken, J., ‘Blantyre Transformed: Class, Conflict and Nationalism in Urban 
Malawi’, The Journal of African History, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1998), pp. 247-269. McCracken’s exploration 
of the local dynamics of Malawian nationalism were later revised in McCracken, J., ‘Conservation 
and resistance in Colonial Malawi: the ‘Dead North’ Revisited’, in McCracken, J., Lovering, T.J., 
Johnson Chalamanda, F., (eds.) Twentieth Century Malawi: perspectives on history and culture 
(Centre of Commonwealth Studies, University of Stirling, Occasional Paper Number 7, Sept., 2001), 
in which McCracken advocated the importance of the rural north. 
18
 McCracken, J., ‘Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The Case of Malawi’, African 
Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 387 (Apr., 1998), pp. 231-249. 
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historiography, new studies refocused attention on previously marginalised 
individuals. These developments were encapsulated in Joey Power’s Building 
Kwacha, the most comprehensive analysis of Malawian nationalism produced to 
date.19 Tracing the origins of mass nationalist sentiment to the pre-Banda era and 
by re-emphasising the role of former disgraced MCP leaders such as Henry 
Chipembere and Dunduza Chisiza, whose legacy was wiped out by Banda’s regime 
after the 1964 Cabinet Revolt, Joey Power’s work has done much to enrich the 
study of the Malawian independence struggle. Based upon diligent archival and oral 
research, having conducted hundreds of interviews with contemporaries over a ten-
year period, Power helped shed light on the manner in which political violence was 
used to popularise and sustain the MCP’s hold over the African polity. This thesis 
hopes to extend Power’s ideas.   
  It was not until the publication of the edited volumes of One Zambia, Many 
Histories in 2008, closely followed by Giacomo Macola’s Liberal Nationalism in 
Central Africa in 2010 that the historiography of nationalism in Zambia was to 
undergo similar major revision.20 By focussing on the continual presence of UNIP’s 
main rival, Harry Nkumbula’s African National Congress [ANC], in the Zambian 
polity, Macola provided an invaluable corrective to the earlier UNIP-centred 
narrative of political change that tended to belittle counter-hegemonic political and 
ethnic projects in Northern Rhodesia during the independence struggle.21 Macola 
thus helped to illuminate the contradictions and internal struggles inherent in the 
                                                 
19
 Power J., Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha (New York, 2010). 
20
 Gewald, J.B., Hinfelaar, M., Macola, G., (eds.), One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of 
Post-colonial Zambia (Leiden, 2008), Macola, G., Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of 
Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula (Basingstoke, 2010). 
21
 Ibid. 
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Zambian nationalist movement that shaped the trajectory of Zambian politics long 
after independence. His approach cast new light on local, regional, and 
international historiographies which in turn precipitated a major revision of UNIP’s 
rise to national prominence. In a similar manner to recent Malawian scholarship, 
this new literature also explored the role of violence and intimidation as an 
important tactic in the nationalist mobilisation programme. By showing the extent 
to which violence and intimidation was deployed by nationalist leaders against their 
political rivals, UNIP’s nationalism no longer appeared to be the all-conquering, 
dominating, liberating force that historians writing in the immediate post-
independence period seemed to suggest. These ideas found expression in the 
follow-up to One Zambia, Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late 
Colonial Zambia, published in 2011.22 
 These new studies have done much to reignite debate on the independence 
struggle in colonial Zambia and Malawi, but a number of fundamental questions 
still remain unanswered. How, for instance, did nationalist politicians mobilise 
Africans? What methods were deployed to win the hearts and minds of the people 
in the 1950s and 1960s and in what ways, if any, did this alter the trajectory of 
nationalist politics as nationalist parties attempted to respond to constitutional 
developments? Moreover, how did nationalism evolve and why were certain 
parties and individuals able to triumph at the expense of others?  
 
 
                                                 
22
 Gewald, J.B., Hinfelaar, M., Macola, G., (eds.) Living the End of Empire, Politics and Society in Late 
Colonial Zambia, (Leiden, 2011). 
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The Development of Nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
1953-64 
  
The intention of this thesis is to answer some of these fundamental questions in 
order to account for the development of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland and the rise of UNIP and the MCP between 1953 and 1964. Where 
the thesis will make an original contribution to the historiography is by shedding 
light on the examination of tactics used by African political leaders to mobilise the 
African people. Exploring the ways in which the two African National Congress 
parties of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland emerged from relative obscurity to 
become fully fledged political parties by the mid-1950s, the thesis will explain how 
national identity developed, how this ideal was translated to the people and why so 
many Africans freely devoted themselves to it. An intrinsic part of making relevant 
the struggle against Federation was the ability of Congress leaders to make political 
capital from local protests. By capitalising upon unrest caused, for instance, by 
discrimination against Africans in butcheries, where non-whites were forced to buy 
sub-standard meat from hatches at the back of shops, leaders from the Northern 
Rhodesian ANC were able to closely tie together African disaffection at the local 
level with the much wider issue of African rights within Federation. Popular politics 
at this stage were rooted in the locality, participation often being dependent upon 
existing ‘local’ discontent. This interpretation is not of course novel, especially in 
South-East Asian historiography. Writing about the Indian experience, for example, 
historians such as Christopher Baker and D.A. Washbrook, have suggested that 
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national politics were forged in the localities by political leaders who used local 
unrest as a means of building momentum behind their ‘national’ campaign.23  
In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, mobilisation in the localities played an 
essential role in laying the foundations for mass nationalism. But at this juncture 
popular participation was too prone to socio-economic and regional differentiation 
for a genuine movement encompassing all Africans to emerge. The declaration of a 
state of emergency in Nyasaland and the implementation of political restrictions in 
Northern Rhodesia in early 1959 marked somewhat of a turning point in this regard, 
a time in which Africans were brought together in unity against the state. 
Thereafter, leaders of the newly formed MCP and UNIP scaled up their attempts to 
adopt a truly ‘national’ approach to African politicisation something, Africans 
leaders felt, would help facilitate a faster transition to independence. Using various 
propaganda and organisational techniques, party activists worked hard to build a 
national programme which transcended local, socio-economic, and ethnic divisions. 
This process was, however, fraught with complications. In seeking to claim for 
themselves inheritance of the new political dispensation, both UNIP and the MCP 
embarked upon a dangerous trajectory, one which resulted in the entrenchment of 
authoritarianism in the burgeoning Zambian and Malawian polity. The result was 
the vindication of intolerance, not only for open political opposition, but for 
independent expressions of civil society which represented a threat to the fragile 
bindings of the nation-state.  
                                                 
23
 Washbrook, D.A., Baker, C.J., South India: political institutions and political change, 1880-1940 
(London, 1975). For a discussion on the ‘Cambridge School’, see Wilson, J., ‘Agency, Narrative, and 
Resistance’, in Stockwell, S., (ed.) The British Empire, Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, 2008) p.253. 
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The thesis will not only seek to identify why violence emerged, but how it 
was used by nationalist politicians as an important tool for political mobilisation. It 
became a key means for enforcing party loyalty, a way in which people could 
actively contribute to the independence struggle. To intimidate a political rival was 
akin to participating in a ritual, visual, display of party loyalty. Violent tendencies 
became especially prominent once it was clear that the anti-Federation struggle 
had been won in 1962. As Jan Pettman later reflected in 1974, ‘what little national 
unity and mobilisation had been achieved in the struggle declined with the removal 
of the common enemy’.24 The response of UNIP and MCP leaders was to find a new 
common enemy, something they felt would unite the people at a critical moment 
before independence.  
For the MCP, groups or individuals questioning Banda’s dominance in the 
party became the focus of agitation. For UNIP, the continued presence of the ANC 
in the Northern Rhodesian polity resulted in the scaling up of the campaign to 
eradicate the party from the political scene. Party propagandists rallied against ANC 
‘traitors’ and party members were warned to remain vigilant against the ANC 
threat. In the short-term, this policy did much to suppress internal differences and 
maintain party unity. UNIP and the MCP each subsequently made a relatively 
trouble-free transition to parties of government in an independent Zambia and 
Malawi. The long-term effects, however, were to cast a lingering shadow over the 
futures of both nations. In their desperation to secure secession from the 
Federation both the UNIP and the MCP sacrificed long-term African unity. The 
seeds for division were always present in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but 
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after 1959 the popularisation of the party-nation conflation intensified socio-
economic and ethno-regional differences. Those groups ‘opting out’ of UNIP and 
the MCP, or those seeking to interpret party policy in a manner different to that 
envisioned by party leaders, were regarded as a clear and present danger to the 
party and, as such, the future of the nation. By populating this monolithic version of 
nationalism, UNIP and the MCP might have succeeded in achieving their immediate 
objectives, but in so doing they undermined the very basis on which politicians in 
the early 1950s had built the anti-Federation struggle: African unity.  
Where this thesis also hopes to make a modest contribution to the 
historiography is by placing nationalist development within a much broader, 
international context. In so doing, the thesis will show that the development of 
mass nationalism was not a process confined to the borders of Central Africa. The 
process was indeed influenced, moulded, and shaped by external forces keen to 
liberate Africa from colonial rule. The thesis thus hopes to go some way to bridging 
the gap between African, Imperial and international historiographies by shedding 
light on African connections with British and international constituencies during the 
1950s and 1960s. The interaction and exchange of information between these two 
constituencies not only helped mould the independence struggle ‘on the spot’, but 
it also influenced the trajectory of international anti-colonialism. The thesis will 
therefore argue that exploration of African engagement with external agencies is 
central to understanding why international anti-colonialism developed in the early 
1960s and why, for instance, the United States and the United Nations helped to 
accelerate British decolonisation in Central Africa by pressuring the British to 
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resolve the racial dilemma in the Federation in favour of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland’s African people.   
As Miles Larmer suggests, it was by no means inevitable that UNIP, or 
indeed the MCP, would become the parties of government in post-colonial Zambia 
and Malawi.25 UNIP in particular was an uneasy coalition of competing elements, 
vying with the ANC for domestic supremacy. What proved critical for both parties 
was the support given by sympathetic governments and anti-colonial bodies, which 
helped facilitate their rise to the fore of national politics. Between 1953 and 1958, 
the ANC and the NAC depended heavily upon the financial and moral support of 
anti-colonialists in Britain to both improve their domestic prospects and to 
consolidate their position as the representatives of African political opinion in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Drawing parallels with Nicholas Owen’s work on 
British anti-imperialism and Indian nationalism, it will be suggested that the close 
and personal contacts forged between African politicians in the Federation and 
prominent members of the British anti-colonial movement played an essential role 
in raising the profile of the anti-Federation struggle domestically, winning for the 
ANC and NAC status as political parties of consequence with whom the British 
government would have to negotiate.26 These connections became increasingly 
important in 1959, when the campaign fought on behalf of Africans in Britain 
proved to be vitally important in keeping alive anti-Federation sentiment in British 
politics. 
Stephen Howe explored British anti-colonial connections with nationalists in 
Anti-colonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire 1918-1964, 
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 Owen, N., The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1947, (Oxford, 2007). 
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published in 1993.27  Since then, only Owen has attempted to explore the particular 
and ever-changing pattern of relations between metropolitan anti-colonial 
organisations and the colonial people they claimed to represent. Even then, his 
study is concerned predominantly with India and, as such, very little has been said 
of anti-colonial relations with African independence movements. This thesis hopes 
to contribute to this neglected field of historical study by tracing the rise and fall of 
nationalist relations with British anti-colonialists, how the anti-colonial message 
was received in Central Africa and, crucially, why after 1959 Africans began to 
doubt the capacity of their metropolitan allies to act decisively in their interests.   
After this time, African politicians began to broaden their horizons, 
expanding their network of collaborators by virtue of an ambitious campaign to 
bring the Federation’s problems to the fore of the international political agenda. 
For the MCP, the 1959 emergency had yielded tangible benefits. The exposure 
given to Nyasaland’s problems throughout the world had given Hastings Banda a 
critical advantage in pressing his claims for his release from detention, the ending 
of emergency regulations and negotiations over African constitutional 
advancement. For UNIP, the changes that followed Banda’s release in Nyasaland 
left an indelible imprint on the minds of party leaders; if Northern Rhodesia was to 
experience similar change, the African struggle needed to be brought to the 
attention of the international community. By extending the struggle for 
independence beyond the borders of the Federation, particularly in UNIP’s case, 
nationalists won crucial support for their cause. They were not only able to frame 
the anti-Federation struggle in an exclusively UNIP context, thereby giving the party 
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a decisive and distinct advantage over its political rival, but they also helped shape 
the growing international anti-colonial debate.28 Using UNIP’s ‘international 
relations’ files, several British and American ‘official’ sources and the archives of 
British anti-colonial groups with whom nationalists corresponded, such as the 
Movement for Colonial Freedom and the Africa Bureau, the thesis will seek to 
explain the importance of the international context in which the independence 
struggle in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland took place.29 It will be argued that as 
nationalists became more assertive, so they attempted to harness powerful forces 
not always in their control and turn them to their advantage, profoundly influencing 
the thinking of the United Nations, and later the United States, towards the 
Federation. This demonstrated not only great flexibility, but a maturity and 
awareness of circumstances external to the independence struggle that many 
historians have neglected to appreciate. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis draws upon research in innumerable British-based and African sources. 
It makes extensive use of archives pertaining to major British anti-colonial 
organisations, including the Africa Bureau and the Fabian Colonial Bureau, held at 
Rhodes House Library, Oxford, and the records of the Movement for Colonial 
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 As the recent work of Andrew DeRoche, which investigates UNIP’s engagement with the United 
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Freedom and Thomas Fox-Pitt, Director of the Anti-Slavery Society, held at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, London. To supplement these sources, and 
to analyse in greater depth the interaction between anti-colonialists, the Labour 
Party Archive, held at the People’s History Museum, Manchester, has been of great 
use. To further explore the ‘British’ perspective, extensive research on official 
government records pertaining to the Federation has been conducted in the British 
National Archives, Kew. In order to glean a greater understanding of the attitudes 
prevailing in the Conservative government between 1951 and 1964 towards 
Federation, the Conservative Party Archive held at the Bodleian Library, Oxford also 
proved extremely useful.   
Given the predominantly African focus of this thesis, the author has been 
extremely sensitive to potential criticism that might arise from the use of 
predominantly British sources. In an attempt to bridge the gap between ‘Imperial’ 
and ‘Africanist’ approaches, much has been done to engage with, and utilise, a 
wealth of material originating from Malawi and Zambia, both written and oral. 
Extensive use has been made, for instance, of the archives of the United National 
Independence Party, which contain also the records of the African National 
Congress Party of Northern Rhodesia, digital copies of which are held at the British 
Library, London, as part of the Endangered Archives Project initiative. During a trip 
to Malawi and Zambia in the summer of 2011, some research was conducted on the 
swathe of material available to view at the National Archives of Malawi, Zomba. 
Perhaps the most interesting evidence used to form ideas contained within this 
thesis, however, was obtained from interviews conducted with former political 
activists and the children of former political activists in Zomba and Lusaka. The 
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selection of interview candidates was largely conditioned by whether certain 
individuals, or in some cases their close relatives, had experienced or participated in 
the movement to achieve Zambian and Malawian independence in the 1950s and 
1960s. All interviewees were asked the same questions pertaining to their 
contribution to the struggle and scope was permitted, where appropriate, to 
follow-up responses with unscripted queries. Of course, not all evidence gathered 
in interviews necessarily reflected a true representation of events as they 
transpired. Indeed, the accounts given were expressions of personal opinions and, 
as such, needed to be subjected to the same scrutiny as would be applied to 
examination of other primary and secondary sources, and used in conjunction with 
them. A notable feature of interviews conducted with former UNIP members or 
activists, for instance, was the tendency to downplay or dismiss entirely the role 
played by the ANC, the party’s political rival. Whilst these interviews were utilised 
to help inform the author’s views pertaining to the nature of the political climate in 
Northern Rhodesia during the 1950s, they were by no means treated as fact. The 
views and opinions expressed in all interviews were in many respects widely 
divergent; some individuals spoke in redemptive terms about their role as former 
MCP or UNIP members, others nostalgic, but each conversation reflected a deep 
reverence for the achievement of their forebears in winning the independence 
struggle. Above all, they helped broaden the horizons of this author, providing a 
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Chapter Synopsis 
The development of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland can be 
divided into two very distinct phases. The thesis will therefore be divided into two 
parts: part one will examine the period 1953-1958 and part two will focus upon 
1959-1964. The years 1953-1958 were, for the Congresses, formative years, a 
period in which nationalist leaders took the first tentative steps to mobilise on a 
truly ‘national’ scale. Chapter one will examine the context of the anti-Federation 
struggle and establish the importance of the debate leading up to the inauguration 
of the Central African Federation in 1953 as a stimulus to African political activity. 
Emphasis will be placed upon African objections to the scheme, and the manner in 
which these objections were translated to the African masses at grass roots. It will 
also be suggested that the process of African political mobilisation rather ironically 
served to undermine Congress efforts to prevent the imposition of the Federation. 
Lacking a coherent political programme and struggling to coordinate party 
activities, the anti-Federation campaign did little to alter the prevailing assumption 
in British government circles that African protest was not only ill-conceived, but 
predisposed towards radicalism. Given the already problematic strain of settler 
nationalism existent in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the Congress-led anti-
Federation protest strengthened Britain’s resolve that Federation would work to 
the benefit of all Central Africa’s inhabitants, providing opportunities for greater 
political and economic development whilst at the same time directing burgeoning 
African nationalism into moderate channels.  
Extending some of the themes in chapter one, chapter two will examine the 
effects that Britain’s actions exerted upon the African community in 1953. 
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Galvanised by the decision to impose Federation upon Africans, this chapter will 
identify the ways and means by which ANC and NAC leaders attempted to translate 
an essentially ‘high-political’ concept to the largely illiterate African masses. 
Building upon recent theses by Power and Macola, it will be suggested that, by 
seizing upon momentum generated by local grievances, the Congresses played a 
pivotal role in establishing ‘nationalism’ in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
Attempts will be made, in addition, to explain how ‘localised’ nationalist protests 
were able to connect with the centre, and more fundamentally, how such ‘local’ 
grievances were given ‘national’ relevance by nationalist leaders.  
Chapter three will focus upon the ways in which British anti-colonialists 
sought to advance the cause of the Congresses in Britain and in Central Africa. 
Whilst their initial remit was to raise the profile of the anti-Federation struggle in 
Britain, anti-colonialist groups such as the Africa Bureau, the Movement for Colonial 
Freedom and the British Labour Party began to play an important role in the 
organisation of mass nationalist politics in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland too. 
By lending advice on political organisation to Congress leaders, and by operating on 
behalf of Africans in the metropole, anti-colonialists served to legitimise the anti-
Federation struggle. Crucially, although they were generally unable to alter British 
government policy in the Federation, anti-colonial activities were vital in providing 
the link between African nationalists and the West, steering the Congresses away 
from potential ‘extremist’ influences. 
The years 1959-1964 were arguably the most eventful in the history of 
Zambia and Malawi. It was during these years that the anti-Federation struggle 
evolved into a fight for independence, a time in which mass nationalism truly took 
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root in Central Africa. Chapters four and five will seek to explore in great depth the 
evolution of nationalist politics in these years. Chapter four will focus on 
Nyasaland’s transition to independence, chapter five will place emphasis upon 
Northern Rhodesia. Why did UNIP and the MCP emerge and how were nationalist 
leaders able to cultivate among Africans a genuine commitment to the achievement 
of a greater nation having struggled to do so between 1953 and 1958? Emphasis 
will be given to the ways in which nationalists struggled to overcome internal 
difficulties and the profound effects that this exerted upon the national agenda.  
Chapter six will have a dual purpose. Initially, the chapter will focus upon 
the role of British anti-colonialists during 1959, emphasising their centrality to the 
emergence of mass nationalism thereafter. By campaigning upon behalf of former 
Nyasaland and Zambia Congress members, anti-colonialists helped sustain 
momentum behind the nationalist struggle at a critical juncture. The second 
purpose of the chapter will be to account for the profound and lasting impact that 
British anti-colonial activities exerted upon the MCP and UNIP national 
programmes. Whilst anti-colonialists arguably succeeded in creating a wider 
consciousness of the situation materialising in the Federation, they failed to gain for 
Africans significant constitutional concessions. For the MCP, the 1959 emergency 
yielded tangible results. Following the release of Hastings Banda in April 1960, the 
British government appeared to be set on a course that would lead to African 
majority government in Nyasaland. For UNIP, the situation stood in stark contract. 
Ever more desperate for change, UNIP leaders began to look beyond their anti-
colonial allies in Britain, sending UNIP representatives abroad with the hope of 
raising awareness of the African plight in Northern Rhodesia.  
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By virtue of the changing international circumstances, UNIP found a 
receptive audience, particularly in America. This impacted upon the situation in 
several ways. In the first instance, the British government came under increasing 
pressure to resolve the situation in favour of indigenous Africans. Perhaps most 
importantly, however, UNIP’s attempts to expand the party’s network of 
collaborators decisively altered the trajectory of nationalist politics. UNIP became 
the preferred interlocutors of the international community, serving not only to 
legitimise its claims to represent all Africans in Northern Rhodesia, but consolidate 
its hold over the national dispensation then materialising.  
The intention of this thesis is not to fundamentally reorient the ways in 
which the historian understands nationalism. By shedding valuable light on the 
ways in which African nationalism took root in Zambia and Malawi, and by seeking 
to trace nationalist mobilisation strategies and their impact at grass roots level, this 
thesis will establish a basis for further study of the origins of African nationalism. 
Moreover, by extending the study beyond the Federation’s borders, the thesis will 
provide a case for studying nationalist development within a much wider remit. In 
this context, the originality of the thesis will lie, not only in its attempts to bridge 
the African-Imperial historiographical gap, but also in its attempts to connect with 
broader studies on international anti-colonialism, endeavouring to explain the 
development of anti-colonial and nationalist ideals by tracing the links between 
Central Africa’s nationalist leaders and prominent international leaders, 
governments and organisations. This study will begin, however, with an analysis of 
the origins of the Central African Federation, the issue which irrevocably damaged 
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the African relationship with their British colonial ‘protectors’, sowing the seeds 
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1  
The Origins of African Politicisation: 
Britain, Settlers and African Opposition to 






Exploring Africa in 1955, American author John Gunther tried to explain why the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came into existence.1 He identified four 
reasons; that it would ensure the continuation of British influence in southern 
Africa, that it would make for a more prosperous Central Africa economy, that it 
would ameliorate racial tension by accommodating settler and African 
constitutional ambitions, and that it would, if successful, provide a pattern for the 
evolution of racial partnership in other parts of Africa.2 Developments in the 
subsequent historiography closely mirrored Gunther’s initial observations. Early 
studies of the region by scholars such as Colin Leys and Philip Mason, both of whom 
were highly critical of Britain’s policy in Africa in the 1950s, attempted to explain 
the Federation’s origins by focusing exclusively upon the role of white settlers in 
pressurising, first, the post-war Labour Government and then the Conservative 
                                                 
1
 John Gunther was perhaps most famous for his "Inside" series of continental surveys. In order to 
research extensively his subject matter, Gunther travelled throughout the region his book was 
intended to cover, interviewing political, social, and business leaders, conversing with average 
people and reviewing area statistics. He then endeavoured to produce a lengthy overview of what 
he had learned and how he interpreted it. 
2
 Gunther, J., Inside Africa (New York, 1955), p.51 
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Government, which came into office in 1951, into creating a constitutional 
arrangement that appeared to hand settlers sole governmental authority in the 
Rhodesias and Nyasaland.3 In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars instead came to 
emphasise Britain’s fear of the spread of South African racial policies northwards. 
The Federation, Prosser Gifford argued, was effectively an attempt to create a bloc 
of British territory capable of countering the threat posed by South Africa’s National 
Government, elected in 1948 with a strong apartheid programme, whose 
discriminatory racial policies might soon spread beyond the confines of the Union 
raising the potential for conflict between white and black throughout the entire 
Continent.4  
In 1987, Ronald Hyam extended Gifford’s thesis. In what is considered to be 
the first study of significance incorporating British archival material pertaining to 
the period, Hyam suggested that Federation was a ‘geopolitical’ initiative designed 
to win the support of Central Africa’s settlers who, it was felt, were becoming ever 
more inclined to turn towards the Union to support their goals for closer 
association.5 South Africa’s influence thus had to be ‘contained’ by consolidating a 
pro-British power-bloc in Central Africa. Although Federation was to all intents a 
compromise for all interest groups involved, it was nevertheless regarded as 
essential for preservation of continued British influence over the future of an 
important part of the African empire. Developing Hyam’s argument, Philip Murphy 
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 Leys, C., European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford, 1959), p.13, Mason, P., The Birth of a 
Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia (London, 1958), p.23. Objections to white 
supremacy caused numerous scholars to incorporate the ‘forgotten factor’ of African nationalism 
into contemporary accounts. 
4
 Gifford, P., ‘Misconceived Dominion: The Creation and Disintegration of Federation in British 
Central Africa’ in Gifford, P., Roger Louis, W., (eds.), The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 
1940-1960 (London, 1982) pp. 387-416. 
5
 Hyam, R., ‘The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South 
Africa, 1948-1953’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 30, No.1. (Mar., 1987), pp.145-172. 
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argued that growing settler nationalism played a key role in forcing officials in the 
Colonial and Commonwealth offices to take a proactive approach to reconciling 
settlers’ amalgamation goals with Britain’s own objectives for southern Africa. By 
exacerbating the threat posed by increased Afrikaner immigration into Central 
Africa, settlers in favour of amalgamation actively played upon British fears 
concerning the spread of South African apartheid northwards. Faced with the 
prospect of losing control in Central Africa, fast becoming an economic and 
strategic asset in the post-war years, British moves towards Federation gathered 
pace in the early 1950s. It was a constitutional measure that would not only 
moderate perceived anti-British settler nationalism, but might also establish the 
basis for multiracial partnership between settlers and the African majority.6  
In addition to the political advantages, the Federation might also promise 
certain economic and strategic benefits. This was acknowledged by Larry Butler, 
who argued that the creation of a larger Central African state reflected its value to 
Britain as a high dollar-earner at a time in which Britain was enduring persistent 
balance of payments crises. The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was especially 
important, not only providing valuable minerals for post-war reconstruction and 
Korean War rearmament, but by assisting the US in meeting a short fall of copper 
and cobalt during its strategic stockpiling programme also served as a key link in 
Anglo-American relations. Officials hoped that federation would facilitate regional 
planning, overcoming persistent fuel and transport problems and encourage much 
                                                 
6
 Murphy, P., ‘‘Government by Blackmail’: The Origins of the Central African Federation 
Reconsidered’ in Lynn, M., (ed.) The British Empire in the 1950s, Retreat or Revival? (Basingstoke, 
2006) pp. 53-76.  
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needed investment that had hitherto inhibited the expansion of the Copperbelt.7 
Recently, Andrew Cohen has disputed Butler’s claims. It was not the economic 
value of Central Africa to Britain that helped convince the British that federation 
would be beneficial, he argued. Rather, it was connections forged between 
influential businessmen with interests on the Copperbelt, such as Harold 
Hochschild, and leading settler politicians, who formed a powerful lobby in Central 
Africa in favour of closer association, which subsequently came to place increasing 
pressure upon the British to resolve the situation decisively in settlers’ favour.8 
A consistent theme running throughout the historiography to date, then, is 
the contention that federation was a British response to concerns over burgeoning 
settler nationalism, a force which posed a clear and present danger to continued 
British control in Central Africa. What remained fairly marginalised in the 
historiography was the role played by African nationalism. This chapter will not 
argue for a major reappraisal of the factors leading to the creation of the 
Federation in 1953; it will, however, argue that burgeoning African nationalism, or 
more specifically British concerns over the trajectory of African political 
development, ought to occupy a more central role within the current debate. By 
exploring African opposition to closer association, and by examining the ways in 
which African politicians in the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress 
[ANC] and the Nyasaland African Congress [NAC] attempted to mobilise vast 
numbers of Africans against the controversial proposals, it will be suggested that 
the British government saw in federation an attempt to moderate what was 
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 Butler, L., Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, C. 1930-64 (London, 
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 Cohen, A., ‘Business and Decolonisation in Central Africa Reconsidered’, The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 36:4 (2008) pp. 641-658. 
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regarded as a potentially dangerous strain of African nationalism. If left unchecked, 
it was feared, Africans might soon become embroiled in a racial conflict with 
Central Africa’s ever more militant settler politicians. Federation, it was believed, 
offered a means to channel African and settler nationalism into lines more 
acceptable to British expectations, consolidating British influence in the region 
providing socio-economic and political advancement for Africans that would 
facilitate greater cooperation between white and black in Central Africa. African 
political development was not, therefore, an issue which precipitated discussions 
over closer association. When African opposition over such proposals rose to the 
fore, however, it confirmed the view that steps needed to be taken in order to 
preserve stability within the region. 
As will be shown, British appraisals of the situation were gravely misplaced. 
In an ironic twist the Federation, once implemented, merely served to fuel existing 
African grievances, bringing together Africans from widely differing socio-economic 
backgrounds for the first time against the colonial state. In laying foundations for a 
measure which appeared at face value to consign Africans to years of subjection to 
the rule of the settler minority, the seeds were sown from which mass African 
nationalism was later to germinate. 
 
The Historical Context: The Origins of the Central African Federation 
The concept of creating an enlarged Central African state dated back to 1915 when 
the British South Africa Company, then administering Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia under Royal Charter, proposed an amalgamation of the territories in 
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order to promote greater economic coordination.9 In 1922, the company entered 
negotiations with the government of the Union of South Africa, which was keen to 
incorporate Southern Rhodesia—a plan foiled by the colony's settlers, who voted in 
favour of self-government. In 1923, the British government chose not to renew the 
Company's charter, and instead accorded 'self-governing' colony status to Southern 
Rhodesia, under the remit of the Commonwealth Relations Office, and protectorate 
status to Northern Rhodesia, which became the responsibility of the Colonial Office. 
It was not until 1930, when Lord Passfield, the Labour Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, reiterated the doctrine of paramountcy of native interests first articulated 
in the ‘Devonshire Declaration’ of 1923 that Rhodesian settlers again began to 
articulate their aspirations for closer association. Settler anxiety to gain full control 
over all aspects of government stemmed predominantly from the perpetual 
insecurity that the British might one day be convinced of the need to hand the 
African majority self-government. Settler objectives were framed in January 1936 at 
the first Victoria Falls conference in which it was stated that early amalgamation 
was ‘in the best interests of all the inhabitants of both colonies’.10 Pressure from 
settlers forced the British government into action. In 1937, the Bledisloe 
Commission was appointed to explore the options for closer association between 
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The report of the Commission, which appeared in 
March 1939, recognised the desirability of closer cooperation between the Central 
African territories, yet ruled against immediate amalgamation owing to the 
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difference in stages of constitutional development between Southern Rhodesia and 
the northern territories.11  
The fundamental obstacle to closer association remained the different 
approach towards native policy in the Rhodesias. Since Southern Rhodesia was self-
governing, the territory’s white settler government had been given a free hand in 
managing native affairs. In contrast, Northern Rhodesia’s protectorate status 
ensured that London continued to look after the welfare of Africans. By the early 
1950s, there emerged somewhat of a discrepancy between the two, with one 
contemporary observer noting that Southern Rhodesia’s attitude to its African 
majority increasingly resembled a diluted version of South Africa’s apartheid 
policy.12 This was a strong opinion, but it nevertheless highlights the obvious 
differences in the ways in which African rights and, more pertinently, African 
advancement in the Rhodesias was perceived. In attempting to overcome this 
barrier the Labour Party’s Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones privately advised 
the leader of the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials in 1947, Roy Welensky, that ‘no 
government’ would agree to amalgamation and ‘place the control of several million 
black people in the hands of a few hundred thousand whites’.13 Concluding that 
‘nothing could be gained by pressing for amalgamation’, Welensky turned his 
attention to some form of federation ‘which would secure all the advantages of a 
larger economic unit, but which would not prejudice the advancement of the 
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African population of Northern Rhodesia’.14 The sign that settler leaders were 
prepared to embrace a more realistic model of closer association altered the 
perception of key officials in Britain. The hugely influential Assistant Under-
Secretary for African Affairs at the Colonial Office, Andrew Cohen, fastened upon 
this as a ‘very important development’, and wondered whether Britain ought not to 
‘attempt a step forward towards federation in the near future’.15  
The deadlock remained until 1951, when Labour’s new Commonwealth 
Relations Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker embarked on a fact-finding mission in 
Central Africa. Upon his return in March 1952, he produced a hugely influential 
memorandum in which he confirmed suspicions that European settlers were likely 
to grow ever closer to South Africa if Britain failed to meet their demands.16 In 
response, G.H. Baxter of the Commonwealth Office produced an outline of federal 
proposals with a view to overcoming lingering concerns pertaining to the 
dominance of European power and African political development.17 The ‘Baxter 
Report’, which contained proposals for an African Affairs Board to act as a check on 
legislation, and a Minister for African Interests to check executive action, formed 
the basis of a joint memorandum produced by the new Conservative Colonial 
Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, and the new Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Ismay, 
which established the precedent for federation soon after the Conservative Party’s 
General Election victory in October 1951.18 Although federation fell short of the 
                                                 
14
 N[ational] A[rchives] of the United Kingdom, Kew, C[olonial] O[ffice] 537/3608, no.4, Record of a 
meeting with Northern Rhodesian Representatives, 30 July 1948. 
15
 NA, CO 537/7203, no.7, ‘Notes on Central African closer association proposals’: memorandum by 
AB Cohen, 18 April 1951, in which Cohen echoed his earlier stance. 
16
 NA, CAB[inet] Office 129/45/ CP(51)109, memo by Gordon Walker, 16 April 1951. 
17
 Murphy, ‘Central Africa: Part I: Closer Association 1945-1958’, p.xlv.  
18
 NA, CAB 129/48 C(51)11, joint Cabinet memorandum by Lord Ismay and Lyttelton, 9 November 
1951. 
Page | 46  
 
settler desire for amalgamation between the Rhodesias, it was seen by British 
officials as a useful compromise. It not only partially fulfilled settler demands, 
staving off further pressure for closer association, but it also held the potential for 
creating a genuine multiracial state in an important strategic location by providing 
Africans with opportunities for advancement under the supervision of the Colonial 
and Commonwealth Offices. It was thus imperative that white settler opinion, 
particularly in Southern Rhodesia, was mobilised behind the scheme. Objections 
voiced against the scheme by the African community was to be expected, remarked 
Edgar Parry of the Colonial Office, but given the likelihood that African would refuse 
to countenance any constitutional measure tying together the Rhodesias anyway it 
ought not to pose an ‘insuperable problem’ to Britain’s aims.19  
After protracted discussions with settler politicians including Welensky and 
Huggins, officials in the Colonial Office, responsible for Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, and the Commonwealth Relations Office, responsible for the 
government of Southern Rhodesia, drew up a draft federal scheme at the Lancaster 
House Conference in April 1952. Under these proposals, legislative powers were 
divided between the federal and territorial governments. Those services that 
covered the day-to-day life of the Africans remained under the control of the 
Colonial governments in each territory while the Federal Government was given a 
very wide range of powers, the most important of which were external affairs, 
defence, European education and welfare services.20 The final constitutional 
conference, held in London at Carlton House, reflected Britain’s desire to secure 
Southern Rhodesian acceptance of the constitution. Among other matters, the role 
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of the African Affairs Board was substantially weakened, becoming a select 
committee of the African parliamentary representatives composed of federal MPs 
with limited powers to defer issues it considered disadvantageous to Africans to the 
British government rather than fully independent members with the power to veto 
discriminatory legislation.21 Given the initial concern raised over the difference in 
approach towards native policy in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, it was 
somewhat surprising that strikingly little attention was paid to mounting African 
opposition to the federal proposals. On 9 April the scheme survived the referendum 
in Southern Rhodesia, passing by 25,570 for and 14,729 against; this proved 
decisive for the British government, who believed that federation was widely 
supported.22 Voting on the second reading of the federation bill in Britain in May 
1953 passed by a margin of just 26 votes, 247 for and 221 against.23 The Central 
African Federation came into existence on 1 August 1953 heralded by a chorus of 
African opposition.  
 
The Origins of African Political Consciousness, 1945-50 
For those few Africans able to make sense of the implications of the scheme, the 
federation was regarded as a constitutional measure which preserved white settler 
supremacy at the expense of African socio-economic and constitutional advance.24 
Most disconcerting was the very real possibility that Southern Rhodesia’s 
discriminatory native policy would spread northwards once the Protectorate status 
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of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was removed. This would have a hugely 
detrimental impact upon Africans’ future development. In the countryside, noted 
Nophas Kwenje, President of the Salisbury branch of the Nyasaland African 
Congress [NAC], the spread of Southern Rhodesia’s Land Apportionment Act, which 
reclaimed land for white settlers, would cause ‘widespread displacement of 
Africans from their homes and livelihoods’.25 In towns, claimed the President of the 
Northern Rhodesian African National Congress [NRAC], Harry Nkumbula, increased 
European immigration would result in the extension of the industrial colour-bar, a 
move that would further preclude African advancement in the labour sphere. The 
effects of federation would be felt by Africans everywhere, he lamented, with ‘little 
hope’ that the African predicament would improve.26  
African responses to what was widely perceived as an attack on their rights 
took the form of a concerted campaign to convince the British government to 
refrain from imposing the federation upon Africans. The campaign waged in the 
1950s was rooted in attempts to secure African political representation in 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia after 1945. Through welfare societies and native 
associations, African intellectuals sought in every conceivable way to better their 
position using constitutional means. These early political organisations operated 
like pressure groups on behalf of their members, petitioning the government to act 
upon an impressive range of regional and national issues.27 At this time, however, 
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many administrators looked upon the associations with a great deal of scepticism. 
As Harold Kittermaster, the Governor of Nyasaland remarked in 1939, the various 
native associations represented somewhat of a nuisance. Comprising a small 
minority of the educated elite, they were far from being representative of African 
opinion in general and far less valuable than the cohort of tribal leaders upon 
whom his government relied to deal with native matters. He personally preferred, 
‘to pour cold water on the associations rather than try to regulate or suppress 
them’.28 
 The Northern Rhodesian administration took a slightly different approach, 
providing a vent for Africans frustrations by establishing Urban Advisory Councils in 
heavily populated urban regions. Despite government attempts to ameliorate 
African concerns, the Councils were seen to lack credibility.29 They were regarded, 
L.H. Gann claims, as the prerogative of the elite, failing to attain any meaningful 
support among Africans at grass roots.30 In Luanshya, for example, Council meetings 
throughout 1952 were never attended by more than two-thirds of the councillors, 
and more usually by only four or five out of a membership of 17; candidates were 
being returned unopposed and in 1954 only 259 from a possible 10,000 Africans 
registered a vote.31 The Councils were exactly what the colonial administration 
hoped, Rotberg suggests, a political safety valve with ‘an absence of real 
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representation’.32 These early engagements with authority nonetheless 
represented a crucial phase in the history of Central African nationalism during 
which the indigenous leadership, like its counterpart in West Africa, recognised the 
futility of a strictly constitutional, and basically elitist, approach to African politics.  
Spurred on by the growing agitation among settlers for amalgamation, 
educated Africans responded by calling for closer cooperation between native 
societies under the premise that government would respect the voice of a national 
African movement more readily than it would listen to the complaints of the old, 
fragmented associations. In Nyasaland in 1943, the Nyasaland Educated African 
Council was created. Unlike the native associations, the Council dealt with matters 
affecting the Protectorate generally and intended to hold regular meetings at which 
all districts would be represented. Surprisingly, the Nyasaland government was 
satisfied with the new organisation, but proposed that it be called the Nyasaland 
African Association on the premise that the term ‘Council’ conflicted with the 
business of chiefs and was likely to cause confusion. With official toleration 
providing a favourable milieu, the Association changed its name to that of the 
Nyasaland African Congress in May 1944.33 Reorganisation of political 
representation did not, however, yield significant progress for the new party. 
In Northern Rhodesia, concerted signs that Africans were beginning to 
organise politically came in May 1946 when the Federation of African Welfare 
Societies of Northern Rhodesia [FAWSNR], which sought to bring the various 
welfare and native societies into one association, was formed under the leadership 
of Dauti Yamba. The formation of the FAWSNR was for Yamba, and indeed others 
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who identified themselves in terms of territorial rather than ethnic terms, the first 
step in developing a national political consciousness. In a letter sent to the governor 
shortly after its formation, the Federation informed him that it was aiming at 
‘developing independently of the African Provincial Councils...to break the tribal 
barriers by endeavouring to foster the spirit of unity among the Africans so that no 
tribe shall be inferior in the eyes of the Federation’.34 In July 1948, at only the 
second general conference of the FAWSNR, the delegates unanimously decided to 
transform the society into a political party and named it the Northern Rhodesian 
African Congress [NRAC]. Mbikusita was elected President with Yamba Vice-
President. As in Nyasaland, the authorities looked ominously upon these 
developments. In early 1947, the Secretary for Native Affairs warned in a 
confidential circular to Provincial Commissioners that Africans were ‘entering a 
difficult phase of race consciousness’ and that ‘every opportunity must be taken to 
retain its confidence and guide it into safe channels’.35  
The immediate post-war years represented an important transition stage in 
the development of African politics. During this time, Africans not only gained 
valuable political experience by engaging in some form of dialogue with the colonial 
state, but they also began to appreciate that satisfying African political ambitions 
would in future rest upon the extent to which political elites could involve 
‘uneducated’ Africans in political affairs. For the Congress parties of Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the amalgamation issue provided the incentive to extend 
the struggle for Africans rights to the masses. The years 1945 to 1953 were to prove 
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critical in this regard; a time in which the Congresses sought to capitalise upon ill-
feeling ;stirred by the debate over Africans’ future. African nationalism, still in its 
infancy, was suddenly thrust into a period of painful adolescence.  
 
Translating the Anti-Federation Message: African Mobilisation and the 
Congress Anti-Federation Campaign, 1950-53  
 
African opposition to closer association between the Rhodesias was born of long 
experience with the white man and limited knowledge of his institutions. Within 
this context the safeguards offered in the compromise scheme for Federation 
proposed by the British—including preservation of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland’s ‘protectorate status’ and the provision that responsibility for matters 
directly affecting Africans affairs would be safeguarded by the African Affairs 
Board—were entirely meaningless. Federation equated to permanent subjection to 
white settlers in Central Africa, the scheme itself a crude attempt by Central Africa’s 
white minorities to obtain absolute authority over the direction of native policy.36 
As Harry Nkumbula told his followers at a meeting of the Southern Province’s 
African Provincial Council soon after his accession to the Northern Rhodesian 
Congress Presidency in July 1951,  
If we have this Federation, tomorrow we shall have a Dominion in Central 
Africa ... We are quite aware of what happens to the safeguard which the 
British Government give to the Colonial people, they are never honoured, 
they have been violated. If you go into the pages of Colonial history, even 
without Dominion status, the safeguards and guarantees that we are given 
by His Majesty’s Government go by the board because of pressure coming 
from settlers ... In view of this I will repeat myself and say on behalf of the 
people I represent we totally reject Federation.37  
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Similar arguments were expressed by the Nyasaland African Congress. In a 
pamphlet entitled, ‘Why We Oppose Federation: Our Aims and Objectives’, the 
NAC’s Executive Council argued:  
We oppose federation not only because of the oppressive racialistic [sic.] 
policy of Southern Rhodesia, where a white settler minority has arrogated 
to itself all political power, and seeks, through federation, to extend this 
obnoxious policy to Nyasaland. The goal of the European settlers is the 
establishment of a Central African Dominion, like SA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, in which they will have an imperium [sic.] over the African 
people, doing with them as they please, and denying them equal political 
and economic rights which they are entitled.38 
 
Years of looking southwards to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had made even 
the most unsophisticated African too wise to accept their alleged protector’s 
assurances at face value. The solution to the problem, Congress leaders advocated, 
was for Africans to work towards achieving for themselves self-government, free 
from discriminatory controls, to be provided with an opportunity to develop 
without hindrance. ‘We have been much humiliated by our partners’, Nkumbula 
remarked. ‘We are a race and like any other race on earth we love to rule ourselves. 
We must have our own Parliament’.39  
The principal problem facing Congress leaders at this stage was that only a 
small cohort of politically educated Africans displayed an awareness of the 
proposals and their implications. The objective of NRAC and NAC agitators, 
therefore, was to expand and scale-up the anti-federation campaign, making 
relevant the arguments against the scheme at grass roots in order to prevent the 
British from imposing the federation on the African majority. The first stage in this 
process was to transform the Congresses into genuine political parties. In 1951, for 
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example, Nkumbula embarked upon an extensive organisational drive, touring 
Northern Rhodesia’s provinces emphasising to local Congress organisers the need 
to maintain registers of paid-up members and donations. Early in 1952, Nkumbula 
established the first permanent party headquarters in Chilenje, Lusaka, redoubling 
efforts to streamline the Congress’ financial running by publishing an official 
schedule of membership and yearly subscription fees.40 By May of that year, 
Nkumbula claimed a total membership amounting to some 20,000 people in 75 
branches. As Giacomo Macola suggests, such estimates may have been overly 
optimistic, but the rise in the number of Congress subscribers helped facilitate the 
employment of a number of salaried provincial organising secretaries who 
immediately began the process of enlisting and registering new members.41 The 
new approach became apparent in June 1952 when the adjective ‘national’ was 
added to the name of the party. This was a clear statement of intent; the African 
National Congress of Northern Rhodesia [ANC] was intending to be a ‘national’ 
party, one which would represent all Africans within the territory.42 
One of the key tactics used by Congress leaders to win support for their 
campaign between 1950 and 1953 was to exacerbate African fears pertaining to 
settler domination. For both parties, the matter of land alienation featured 
prominently. The fear of land loss was felt throughout Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, and, as such, it became an important means by which the Congresses 
could make relevant to Africans at grass roots the complex objections to 
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federation.43 Land possessed divine significance for Africans in Central Africa; it was 
an inherent part of their heritage and tradition. It tied Africans to their ancestors 
and their kin, and played an important function in power relations between chiefs 
and their people.44 Land was life; losing it was a potent symbol for annihilation. 
When Nkumbula therefore asked rhetorically whether Welensky would remove 
Africans from their land once federation had been established, he was doing so 
because the matter struck at the very heart of Africans’ belief systems.45 By 1951, 
several provincial officials noted with concern the extent to which the ANC had 
been successful in linking together the issue of land alienation with federation. As 
J.E. Passmore, District Commissioner in Southern Province, noted in his 1951 annual 
review, 
The general attitude of Africans is one of intense suspicion that the 
Europeans are plotting to take away their land. Every political move or 
development proposal is viewed in this light. The political minded have 
easily been able to take advantage of and increase this feeling to whip up 
opposition to Amalgamation and Federation ... Mr Harry Nkumbula has 
found the fear of loss of land ready-made for him to work on; he has done 
so very successfully.46 
  
American anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker, conducting research in the 
Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia during the early 1950s, lent credence to 
Passmore’s observations. The land loss issue was by 1953 ingrained within African 
society, she said. It was ‘dragged into almost every interview and conversation, 
regardless of context or relevancy’ and most Africans, ‘with or without education, 
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young and old’, had ‘a compulsive need to talk about [federation] and the related 
fear of losing their land’.47  
NRAC and NAC attempts to play upon fears pertaining to the extinction of 
their land rights and culture created an atmosphere in which uncertainty and 
suspicion thrived. This came to be reflected in the growth of several rumours, 
conceived and populated by Congress activists, which underpinned African 
understanding of federation and all that it entailed. Early in 1952, for instance, a 
rumour circulated in Northern Rhodesia that the British and Northern Rhodesian 
authorities were attempting to sell poisoned sugar to Africans. Peter Fraenkel, a 
broadcaster working for the Northern Rhodesian Broadcasting Service, described in 
his memoirs the moment at which he interrupted two African employees using a 
duplicating machine to make copies of a ‘Private Circular’ warning Africans that the 
‘House of Laws’ in London had decided to put poisoned sugar on sale to Africans 
that would cause children to be born dead and men to become impotent.48  On the 
Copperbelt, the sale of sugar dropped suddenly. From sugar, the rumour turned to 
tinned ‘human’ meat, which was being sold to Africans to break their opposition to 
federation.49 Rumours soon spread to Nyasaland and parts of Southern Rhodesia, 
coinciding with the re-emergence of the banyama (vampire-men) myth which 
posited that African members of the pro-federation, white-led Capricorn Africa 
Society, founded in 1949 to campaign for closer association, were kidnapping 
Africans and selling them to Europeans. The rumour was so strong in Lusaka, M.C. 
Musambachime noted, that children were kept away from school and people 
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became afraid to walk the streets at night.50 Keen to exploit political capital 
generated by the rumours, the ANC made several attempts to legitimise African 
suspicions. In December 1952, Congress passed a resolution accusing the 
government of complicity in the attacks on innocent Africans for ‘failing to deal with 
the Vampire men threatening the peace and order of the country’.51 To all intents 
and purposes, Congress leaders were trying to give added credence to the banyama 
rumour. 
African politicians did not create the rumours circulating in the early 1950s, 
but they were an important part of the ANC’s early mobilisation campaign. The 
banyama myth, for instance, had a long history stretching back to the 1930s when 
stories linking the enforcement of state-imposed agricultural practices with men 
who would systematically kidnap and kill Africans, draining their blood, spread into 
Central Africa from Tanganyika.52 Rumours were, nonetheless, an important means 
by which federation could be linked inextricably with European socio-economic and 
political domination, a means by which the anti-federation message could be 
translated into a ‘usable lexicon of protest’.53 The fact that they spread so rapidly 
throughout Central Africa at this time, Luise White suggests, reflected the deep 
concerns of the people hearing the story. The African masses expressed themselves 
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in ways which unduly emphasised the supernatural, but their fears were genuine.54 
Although many might not have been able to comprehend fully the complexities of 
the federation debate, the popularisation of rumours at least indicated that many 
were aware of the negative impact that federation was likely to have upon their 
future.  
In July 1952, R.S. Hudson of the Colonial Office ominously reported after a 
tour of Central Africa that the Congresses were having ‘all the running now’, adding 
to their prestige as a result of their campaigning efforts.55 In a particularly 
enlightening report from the Mzimba District, the Nyasaland Special Branch, the 
intelligence wing of the British South Africa Police responsible for matters of 
national security, noted that everywhere the NAC had begun to turn African 
opinion decisively against federation. When the preliminary White Paper detailing 
federal proposals was published, Africans ‘had been willing to discuss the paper 
with every sign of interest’. When Congress arranged a meeting to counter a 
Provincial Council conference to discuss the paper, however, the mood of Africans 
changed to ‘one of obstinate refusal to discuss anything connected with it at any 
level’.56 In a report to Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton, Governor of Nyasaland 
Geoffrey Colby agreed that African opposition was ‘hardening as realisation of what 
is at stake spreads to the non-vocal masses’.57  
Congress efforts were undoubtedly strengthened by the failure of the 
territorial governments to effectively publicise the federal scheme. ‘It does not help 
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that Africans are not receiving a lead from the Government’, wrote Bishop Oswald 
Thorne of Nyasaland in a statement on the federation. Africans consequently 
became ‘very suspicious’ because they felt the ‘government itself was not strongly 
in favour of the proposals’.58 In the struggle for African public opinion, official pro-
federal propaganda was generally ineffective, falling short of conveying a simple 
and convincing message outlining how federation would work to Africans’ benefit. 
The level of disagreement at local government level served only to further 
undermine efforts to win indigenous support. Many District Commissioners, 
reported E.C. Greenall, then serving as a DC in Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia, held 
little regard for the scheme and as such were less inclined to publicly proclaim its 
virtues to African citizens.59  
 
African Opposition to the Central African Federation  
Popular mobilisation against federation was an important means by which the 
Congresses hoped to convince the British that disapproval of the scheme was 
universally shared and, subsequently, that the Colonial Office ought to reconsider 
the logic of imposing it upon its African citizens. Official Congress opposition to the 
federation assumed several different forms, all of which involved drawing 
maximum public attention to African objections. Numerous statements and 
petitions each highlighting the main points on which the scheme was deemed 
unfair to African interests were made to the British government and the British 
                                                 
58
 RH, AB 243/1, Bishop of Nyasaland, Statement on Federation, Jan., 1953. 
59
 Coe, D.G., Greenall, E.C., Kaunda’s Gaoler: Memories of District Officer in Northern Rhodesia and 
Zambia (London, 2003). Greenall remarked, ‘It was a fact that in private discussions most of us 
believed that the constitution was unsatisfactory because it was so manifestly unfair’, p.57. 
Page | 60  
 
press.60 In a display of open defiance, African leaders publicly boycotted the 
Lancaster House conference convened in April 1952 to discuss federation. Instead, 
the NAC and NRAC used funds of over £7,000 collected from among their 
supporters to send a delegation to Britain to ‘educate the British public in Central 
African Affairs’.61 ‘We have been entrusted by our people’, read the NRAC’s press 
statement, ‘with the task of explaining to the British people what are the hopes and 
fears which we in Central African have today and why we felt it necessary to come 
here in order to appeal that the British Government reconsider its decision to 
establish Federation in Central Africa’.62 
The advance of Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention Peoples Party [CPP] in the 
Gold Coast, following the territory’s March 1952 elections which gave the CPP a 
majority in the Legislative Assembly, provided added impetus to the NRAC and NAC 
anti-federation campaign. By ignoring African objections, they separately argued, 
Britain was failing in its responsibilities to secure the interests of its African citizens. 
If the Gold Coast could achieve self-government, asked Godwin Lewanika, the first 
president-general of the NRAC, why were Africans in Central Africa not entitled to 
demand the same?63 Following the publication of the Draft Federal Scheme in April, 
the Congresses intensified their efforts.64 In Northern Rhodesia, the NRAC began 
drafting alternative plans for constitutional development, the first stage of which 
was the implementation of parity of representation in the Legislative Council 
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between African and European representatives. In a Presidential address delivered 
in Lusaka, Nkumbula was unequivocal in his stance that Africans would not back 
down from their demands. ‘The best government for the black people is a 
government fully manned and run by the black people of Africa’, he commented. ‘I 
do not accept white man’s Governments. They to me are foreign and foreign they 
will remain’.65 During the last stages of debate in British Parliament, the ANC’s anti-
federation campaign culminated in Nkumbula’s symbolic burning of the final 
Federal Scheme for Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland before a 
Lusaka audience of 800 Africans and six prominent chiefs, threatening widespread 
unrest if Britain continued to ignore African grievances.66 The introduction of the 
Federation, Nkumbula warned, would cause great ‘unrest’ in Central Africa since 
there was ‘no force in the world’ which could destroy the love and aspirations for 
freedom and independence among Africans.67 
The reaction in Britain was equally strong in Nyasaland. In April, 3,000 
Africans crammed into the market square in Blantyre to attend an emergency 
conference of the Nyasaland Congress. They listened to the chiefs who had visited 
Britain, to a summary of a letter from Dr Hastings Banda, future leader of the NAC 
then working in London as a medical doctor, and to a speech given by the Reverend 
Michael Scott, the director of the African Bureau, before resolving to meet the 
imposition of federation by ‘the strongest non-violent resistance’.68 Chief Mwase 
refused to attend the Queen’s coronation whilst Chief Gomani obstinately ordered 
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his people to disregard all agricultural, forestry and veterinary laws and suggested 
that they refuse to pay taxes.69 In spite of pleas from NAC leaders to adhere closely 
to a campaign of non-violent resistance, reports of intimidation of Africans voicing 
their support for federation became ever more frequent. In August 1952, Chief 
Kabalata reported to The Livingstone Mail that he now needed close police 
supervision to ‘ensure that the more hot-headed do not interfere with him’ after 
having spoken in favour of federation.70 Similar to the Northern Rhodesian ANC, the 
NAC besieged the Nyasaland and British governments with pleas and petitions. An 
indication of the far-reaching and ambitious campaign was seen in the petition sent 
to the United Nations questioning the legality of imposing Federation and asking 
whether the scheme was compatible with the UN Charter, Article 73.71 
In their efforts to prevent federation, Congress were ably supported by a 
number of liberally oriented groups in Britain and, later, the British Labour Party. 
One of the first organisations to leap to the defence of the Congresses was the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau [FCB]. Founded in 1940 as a special department of the 
Fabian Society in order to facilitate research, information gathering and the 
development of constructive ideas on colonial policy, the FCB worked closely with 
the Labour Party in Parliament, establishing a panel of members for the purpose of 
asking informed Questions and supplying them with information and inviting MPs 
to sit on various study groups and sub-committees.72 The FCB provided a lead for 
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the British left in regards to colonial issues. In 1952, for example, Reverend Guthrie 
Michael Scott and several of his friends founded the Africa Bureau, an organisation 
dedicated to advise and support Africans who wished to oppose by constitutional 
means political decisions affecting their lives and futures imposed by alien 
governments. Drawing a bulk of their membership from the Labour Party, the initial 
architects of federation, the FCB and the Africa Bureau did not oppose the scheme 
altogether. Their principal objections centred upon the refusal of the government 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of African concerns. ‘Make no mistake’, wrote 
Michael Scott, who served as the Africa Bureau’s Director, ‘Britain should not 
proceed on the false assumption that the opposition to Federation can safely be 
ignored as something quite unsubstantial and ineffectual’.73 Arthur Creech Jones, 
Labour’s former Colonial Secretary and founding member of the FCB, agreed. 
‘African opinion’, he stated, ‘is exceptionally well nourished and informed. It is not 
as blind and ignorant as these politicians think’.74 What was needed, wrote the FCB 
in May 1952, was a reappraisal of the federation’s raison d’être. ‘What does 
‘partnership’ mean ... Does it mean ‘partnership’ between separate racial 
communities, whatever their size and state of development? Does it mean ‘equal’ 
‘partnership’, or ‘senior and junior’ ‘partnership’?75 Parliament soon became one of 
the key arenas for debate over the federation. In March 1952, for instance, the 
Labour Party passed a resolution condemning the ‘idea of Federation’ unless the 
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native populations gave their ‘full assent’.76 Innumerable petitions and letters were 
sent to government officials and prominent domestic newspapers, arguing in favour 
of greater consultation with African opinion.  
The impact of anti-colonial activities upon the Conservative government’s 
Central African policy is somewhat difficult to measure. Whilst the campaign almost 
certainly helped enhance public awareness of the government’s actions, they were 
generally unable to exercise significant influence over the course of events in 
Central Africa. Part of the reason lay in the fact that ‘federation’ had been a Labour 
initiative. The Party, and indeed its supporters, thus found themselves unable, and 
perhaps unwilling, to turn its back on a scheme for which it had been responsible 
for setting in motion.  
Anti-colonialists did, however, enjoy much greater success in influencing the 
African campaign. This owed much, in part, to the close and personal connections 
that developed between leading left-wing British political figures and Congress 
leaders. During his time studying at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science in the late 1940s, Harry Nkumbula was brought into contact with 
individuals such as Rita Hinden, secretary of the FCB, Harold Laski, then chairman of 
the Labour Party, and Fenner Brockway, later to become leader of the influential 
Movement for Colonial Freedom [MCF], all of whom later provided support to 
Nkumbula and the ANC in the fight against Federation.77 Anti-colonialists 
corresponded regularly with both the ANC and NAC, providing both parties with 
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small donations that helped them to function in their formative years and offering 
to print and distribute Congress literature. It was advice given to the politically-
inexperienced Congresses about the ways in which their campaign might impact 
more favourably on the British government which proved especially valuable, 
however. It was perhaps no coincidence that the Congress campaign in Britain 
closely resembled tentative suggestions made by Michael Scott to the NAC. 
Although Africans had chosen to boycott the Lancaster House conference, it was 
vital, he told A.J.M Banda, Secretary of the NAC, that the Congress should make 
every effort to send able delegates to Britain to put forward their case against 
federation.  
The record will, I think, show how misinformed opinion is in England. It is this fact 
which moves me to write to you in the hope that ... you should have trustworthy 
representatives here who can explain your views to the press and public in Britain 
and make sure that when the matter is again debated in Parliament Members will 




Thomas Fox-Pitt meanwhile, a former Provincial Commissioner in Northern 
Rhodesia and future Director of the Anti-Slavery Society, a post he took up in 1953, 
was proactive in securing the aid of experienced former Colonial Office officials, 
including Creech Jones, in assisting ANC delegates to draft their case against 
federation during their visit to London.79 These early exchanges were more perhaps 
important for what they represented rather than for their achievements. They not 
only provided the Congresses with an insight into the decision making process in 
London, bringing political leaders into contact with senior Colonial Office officials 
for the first time, but they also helped stimulate and encourage African 
politicisation by legitimising Congress objections to the federal scheme.  
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The Failure of the Anti-Federation Campaign: African Political 
Development and British Perceptions of African Nationalism, 1950-53 
 
By 1953 it was undeniable that there existed strong African opposition to the 
federation. Why, then, did the British government fail to acknowledge African 
concerns? Why, when Africans in West Africa were gaining political advancement, 
did Britain appear reticent to provide similar opportunities for Africans in Central 
Africa, instead handing full governmental responsibility to European settlers? Part 
of the reason lay in the failure of the Congresses to mount an altogether united and 
convincing anti-Federation campaign. In both territories ANC and NAC branch 
formation was uneven and poorly coordinated, with many provincial, district and 
branch executives enjoying greater autonomy than its inexperienced leaders could 
wisely utilise. Both parties also suffered from chronic financial difficulties, lacking 
the steady income required to finance their operations.80 Colin Legum, a leading 
anti-apartheid activist then working as Commonwealth correspondent for the 
Sunday Express, brought these problems to the attention of the Africa Bureau, 
admitting his ‘shock’ at the weakness of the ANC’s organisation which made it 
‘physically impossible for them to control and direct a large-scale campaign on the 
basis of their resources’. He also observed growing division between ‘the activists 
and the go-slowers’, made worse by the absence of strong leadership.81  
The division over tactics and policy in Northern Rhodesia was most evident 
in April 1953, when the African Mine Workers Union [AMWU], led by Lawrence 
Katilungu, failed to participate in a ‘day of national prayer’ organised by Nkumbula 
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despite having initially given their word to do so.82 Although evidence suggests that 
African trade union leaders were initially in support of Congress, having been 
assigned eight out of eleven seats on the Supreme Action Council – an ANC group 
charged with responsibility of leading the anti-Federation charge, Katilungu was a 
faithful supporter of the Northern Rhodesian Government’s trade union policy and 
was therefore unlikely to jeopardise the future prospects of his organisation by 
acting against the future settler government of Northern Rhodesia.83 In Nyasaland 
too, the presence of a group of chiefs and politicians who publicly flouted Congress’ 
policy of boycotting all discussions on federation also served to undermine the 
claim to be fully representative of all Africans in relation to political issues. Such 
men were ‘quislings’, wrote A.J. Banda, men who were acting against the 
‘expressed feelings of the people’.84  
Despite the fact that the ANC and NAC had manoeuvred into a position in 
which they were able to exploit African discontent, therefore, some colonial 
officials in Britain and Central Africa had good reason to question whether Congress 
leaders were capable of building an organisation that could maintain a permanent 
following. As G. Howe, a Provincial Commissioner in Lusaka informed the Northern 
Rhodesian Director of Information, this was not ‘the mark of a well organised, 
efficient movement’:  
On the whole it cannot be said that Congress stand to represent the 
majority in this Province. The population here is either disinterested or fed-
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up with Federation and it is only when Congress agitators put in an 
appearance that the question of Federation flares up for a few hours.85   
 
Both Congresses thus presented somewhat of a menace to colonial authorities, not 
only because rapid African politicisation emerged as a challenge to colonial 
supremacy, but because the very nature of African political protest was deemed 
unpredictable and so, potentially destabilising to the delicate political situation in 
Central Africa.  
The extent to which reports ‘on the spot’ were likely to have been a true 
reflection of the situation as it manifested is unclear, but with the ‘savage’ and 
‘violent’ Mau Mau rebellion gathering pace in Kenya – considered by settlers as the 
epitome of colonial society gone wrong – it is not beyond the realms of possibility 
to suggest that the ‘African threat’ in Central Africa would likely have been 
exacerbated in order to encourage the Colonial Office to expedite the passage of 
federation legislation in order to narrow the remit for African opposition.86 
The response of colonial and settler authorities to the African anti-
federation campaign was to demonise Congress leaders, denying them the 
legitimacy needed to convince the British government that their objections were 
well-reasoned and genuine. This was especially apparent when, in early 1952, the 
District Officer in Kalomo attempted to turn the poison sugar rumour on its head by 
accusing Nkumbula of using his links with an African tea-room in Lusaka to ‘stage-
manage’ a discovery of a drug stole from Kasenga mission capable of causing 
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abortions. The panic spreading among Africans thereafter was not, therefore, 
reflective of genuine anti-federation sentiment.87 Further attempts to malign the 
increasingly popular Nkumbula were made by K.M. Chittenden, the District 
Commissioner for Namwala, the ANC President’s home district, who wrote to the 
Provincial Commissioner of the Southern Province suggesting ‘a little publicity 
carefully put around about his private life might be advantageous’.88 Clearly 
intending to play upon growing fears in Britain that the Soviet Union was actively 
seeking to infiltrate popular African nationalist movements, Roy Welensky later 
added fuel to the fire by drawing explicit links with the Congresses and 
communism. Numerous statements were made to the effect that colonial 
authorities ought to ‘face up to the fact’ that communist sentiment was ‘rapidly 
gaining ground, particularly in areas such as the Copperbelt’.89     
Although the effect of such statements is unclear, they almost certainly 
helped to heighten tension within Central Africa. This came to be reflected in the 
methods adopted by the governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to 
clamp down upon African disturbances once Federation came into existence on 1 
August 1953. This was most evident in the series of riots that erupted in Cholo, 
Nyasaland, when in August 1953 over 5,000 Africans assembled at Cholo boma to 
protest about the imposition of higher rents for land. Once village headmen were 
arrested, the protesting crowd proceeded to riot, killing 11 Africans.90 Recalling the 
events, former civil servant and Congress member George Nyondo, then a young 
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boy of 13, stated in interview that he had been ‘shocked’ and saddened by the 
actions of the soldiers used to quell unrest in Blantyre. ‘They were very, very 
violent’, he said. ‘We felt afraid to come out of our home after we had heard what 
the government were doing to the people’.91 Occurring against the backdrop of the 
anti-Federation campaign, it was initially assumed that the disturbances were a 
manifestation of anti-federal sentiment and, as such, warranted harsh reprisal to 
prevent an increase in agitation that might lead to a larger insurgency akin to Mau 
Mau. After a thorough investigation into the event, however, a report concluded 
that the disturbances had been ostensibly ‘local’ in character and had in fact 
‘nothing to do with Federation’.92 But this was no mild affair; state suppression of 
the disturbances had been ‘skilful’ and ‘ruthless’, and left an indelible imprint on 
the minds of Africans in regards to what life under the Federation would entail.93  
 
British Government Responses to the African Anti-Federation Campaign  
Officials in London remained sceptical about Africans’ capacity to voice legitimate 
opposition to a scheme which might, in the event, prove beneficial to their 
interests. As indicated by Henry Hopkinson, a Colonial Office official despatched to 
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in 1952 to investigate African objections to 
federation, this led to the supposition that between 90 and 95 per cent of Africans 
‘knew nothing and cared little about federation’.94 Educated opinion ‘hardly 
existed’ and the criticisms levied against it ‘had little or nothing to do with the issue 
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at all’.95 Hopkinson’s views of course reflected a desire to press ahead with 
federation in as expedient a manner as possible, but, as Kate Crehan suggests the 
tendency to view African political development in these terms was intimately 
related to the prevailing belief that Africans in Central Africa were still very much 
part of a ‘tribal’ society, quite different from their African brethren in the Gold 
Coast.96 As the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Lord Ismay, commented to the 
Governor of Southern Rhodesia in 1952, Central Africa was a very special case. The 
average Rhodesian African was ‘of the mental calibre of a British child of ten’, and if 
Britain was to fulfil its role as Governess properly, ‘we have got to give him better 
prospects and better education before we can think of full political emancipation’.97  
For Britain, the dismissal of both domestic and African opposition was 
grounded in the conviction that Federation would best serve Africans’ interests. In 
1953, Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton later remarked, it was deemed unfeasible 
to grant universal suffrage to ‘primitive’ Central Africans and hope that they might 
run and build a modern state.98 If eventual African advancement were to occur it 
could only take place in the context of rising economic prosperity and harmonious 
race relations, which would eventually permit the gradual participation of Africans 
in the legislature. Federation thus offered an opportunity to ‘educate’ Africans 
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politically, moderating perceived radical tendencies and thereby circumventing the 
problem of competing nationalisms in a strategically and economically pivotal 
region. Crucially, the partial fulfilment of settler amalgamation goals would 
preserve the British connection, providing the Colonial Office with a voice, however 
distant, in Central African affairs. As Lord Chandos affirmed, ‘if our way of leading 
these nations to self-government and independence was to prevail, federation 
seemed to us to be essential’.99  
When African protest did materialise it was considered to be dangerous and 
potentially destabilising in an already politically volatile region. As correspondence 
with officials in Central Africa indicated, the signs were ominous. ‘We know that 
both Congresses are in close liaison’, reported Colby from Nyasaland. ‘Declarations 
have been made that strikes and civil disobedience will be organised if federation is 
imposed; in such conditions, African excitability or racial feeling might easily 
precipitate incidents which would lead to serious trouble’.100 If the Congress 
campaign continued to gather momentum, Britain could soon be faced with a 
militant anti-colonial nationalist movement set firmly on a collision course with 
belligerent Central African settlers, themselves threatening to sever ties with the 
British and turn instead to South Africa. The dangers arising from such a 
predicament would be ‘unthinkable’, remarked Labour’s then Commonwealth 
Secretary Gordon Walker at a Cabinet meeting in May 1951, conclusions later 
supplemented by GH Baxter, a civil servant at the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
                                                 
99
 Chandos, Memoirs, pg 387. 
100
 NA, CO 1015/65, Colby to Lyttelton, 19 Mar., 1952. 
Page | 73  
 
in November.101 The effects of such conflict would not only spread southwards, 
potentially creating a much larger inter-racial conflict, but Britain’s reputation as a 
colonial power would also be damaged irrevocably. In these circumstances, 
commented William Gorell-Barnes, Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 
Britain would be left powerless, and would permanently lose influence over African 
development.102  
Failing to acknowledge African objections was undoubtedly a risky strategy, 
but short-term alienation of the African community was regarded as essential for 
the preservation of Africans’ long-term interests. Stanley Evans, Conservative MP 
for Wednesbury, best summed up the government’s attitude in his statement that, 
‘there is a moment in history when by giving an inch one can save a yard. Later by 
offering a mile one cannot save an inch. Of this I am certain: the long-term answer 
cannot be found in racial segregation’.103 The government would face a hard task 
defending the scheme in the initial instance, but opposition need not worry them 
unduly, concluded Oliver Lyttelton and Lord Swinton, the Conservative Party’s new 
Commonwealth Relations Secretary: protest in Central Africa itself would be of 
short duration. In Britain, the Labour party would fight it, but that must be faced. 
The 'more emotional elements' – the Africa Bureau, the Fabians – were ‘hardly 
open to argument’; the only way of convincing them was ‘to implement the scheme 
and to show that it worked successfully and to nobody's detriment’.104 The scheme 
was not, then, a hastily conceived reaction to settler nationalism, and South African 
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expansionism. Rather, there was a genuine optimism that, if given time, Federation 
would eventually become a progressive, multiracial dominion, a prominent symbol 
of Britain’s imperial legacy. The development of African nationalism might not have 
initially featured in Britain’s justifications for the Federation, but it almost certainly 
consolidated officials’ approach. 
 
Conclusion  
In the late 1940s, African politics was by and large the domain of the African 
educated elite. Incensed that the British appeared to be conceding to settler 
demands for closer association, Congress leaders, self-appointed representatives of 
African political opinion and at this stage only small voices in the African polity, 
agreed that the only means of preventing the spread of settler domination rested 
upon their capacity to politicise the African masses, disseminating anti-Federation 
sentiment throughout Central Africa. By 1952, officials at the Colonial Office were 
forced to concede that the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian Congresses were 
beginning to win over large sections of the African people, translating the complex 
political message against Federation into a usable lexicon of protest that oriented 
around fear of land alienation and permanent subjection to European ascendency. 
But whilst both parties were successful in raising African antipathy to the scheme, 
the rise of the Congress parties was rapid and unexpected. In British circles, it was 
subsequently an easy transition to regard African opposition as immature and 
unrepresentative of African opinion. Given the extent to which the Congresses had 
neglected to establish a coherent, long-term, political programme, and considering 
the pressure applied to the British by Central Africa’s settler community, opinion 
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prevailed that political opinion voiced at this time was potentially threatening to 
Central African stability. In spite of their protests, African opposition to the scheme 
was by-passed.  
Contrary to John Darwin’s claim that Britain could ‘neither see, nor hear’, 
African protest, this chapter hopes to have demonstrated that Federation was also 
in fact a response to what was perceived to be a burgeoning strain of African 
nationalism incompatible with the political composition of the region.105 Views of 
African protest, then, were at least in part conditioned by Britain’s relationship with 
the settler community. In this respect, parallels may be drawn with Philip Murphy’s 
pro-settler argument—that Federation was a response to concerns over the 
alienation of an economically and politically influential group in Central Africa 
threatening to sever ties with their former British allies if closer association was not 
forthcoming. The intention here is not to advocate a major reappraisal of the 
debate pertaining to the Federation’s origins. Rather, by focussing upon the manner 
of African political development, and its interaction with the colonial and British 
sources, it is entirely feasible to suggest that the growth of nationalism helped 
consolidate Britain’s commitment to the federal panacea in 1953.  
Although unforeseen at the time, the failure to give a sympathetic hearing 
to Africans not only caused widespread hostility towards the Federation, but it also 
marked the point of departure from which Africans could safely assume that Britain 
acted in African interests. As Hastings Banda, the future leader of the Africans of 
Nyasaland told Dr Donal Brody in interview, 
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I could not believe that almost one hundred years of promises of eventual self-
determination were broken by a cabal of selfish individuals seeking to exploit 
the very Africans they had, almost a century ago, pledged to protect. I would 
not take this lying down. I spoke to influential people and groups all over Britain, 
but the tide had indeed turned against us. That is not to say that I gave up. No! 
Not at all. I continued to press the government in every forum I had available to 
me. I was determined to be the thorn in the side of the British in London and in 




From this juncture, both Congresses realised that their policies and their claim to 
represent African opinion in general needed to change if it was to exert any 
meaningful influence over British policy. Such hostility contributed to making British 
aims unworkable. As will be explored in the following chapters, when the 
Federation was inaugurated, Africans believed that calls for greater representation 
would simply result in further entrenchment of white settler supremacy. During 
these crucial years, Africans laid the foundations for a movement that was later to 
win independence from Britain. Africans had gained valuable organisational 
experience and had committed themselves to a truly national cause. Rather than 
subdue African nationalism, therefore, Africans in the North thus came to interpret 
Federation as an insuperable barrier to their own ambitions for national self-
determination and its imposition gave African nationalism in the region its decisive, 
early, boost. As N.D. Kwenje told Hastings Banda in 1952,  
The Federation question has done a great deed for us Africans. It has 
united us far more closely than any other question would have 
accomplished.107 
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2  
The African Response to Federation: 
African ‘National’ Protest and the 
Congress Parties of Northern Rhodesia 






The period 1953-1958 was a critical phase in the short history of the Federation 
during which the African National Congress parties of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland emerged from relative obscurity to champion the anti-federation cause. 
Whilst these developments failed to yield significant political gains for Africans, 
British colonial officials and the settler press were forced to admit that African 
nationalism was a growing and potentially dangerous force in Central African 
politics. By 1958, the European-owned Northern News ruefully concluded that 
African nationalism was a phenomenon of major importance, one that would 
become a permanent feature of political life in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.1  
What is perhaps most surprising is the relative lack of historiographical 
scrutiny, especially in the early post-independence literature, on the manner in 
which this transformation in African politics occurred. Indeed, whilst historians such 
as Robert Rotberg, L.H. Gann and David Mulford could comment upon the growth 
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of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, they could not explain its 
emergence.2 Accounts that emerged in the immediate post-independence period, 
therefore, tended to place undue emphasis on the extent to which the Federation – 
or more specifically the imposition of the Federation – provided an incentive for the 
African elite to mobilise the masses against the colonial state. Implicit in these 
studies was the view that African nationalism was ostensibly reactionary in 
character, that without the external stimulus given to African politicians by the anti-
Federation debate it was highly unlikely that African nationalism would have 
emerged in the near future. African nationalism was thus seen to have developed in 
response to external factors that impacted unfavourably on the small cohort of 
‘elite’ Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, who, in turn, sought to defy 
the Federation by winning the hearts and minds of the Africans masses which could 
then be used to win for Africans greater socio-economic and constitutional rights.  
 This chapter will confirm and extend these conclusions. Federation did 
provide a catalyst for African politicisation and the initiative for mobilisation against 
the Federation did come from the African elite. But such views are not entirely 
sufficient to explain how political sentiment spread within African communities and 
how the Congress parties of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were able to bring 
together Africans at the grass roots in a united, ‘national’, protest against 
Federation. Recent studies, such as those by Joey Power and Owen Kalinga, have 
provided a valuable corrective to this anomaly. As they demonstrate in regards to 
Nyasaland, for example, peasant agitation for political change in the localities was 
equally as important in nurturing anti-Federation sentiment as the campaign waged 
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by the African elite at the high political level. Protesting against local grievances, 
such as discriminatory state agricultural legislation, the peasants gave an impetus 
and focus for the African elite who were then able to link them together and 
incorporate them into a wider, national, struggle.3 Whilst African protest over local 
issues allowed for the articulation of ‘local’ grievances, therefore, it was the 
educated elite that gave them national relevance, manipulating local discontent 
and diverting its flow into constructive, more overtly political, channels. This 
chapter will extend these ideas with a view to suggesting how this process 
occurred. Just how did African political leaders mobilise grass roots support? 
Moreover, how were the Congresses able to provide Africans with an ‘experience of 
the state’ and, crucially, how were African leaders able to turn African politicisation 
into genuine African nationalism?  
 
The Growth of African Nationalism and the Politics of Federation: 1953-
58 
 
In the words of Peter Fraenkel, a broadcaster and close friend of Rhodes 
Livingstone Institute anthropologists working in Central Africa during the 1950s, 
Africans did not settle down happily under Federation despite the confident 
predictions of British politicians. ‘The tensions and the hatreds of the land did not 
diminish. They grew worse every day’.4 In their desire to ease the multitude of 
pressures in the region, the Conservative government had not confronted the 
crucial problem of racial equality in Central Africa. This was seen initially in the 
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failure to calibrate the powers of each territory, which subsequently ensured that in 
key policy areas, such as native policy, the entire Federation became subject to the 
will of its more influential settler cohort. This not only led to a regression in African 
advancement policy but also created resentment and bitterness that jeopardised 
long-term multi-racial cooperation. Nyasaland, for example, had a much higher 
number of ‘educated’ Africans and thus had greater opportunity for advancement 
than Africans in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, yet, under the terms of the 
Federal constitution, African progress was likely to be stifled by settlers in the 
Rhodesias who feared that Africans in their own territories would demand equal 
opportunities.5 With only seven members in the Federal Parliament compared to 17 
members from Southern Rhodesia and 11 members from Northern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland’s interests would constantly be subject to the will of its more influential 
Federal neighbours and, as Governor Geoffrey Colby warned Colonial Secretary 
Oliver Lyttelton, the future of the Protectorate would ‘largely rest in the hands of 
the European elected members of the Rhodesias’.6 
Progress towards partnership in the period after the Federation’s formation 
had thus been slow. In a brief prepared for new Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-
Boyd before his visit to Central Africa in 1957, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at 
the Colonial Office William Gorell Barnes surmised that the British and Federal 
governments had failed to win Africans over to the idea of Federation. Even in the 
socio-economic sphere, he said, ‘segregation and discrimination’ remains a 
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prevalent feature of life in the northern territories’.7 Africans continued to use 
separate entrances for post offices and share separate facilities in hospitals, hotels 
and on the railways, whilst the industrial colour bar, meanwhile, continued to 
prevent Africans competing with whites for jobs. These features of life in the 
Federation served only to crystallise African fears that it was a construct intended 
to preserve settler ascendancy. As Kenneth Kaunda, General Secretary of the 
African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia [ANC] told his friend Thomas Fox-
Pitt of the Anti-Slavery Society in Britain, a man whom he had met during the 
latter’s time as a colonial official in Kitwe on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, 
the situation appeared ominous. ‘Democracy and equality is being suffocated by 
Federation’, he said. ‘Racial strife has only been shelved and if progress is not made 
soon serious trouble lies ahead’.8 
By the end of 1956, constitutional issues, both territorial and Federal, 
loomed large on the horizon. For the Federal government, the immediate objective 
was for the Federation to become an independent member of the Commonwealth 
as soon as possible. As Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins, by then Lord Malvern after 
the granting of a peerage in 1956, observed, not only would this hand his 
government greater autonomy from the Colonial Office, but it would also help 
stave off calls for African self-government, providing the African majority with an 
incentive to work towards implementation of multiracial partnership.9 The request 
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for prospective Commonwealth status was initially made to the British on 12 March 
1956, much to the chagrin of Northern Rhodesia’s Governor, Arthur Benson, and 
the new Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Robert Armitage, who regarded the move as a 
prelude to amalgamation.10  
In what has long been interpreted as an attempt to placate the settlers and 
delay an immediate decision on the future of Central Africa, the Colonial and 
Commonwealth Relations Offices issued a joint communiqué in April 1957 handing 
the Federal Government greater control over the Federation’s external affairs. The 
communiqué also guaranteed that the British would not amend or repeal any 
Federal Act except at the request of Federal authorities and brought forward the 
Federal Review Conference to 1960 where the future of the Federation as a full 
member of the Commonwealth would be considered.11 To the untrained eye, this 
might have appeared like the promise of independence shortly after 1960. It also 
appeared to contradict earlier commitments by the British government that 
protectorate status would not be withdrawn from the northern territories without 
the consent of their inhabitants. The implementation of the 1957 Constitutional 
Amendment Act and the 1958 Federal Electoral Act shortly thereafter, in spite of 
opposition from the African Affairs Board which was subsequently bypassed, 
confirmed long-held African suspicions that British and Federal governments were 
                                                 
10
 RH, W[elensky] P[apers], Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Central 
African Federation 1957-64, Box 20/1, Malvern to Lord Home, 12 Mar., 1956. See also NA, CO 
1015/1129, Benson to Lennox-Boyd, 6 Jun., 1956. 
11
 RH, AB 107/2, Joint Announcement by the Governments of the UK and of the Federation, 27 Apr., 
1957. 
Page | 83  
 
unlikely to promote African advancement until white settler interests had been 
safeguarded.12  
The former Act provided for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly from 
35 to 59 seats. In the old Assembly there were 26 ‘ordinary’ members (European), 
three European members representing African interests, six specially elected 
Africans and an additional six Africans who would be directly elected by both 
electoral rolls. Hence, although the number of members representing Africans 
would increase, the increase would come in the form of six members who might 
well be chosen by a European electorate. The Federal Electoral Act provided for the 
creation of ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ electoral rolls. Property and literacy 
qualifications would ensure that the former would be predominantly European and 
the latter African. British Protected Persons would be able to register to vote, 
although the minimum qualification of £150 per annum plus literacy for the 
‘special’ roll promised to exclude the majority of Africans. What small faith Africans 
had retained in the capacity of the British government to secure their interests after 
the formation of the Federation had been shattered. As Stewart Gore-Browne, a 
former Member of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council and close friend of 
ANC President Harry Nkumbula and his deputy, Kenneth Kaunda, commented to 
the left-wing British newspaper, the Manchester Guardian, Africans now believed 
that unless drastic action was forthcoming in the next months, Central Africa’s 
whites would inevitably achieve their goal of dominion status in 1960.13  
The disappointment shared among Africans and their supporters came to 
the fore in Northern Rhodesia during the discussions over what was to be known as 
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the Benson Constitution in 1958. Under the new provisions, which were published 
in a White Paper in March, 22 members would be elected, 14 of which would be 
European and eight African.14 In addition there would be six official and two 
nominated members. Behind these bare details of racial representation lay a hugely 
complicated system of cross-racial voting.15 Whilst Federal Prime Minister Sir Roy 
Welensky complained that the increase in African representation was a ‘betrayal’ of 
multi-racial partnership, the Northern Rhodesian Congress complained that the 
measures did not go far enough.16 In January 1958, ANC leaders wrote to Benson 
demanding that the only solution to satisfy the political aspirations of the majority 
would be universal adult franchise under the premise of one man, one vote’. 
‘Taking into consideration the relative populations of the two races’, ANC President 
Nkumbula said, ‘what could be more moderate and civilised?’17 Once again, African 
objections were ignored and their hopes for partnership frustrated. On 4 July, 
having failed to gain a sympathetic ear in the Colonial Office, the ANC publicly 
burned copies of the White Paper. The symbolic act represented the final departure 
for Africans from any notion or vague hope that the Colonial Office would come to 
their rescue. Settlers, too, also found their efforts to extract concessions frustrated. 
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On 19 December, following a question in Parliament from the Labour Party, Lennox-
Boyd re-stated the government’s commitment to the White Paper. With the British 
finding their policy solutions unacceptable to either race in Central Africa, and with 
both Africans and settlers growing increasingly suspicious of each other, the 
prospects for Federation were bleak. The seeds had truly been sown for a crisis that 
would sound the death knell for Federation. 
 
Nyasaland African Congress Mobilisation, 1953-58 
 
The development of nationalism in Nyasaland can be divided into two distinct 
phases. The period 1953-56 has been characterised by scholars as a ‘desperate’ 
phase for the NAC.18 As shown in the previous chapter, the onset of Federation and 
subsequent decline in Congress membership to under 1000 created among African 
political leaders in Nyasaland a sense that support for political goals had to come 
from ‘grass roots’.19 ‘Federation came’, wrote Leonard Chirwa to the Secretary 
General of the NAC, ‘not because we wanted it but because our opposition was 
weak. If the Congress is to become strong once more we must take the message to 
the people of this country’.20 It was not until 1955, after the emergence of a new 
generation of more militant African political activists, that national politics were 
extended beyond conferences, delegations and petitions, and a more concerted 
effort was made to unite the radical and moderate factions of the NAC, plagued by 
disagreements pertaining to NAC representation in government since 1953. If the 
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NAC were to make significant progress in their attempts to win equal rights for 
Africans, politics had to be firmly rooted in the localities. In the opinion of the NAC’s 
new leaders, the Nyasaland government had to be made aware that Congress was 
not an organisation of educated clerks, but a movement representing all Africans.  
The NAC’s popular mobilisation campaign in rural areas centred upon the 
party’s ability to exploit rising discontent with colonial conservation policies. In 
Nyasaland, as in other regions in east and southern Africa, the determination of 
British and colonial authorities to increase agricultural productivity while coping 
with a perceived crisis of accelerating soil erosion was a key factor in explaining the 
intensification of state intervention in the agricultural sphere after the Second 
World War.21 Of great concern among landowners and settlers was that Africans, 
through lack of training, held an irresponsible attitude towards natural resources. 
To hand Africans sole responsibility over agricultural affairs would lead, in years to 
come, to ruination of soil and to the decimation of Nyasaland’s agricultural 
industry.22 In the early 1950s, under pressure from the settler dominated 
Agriculture Department, the Nyasaland government implemented a series of 
measures intended to conserve farming land and prevent soil erosion. In the 
Northern Province, the most popular and arguably most successful conservation 
methods evolved from the Misuku Land Usage Scheme of 1938. This involved, 
among other proposals, prohibiting peasants from growing crops such as millet 
unless under strict supervision and restricting cattle to designated grazing zones by 
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constructing contour ridges and bunds.23 In the Southern Province, schemes for soil 
conservation were closely associated with the introduction of ambitious land 
settlement programmes involving the forced movements of thousands of Africans. 
The enforcement of such policies served to intensify African suspicions of 
the state. As Griff Jones, District Commissioner in the Nkhata Bay area remarked in 
his diary, post-war agricultural legislation was hugely unpopular. People frequently 
complained that the rules were inadequate and showed a lack of understanding on 
behalf of the Nyasaland government to some of the issues faced by African farmers. 
Villagers were ‘insistent’, for instance, that the enforcement of contour ridging was 
misguided since cassava would ‘rot if grown on ridges’.24 Elsewhere there were 
complaints concerning the excessive labour involved in digging bunds, the loss of 
fertile land, and above all, the fear that bunding (land enclosure) would serve as a 
prelude for European settlement in the area. 
 Tension was heightened in the early 1950s by the implementation of the 
controversial Master Farmers’ Scheme, intended to increase African food 
production by encouraging yeoman farmers to enclose and farm their own land.25 
To ensure that the envisaged ‘yeoman farmer’ really emerged, the Master Farmers' 
Scheme was to be given a boost by the introduction of bonus payments for those 
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who were to 'farm their land in conformity with prescribed conditions'.26 The 
scheme itself became particularly contentious in the late 1950s. Surveys carried out 
in 1955 and 1956 indicated that the scheme was not proving entirely profitable for 
farmers and consequently their commitment to the scheme began to lapse. This in 
turn provoked the state to pass legislation which enabled agricultural officials to 
prosecute members, and indeed non-members, of the scheme not following what 
officials at the department of agriculture considered to be proper practices. People 
came to be prosecuted for bunding offences, for not clearing their gardens early 
and even for poor crop spacing and late weeding. Offenders were routinely 
summoned to their chiefs’ court where almost invariably a fine was imposed. In the 
1956 season, 8,107 people in the Southern Province were prosecuted and over 230 
farming offences committed in the North.27 Naturally, the prosecutions and the 
accompanying increase in fines were deeply resented by farmers and peasants in 
general.  
  Before 1953, African opposition to state intervention was uncoordinated, 
largely passive and generally disconnected with Congress political activities. 
Resistance often took the form of open disregard for agricultural rules, much to the 
chagrin of agricultural officers employed to enforce them. In the Northern Province, 
where there existed only a handful of police, local authorities lacked both the will 
and initiative to clamp down upon non-cooperation. Perhaps more disturbing, 
however, was that the Native Authorities upon whom the government relied to 
enforce state agricultural policies began to lend support to the protesters. By the 
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late 1950s, agricultural reports referred to often low-level fines imposed upon 
offenders. In regions where local resistance was high, Congress activists found 
fertile ground with which they could stir African emotions and link local discontent 
with the discriminatory racial policies of the Nyasaland and Federal governments. 
As the Governor reported to Lennox-Boyd, the issue of land alienation in particular 
was one that resonated deeply with Africans. 
The ordinary villager, dependent either on agriculture or on manual labour 
for his living, lies at the potential force behind Congress and its real danger 
... He is prevented from seeing the true benefits of Federation by the policy 
of Congress in constantly stimulating his fears on any subject likely to cause 
him apprehension. Typical and recent examples of such subjects have been 
the proposals to federalise non-African agriculture and alterations to the 
Federal Constitution, all of which are represented by Congress as steps 
specifically devised to interfere with his land or his liberty.28 
 
Before long, Congress came to appreciate the political capital that could be 
made from the prevailing tension, taking active steps to exploit sources of tension 
within the localities. In 1956, for example, Congress encouraged farmers to openly 
resist agricultural rules by not paying rent and ignoring restrictions imposed upon 
them by the farming scheme. Since the scheme impacted upon Africans throughout 
the territory, Congress was easily able to create widespread protest uniting Africans 
against state oppression. The effect was that soon, many farmers became active 
politicians in their areas, coordinating local resistance and mobilising Africans to the 
Congress cause. This was especially apparent in the Karonga District of the Northern 
Province, in which members of several cooperative unions operating in the region 
became key political figures in the local community. As manager of the Kilipula Rice 
Growers Cooperative Union, formed to assist rice growers in the production and 
marketing of their crops, for example, Robert Gwebe-Nyirenda played a key role in 
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disseminating Congress literature in the localities in which the KPGCU operated, 
publicising and holding NAC meetings throughout the region.29   
During the 1950s NAC mobilisation was undoubtedly more impressive in the 
countryside; this is not to suggest, however that Congress was not operating in 
urban regions. Given that the party was formed in one of Nyasaland’s fastest 
growing centres, Blantyre, in 1943, NAC leaders were acutely aware that they could 
not afford to neglect Nyasaland’s urban population. Unsurprisingly, the NAC’s urban 
campaign differed little from the party’s approach in rural regions. Politicising 
Africans in and around Nyasaland’s colonial towns also meant engaging with African 
responses to threats to their homes and livelihoods, equating these struggles with 
the fight against land grubbing and the colour bar. The campaign grew by forging 
bonds with, and working through, local voluntary organisations, workers’ 
organisations, women’s schools, youth groups and chiefly authorities, all of them 
threatened by state-imposed changes to urban space.  
One of the first targets for the NAC was the Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance, launched by the Nyasaland government in 1951, which proposed the 
effective segregation of Limbe and Blantyre into high, medium and low density 
residential zones. In conjunction with proposals to establish commercial and light 
industrial zones in the very areas where the majority of Africans had their homes 
and business premises, the Ordinance re-designated African Trust Land to be 
allocated to white business people with substantial investment capital ‘far 
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exceeding that available to the average African entrepreneur’.30 Enforcement of the 
new plan in the early 1950s involved the movement of Africans to comply with new 
zoning regulations. Despite attempts to defy regulations, by 1952 some 6,000 
people had been removed from areas affected by the scheme. In spite of their 
failure to prevent African displacement, Congress members operating in the region, 
such as Grant Mikeka Mkandawire, who became chairman of the influential 
Blantyre branch in August 1952, had linked the issue closely with Federation. If 
Africans were moved once, he told NAC supporters, they would almost certainly be 
moved again once they had developed an area sufficiently for Europeans to move in 
and reap the benefit from their labours.31 This was an issue of racial discrimination, 
a sign of things to come under Federation. 
The NAC’s urban mobilisation campaign achieved its most notable success in 
February 1955, when Congress members in the Soche area of Blantyre opposed 
local administration plans to transform all remaining African Trust Land into public 
land.32 The memo written to the government by prominent Soche citizens and, later 
supported by the NAC, protested against forced removals and noted that most of 
the land that had been cleared was still undeveloped. While the government 
iterated that their policy would not be reversed, it suspended removals from the 
disputed areas for several years. This was in many respects an isolated victory, with 
evictions continuing elsewhere in urban centres until 1959, but it proved to be 
hugely important in building NAC prestige in Blantyre from which the party’s 
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influential Blantyre branch could begin to make a concerted attempt to harness the 
support of Africans elsewhere.  
 Targeting forced removals was just one way in which the Congress sought to 
exploit economic and physical hardships experienced by Africans. The downturn in 
the economy from 1957 provided the NAC with a further opportunity to harness 
popular discontent, rallying against growing unemployment and rising living costs. 
As both Power and John McCracken have demonstrated, the position of 
Nyasaland’s labourers, although poor, was generally favourable throughout the 
1950s and consequently, there existed little incentive for worker militancy.33 Whilst 
wages were pitifully low, Europeans earning up to 20 times the wage of Africans, 
the rise in minimum daily wages in towns such as Blantyre from 10d in 1952, to 16d 
in 1955, 24d in 1957 and 30d in 1959 almost certainly involved a real increase in 
living standards for workers.34 Economic problems experienced by all after 1957 
fundamentally altered the African predicament, giving rise to circumstances that 
made easier attempts to attribute poor standards in African living to the 
Federation. By suggesting that low wages paid to Africans were a product of racial 
discrimination, and by linking African impoverishment with Nyasaland’s 
membership of the Federation, which was argued to by the Congress to have 
consumed Nyasaland’s natural resources, the NAC had begun to successfully make 
the connection between local politics and the fight against chitaganya.35  
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Tony Woods is right to suggest that the implications of this policy, especially 
in regards to the politicisation of Nyasaland’s trade union movement, were to be 
felt more profoundly after 1958, when for the first time in the country’s history 
crowds of young marginalised men came out on Blantyre’s streets in defiant 
demonstrations in support of Congress.36 It is important, nonetheless, to recognise 
that the attempt to harness the powerful political force of organised labour was 
rooted in the NAC’s urban campaign at this time. Indeed, there existed strong 
connections between Congress and trade unions. Several labour leaders in Blantyre, 
such as Lawrence Makata and Lali Lubani, Chairman of the African Motor Transport 
Workers Union, for instance, were active members of the local Congress branch as 
well as founding members of the African Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and 
although their own interests as employers of Africans perhaps meant that labour 
politicisation was not wholly in their own interests, they provided them with a 
distinct political veneer. This is not to say that Congress was not above capitalising 
on workers’ grievances for its own ends. In 1956, for example, the labour 
commissioner in Blantyre suspected that Congress leaders in the AMTWU had been 
responsible for the rejection of a wages and benefit package put forward by the 
Nyasaland Transport Company following a pay dispute over the amount skilled 
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The Decisive Push for National Unity: The Nyasaland African Congress 1957-1958 
By 1957, in spite of initial problems caused by divisions in Congress that rose to the 
surface after 1953, Africans in Nyasaland were beginning to rally behind a national 
cause. Writing in New Commonwealth, historian Richard Gray stated, 
The love and loyalty shown by Africans in Nyasaland to their territory is 
unique in Africa ... Elsewhere, in the Gold Coast, Uganda, the Sudan and 
Nigeria, tribal and local loyalties seriously threaten the emergence and 
stability of new national states. In Nyasaland they do not. Nationalism has 
united Congress and Chiefs, Muslim and Christian, lake-shore and 
highlands. Three years of Federation have done little to diminish this.38   
 
With a focussed and united leadership, brought together by the decision of 
prominent NAC members Henry Masauko Chipembere and Kanyama Chiume to 
walk out of the Legislative Council in protest against the Federal Constitution 
Amendment Bill being introduced in the Assembly in June 1957, a clear lead was 
given to Congress members.39 But the cultivation of unity also owed as much to 
circumstance as political activism. Nyasaland was a comparatively small nation with 
an economy based predominantly on agriculture. The NAC was therefore able to 
mount a broadly homogenous anti-government campaign based on state 
intervention in the agricultural sphere. This not only ensured that there existed 
little regional differentiation in the overall nature of African nationalism, but also 
that a genuine sense of African commitment to the Congress’ ‘national’ agenda was 
able to be fostered. As Chipembere wrote in 1957, commitment to a single 
nationalist programme was essential in the pre-independence period. 
Diversification and ‘party politics’, he wrote, were a ‘dangerous thing during pre-
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liberation views’. What was needed at this stage was ‘one solid powerful mass 
movement embracing all people’.40  
In spite of the NAC’s progress, the party had still to make a significant 
impact upon Nyasaland politics. The most important development in this respect 
was the decision to invite Hastings Banda to return from Ghana to lead the NAC in 
their struggle. Banda was not an unknown entity to the NAC. Together with Harry 
Nkumbula, the future leader of the Northern Rhodesian Congress, Banda made the 
first significant African intervention in the anti-Federation debate by publishing a 
point-by-point rebuttal of the arguments in favour of federation in the form of a 
memorandum to the Colonial Office in 1949. The document declared that a form of 
federation would not be in the best interests of the peoples of Central Africa 
because such a plan would extend to the two protectorates the policy of 
segregation and discrimination under which their fellow Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia had suffered. It was the ‘thin end of the wedge of amalgamation’, the 
memo argued, ‘coated with the sugar of federation to make it easier for the 
Africans and the Imperial Government to swallow’.41 It was rumoured in 1951 that 
Banda would return to Nyasaland, but he instead chose to move from his London 
home to the Gold Coast, where he continued to practice medicine. For Chipembere, 
Chiume and Dunduza Chisiza, a rising star in African politics, Banda was a man who 
already held a prominent place in Nyasaland’s history. He was thus perfectly placed 
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to lead the NAC at this critical juncture.42 Upon being persuaded to return in July 
1958, Banda provided the anti-colonial struggle with renewed impetus. In August 
he was elected President of the party without dissent. During the year, he toured 
the Protectorate, emotionally denouncing the Federation and exhorting Africans to 
swell the membership rolls of Congress. ‘If we are organised and united, from 
Karonga to Port Herald, or from Port Herald to Karonga’, he said, ‘nothing will or 
can ever stop us from achieving our aim or reaching our goal’.43 He was ably 
assisted in his task by Congress’ allies in the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, 
who played an essential, if indirect, role in facilitating the rapid politicisation of the 
people in key locations around Blantyre and Lilongwe.44  
Having been reluctant to take a leading role in political issues, the joint 
declaration issued by the CCAP missions in March 1958, which condemned the 
Federation and advocated Nyasaland’s secession, marked a decisive turning point.45 
Whilst the CCAP refrained from taking a leading role in African politics, believing 
that change would only occur if Africans themselves assumed the initiative, the 
missions provided an important support base for Congress members, not least 
because the Nyasaland police were ‘unable to put a set of ears in every 
congregation’.46 The CCAP alone had a protectorate-wide membership of some 
150,000, and church services became an important means by which Congress 
members could address, or influence, large groups without police permits and to 
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ensure that political messages reached those who did not usually attend political 
gatherings.47 As Joey Power claims, some CCAP ministers, like Reverend Makwakwa 
of Nkhata Bay and Isaac Chirwa in Central Province, openly expressed political 
sentiment from the pulpit, condemned state injustices and helped to ‘spread the 
word’ by virtue of the geography of their ministries. Ministers with political leanings 
like Makwakwa travelled around very large parishes and as a result acted as a 
conduit for information, cards and funds.48  
The prominence to which Banda had been elevated, and the constant 
reassertion that self-government was just over the horizon, added a great stimulus 
to the NAC’s political activities in 1958. In his protectorate-wide tour, upon which 
he embarked soon after his arrival, Dr Banda spoke passionately about ‘bringing 
politics down to earth ... to talk politics in terms of every day life’.49 Everywhere he 
rallied against ‘local’ grievances, tying together the Congress demand for a new 
Constitution with prices of farm products and the enforcement of agricultural rules. 
‘I have the whole of Zomba and Blantyre on fire’, claimed Banda, ‘and soon I hope 
this to spread throughout Nyasaland’.50 He was not to be disappointed. In 
September, Africans in the Fort Johnston district stepped up opposition to the 
enforcement of a range of agricultural rules after Banda had noted their complaints 
in a speech. Later in the month, unrest broke out after Banda addressed a large 
meeting in Zomba. Automobiles belonging to Europeans and Asians were stoned 
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and caused the Nyasaland Times to claim that the demonstration of hooliganism 
was akin to ‘mob rule’ which was beginning to ‘pervade the territory’.51   
A poignant symbol of the NAC’s growing following was the extent to which 
NAC rhetoric was gaining ground among women and the youth, groups previously 
excluded from national politics.52 Politicisation of Nyasaland’s women owed much 
to the efforts of Rose Chibambo, who played a key role in developing a political 
programme that appealed specifically to women. She spoke vociferously against the 
colour bar and connected the grievances of agriculturalists in the Southern Province 
with discrimination against Nyasaland’s women. Labour migration and land 
alienation affected women as much as men; as mothers, it was they who suffered 
most from being removed from their rural homes. Upon being transferred with her 
husband from Zomba to Blantyre in 1953, Chibambo became treasurer of the NAC 
Blantyre branch, the first woman to hold an executive position in the party. Her 
presence as a member and officeholder attracted more women to branch meetings, 
raising the party’s profile. By 1956, Blantyre had a significant women’s contingent 
and in September 1958, Banda instructed Chibambo to form the Women’s League, 
which soon became a key presence at political meetings and at NAC 
demonstrations.53 
The NAC was equally successful in mobilising the youth, and this came to be 
reflected in the frequent instances of unrest that took place in all three senior 
                                                 
51
 Nyasaland Times, Oct., 1958. 
52
 See Power, Building Kwacha, p.108-110. 
53
 NA, CO 1015/1749, Political Intelligence Report, Jan., 1959. Women played an important role, for 
instance, in meetings at which Banda spoke, dancing and singing for their leader.  
Page | 99  
 
secondary schools in the Protectorate.54 Blantyre Secondary School, for instance, 
was closed for two weeks in October 1958 after a number of girls were expelled for 
singing an anti-Federation song at a school assembly.55 Similar events unfolded at 
Central Province schools. In Dedza, students objected to the appointment of a 
Chichewa language teacher whom Congress had identified as a Special Branch 
mole. Students were reported to have uttered death threats against the teacher 
and his family and, subsequently, the school was closed and its students 
transported home singing ‘Kwaca! Kwaca! Hellelujah!’ from the back of trucks.56  
As the Nyasaland Intelligence Committee perceived the situation, 
developments since Banda’s return had changed the pattern of African resistance, 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that African opinion will from now 
onwards exercise an increasing influence on political, constitutional, 
economic and social development in Nyasaland ... Africans, led by militant 
nationalist leaders working on and stimulating the existing rooted distrust 
by the ordinary villager of the Southern Rhodesian impact on his life in 
Nyasaland and impelled by an emotionalism which overrides all economic 
considerations, could make effective government of the country extremely 
difficult.57  
 
Hastings Banda’s impact upon nationalist politics was profound, and lasting. In his 
own words, he had been a ‘revelation’ to the people.58 From only 1,000 paid-up 
members in April 1956, over 13,000 had registered with Congress branches by 
October 1957, increasing to over 20,000 by September 1958.59 Mobilisation in the 
Northern Province was particularly impressive. In 1956, registered NAC branches 
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numbered only seven from a total of 18. By October 1958, no less than 48 out of 63 
branches were located in the region.60 Banda’s return to Nyasaland not only served 
to unite the NAC, providing a charismatic figurehead around which moderate and 
radical factions of the party could unite, but his presence also served to excite 
nationalists elsewhere. Banda’s most important role in this capacity was the 
stimulus he gave to the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress. On 21 
December Banda addressed an ANC meeting denouncing moderates and expressing 
his hope that Africans in the territory were not ‘like pigs that just wanted to eat and 
go to bed when their stomachs were full’.61 Nothing, Terrence Ranger suggested, 
had been heard in Southern Rhodesia like this before. As the Central African 
Examiner reported in January 1959, Banda’s visit heralded a ‘new chapter’ in 
African politics in the territory.62  
By 1958, the NAC’s prospects appeared to give cause for optimism; it was 
‘the most organised nationalist movement in Central Africa’, respected by even the 
Colonial Office as a ‘legitimate political force’.63 Banda’s return had galvanised the 
party, and NAC leaders had been eminently successful in developing a political 
rhetoric to which a wide range of disparate interest groups were able to respond. 
Federation had come to be associated with everything negative in villagers’ lives, 
from taxation to soil conservation, from resettlement schemes to dog licenses and 
this made Congress ‘a political danger of the first magnitude’, remarked Governor 
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Armitage in 1957.64 The upshot of the NAC’s growth in popularity was the mounting 
intolerance of opposition that party leaders did little to quell. As J. Footman 
reported to his colleague J.C. Morgan at the Colonial Office,  
Congress have in the past found it difficult to sway the more conservative 
members of society ... They are now, however, enjoying greater success in 
winning their support even if this means resorting to intimidation. To take 
one of the most common forms of intimidation, the threat of arson for 
example, if a hut burns down, perhaps quite accidentally, all that Congress 
supporters have to do is to make the observation that the owner is not one 
of their members, and the allusion goes straight to its mark ... It is with 
tactics such as these, allied to a constant series of cleverly-veiled threats 
against their enemies as a whole, that Congress does the damage.65 
 
Part of the problem, McCracken suggests was the insistence upon ‘absolute unity’ 
adopted soon after Banda’s arrival.66 As the ‘Messiah’, the ‘saviour’ of Malawi, the 
man capable of taking on the British on their own terms, Banda’s word was 
becoming law.67 Whilst the Congress purported to represent all Africans, the NAC’s 
national programme came to be underpinned by coercion. By January 1959, those 
who openly rejected Congress policy stood in real danger of social ostracism, at 
worst, physical assault. Banda himself did much to encourage the actions of his 
followers and younger colleagues, going out of his way to denounce ‘moderates’. 
This was a worrying development, the implications of which were to be felt after 
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Rebuilding Congress Prestige in Northern Rhodesia: ANC Mobilisation in 
the Towns and Countryside, 1953-57 
 
Similar to the predicament of the NAC, the failure to prevent Federation gave rise 
to disillusionment and resignation among African politicians in Northern Rhodesia.68 
Having united a vast swathe of African opinion behind the anti-Federation cause, 
the African National Congress quickly lost its purpose. ‘Everywhere Congress has 
lost a lot of face’, reported the Northern Rhodesian Special Branch, ‘its influence 
continues to decrease as Africans fast recognise the futility of political actions’.69 
Although the ANC continued to publish circulars and a monthly paper, the Congress 
News, which first appeared in October 1953, a general sense of apathy displayed 
towards the party provoked Kaunda to assess that ‘some constructive thinking 
would have to be done if Congress was to hold together’.70 Part of the decline 
Kaunda blamed on the absence of an organisational infrastructure capable of 
sustaining political momentum generated by the proliferation of African grievances. 
‘As soon as a specific issue is lost or won’, he wrote, ‘popular interest in the 
Congress dies. When such an artificial stimulation has been applied, and an issue 
fails, then there is greater despondency than before. There is no real organisation 
linking local groups and African protest together’.71 Also responsible, Kaunda 
believed, was the strict policy of zero-tolerance pursued by the Northern Rhodesian 
government. With the suppression of political activists, it was difficult, he said, ‘to 
maintain the enthusiasm’ of ANC branches.72 In January 1955, both Kaunda and 
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Nkumbula themselves became victims of the government’s policy to limit what was 
considered to be ‘subversive’ political activity. Following a raid on their offices, they 
each received a two month prison sentence for possession of ‘seditious material’.73 
The experiences of the early Federal years appeared to have had a marked 
effect on both men. Whilst their imprisonment had given both men personal 
experience of the lengths to which the government was seemingly prepared to go 
in order to suppress African political development, it provided them with a crucial 
insight into the nature of African politics. If steps were not taken to rekindle African 
interest in the anti-Federation campaign, Congress was itself likely to become 
obsolete.74 Upon their release from gaol, Nkumbula and Kaunda began to 
reorganise the ANC. Published in the form of a five-year Development Plan, Kaunda 
launched an appeal for support ‘in the national struggle’ from all Congress branches 
in operation. Emphasising that the fight against Federation had been hugely 
significant in ‘uniting the people’, momentum must not be lost behind the ‘great 
national movement’ fermenting among Africans.75 In a series of monthly circulars 
following publication of the Plan, Kaunda appealed for Africans to join the ANC and 
pledge a small membership fee in order to ‘fight for the franchise’, ‘fight against 
colour discrimination’, and ‘fight against the final stage of the dreadful federation 
which is intended to be Central African Dominion’.76  
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Significantly, it was at this time that ANC leaders took a truly national 
approach to political organisation. It was here that this juncture that ANC leaders 
began to see themselves as ‘national’ figureheads. The problem remained, 
however, as to how Africans at grass roots, seen by nationalist leaders as key to the 
success of the anti-Federation campaign, could be mobilised. This was particularly 
since it was feared that most would be unaffected by, or would simply not 
understand, the ‘high political’ ramifications arising from being part of the 
Federation. In an unsigned letter to Mary Benson of the Africa Bureau, an African 
ANC member wrote, ‘Congress does not mean much to the ordinary man or 
woman. We must begin to concentrate on day-to-day specific issues, which would 
then be brought in at a higher political level, for instance by the African 
representative in Legco’.77  
The ANC anti-Federation campaign began by holding frequent meetings 
throughout the country. As Robert Makasa, then an ANC organiser in Chinsali, later 
reflected it was at these meetings that ANC activists sought to ‘awaken the masses’, 
to make the party a presence in the everyday lives of Africans. This was a 
monumental task, he opined, considering the extent to which the people had been 
‘brainwashed’ and ‘indoctrinated’ to accept colonialism.78 During these meetings, 
Congress leaders worked hard to make relevant the implications of living under 
colonial rule at local level. Makasa remarked that the first target was Northern 
Rhodesia’s district commissioners; ‘well-known’ figures in the local community and 
prominent symbols of the colonial state. 
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We pointed out the evils of absolute power he had and we gave specific 
examples of dictatorial decisions and arbitrary actions which worked 
against the real interests of the people. There was no shortage of 
examples; it was a matter of teaching from the known to the unknown. 
 
The next step, Makasa continued, was to ingrain in the minds of attendees that the 
dictatorial nature of local government rule was indicative of the degree to which 
Africans in Northern Rhodesia had been continually exploited by the government, 
which was acting solely in the interests of Europeans. 
We did not fail to expose the discrimination and slave-like conditions under 
which the Africans laboured in the two wars. We reminded them that they 
were bundled and pushed into these wars just because they were colonial 
subjects ... We made it doubly sure that these points got rubbed into their 
heads that they would understand the evils and disadvantages of colonials. 
We called upon them to join the political struggle in order to break the 
chains of colonialism and restore their human dignity as a respectable 
race.79 
 
At meetings attended by chiefs, whose support was deemed essential for boosting 
the profile of Congress in the villages, it was emphasised that their position would 
always be vulnerable and subject to the will of the white government ‘so long as 
colonialism remained with us’.80 
Meetings would often close with a song, heavily laden with political 
connotations, so as to heighten the political fervour of the people. In interview, 
Soloman Mwamba, an African shop owner in Lusaka and ANC activist in the 1950s 
and 1960s, alluded to the powerful effect that such songs had upon attendees. 
They gave the veneer of something akin to a ‘church service’ and ‘made [us] believe 
that we belonged to something much bigger, much [more] significant than a small 
village gathering’.81 When looking at just one of the songs sung at ANC meetings, it 
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is obvious why they were recounted with such reverence. It is worth quoting in its 
entirety; 
Ubintungwa bwesu bwakale 
Our Freedom is our birth right 
It was given to us by God 
He gave the soil to all His men  
Living on earth today. 
 
Mwebombeni bombeni bombeni 
Let’s do more, do more, do more. 
All we sons of Africa. 
 
Nomba twabikukisha ifyakale 
Now let us remember all your deeds  
When you Europeans came to this land 
You mercilessly rounded up our people, 
And sold them as your slave; 
You dropped those one into the sea 
Who were sick and weak, 
You always wickedly laughed at them 
As fish ate them up.82 
     
The link with church services was quite deliberate, especially when 
considering ANC concerns over the barrier that Northern Rhodesia’s churches might 
in future to Congress activities. Congress did in fact have many sympathisers within 
the church, many had encouraged if not actively supported Congress’ anti-
Federation campaign. But there nevertheless remained the perception that white 
Christian leaders were working hand in hand with colonialists, telling their followers 
that a good Christian could not be a nationalist. Makasa suggested that a number of 
missionaries even went so far as to preach against Congress in Sunday services. 
Makasa describes how he and Kaunda were one Sunday impelled to walk out of a 
church service at Lubwa Mission in protest against remarks made by Reverend 
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MacPherson against Congress. The party thus had to plan its strategy accordingly.83 
The immediate objective was to show people that they could be both Christian and 
nationalist. What better way to do so, leaders argued, than to tie closely the notion 
of freedom with God’s will? It was perhaps for this reason that every Congress 
meeting opened with a Christian prayer and that emphasis was placed on the 
notion that the God spoken about by whites in church was the very same as ‘Lesa, 
our Creator’.84 
Whilst meetings were an important tactic used by Congress to arouse mass 
support, they targeted a comparatively small number of people. They therefore had 
to be used in conjunction with a more far-reaching campaign that targeted a 
significantly larger audience. In much a similar way to the NAC, the ANC 
endeavoured to build Congress prestige by capitalising upon ‘local’ grievances that 
could then be presented to Africans at grassroots as a manifestation of living under 
colonial rule. The most notable exteriorisation of this policy was presented in 1954 
during the boycott of European-owned shops in Lusaka. The protests initially began 
in remonstration against the discriminatory practices in butcheries, where African 
customers frequently complained of the degrading manner in which they were 
forced to buy ‘highly stinking meat’ served from hatches.85  
Independent of directives from ANC Headquarters, Congress members 
began to picket offending shops. Africans respected the picket lines and within 
week the boycotts had spread to Livingstone, Mazabuka and the Copperbelt 
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towns.86 After a period of seven weeks, during which the Congress took their 
complaints to the African Urban Advisory Council, the Chambers of Commerce 
advised Lusaka butchers to seal their hatches and open their doors to Africans. 
Most importantly, in the opinion of both settlers and Africans themselves, the 
boycotts had gone some way to ‘re-establish Congress as the champion against 
injustices’.87 This was evident not only in the growth of ANC membership that 
according to Kaunda in a Congress circular had increased to ‘well over 20,000’, but 
also by the proliferation of new Congress branches across the territory.88 It was 
more likely that the numbers quoted by Kaunda were ‘Congress Sympathisers’ as 
opposed to members, but there was no doubt that Congress activists had begun to 
establish the party as a prominent force in Northern Rhodesian politics. As an 
intelligence summary commented, ‘Congress is taking advantage of the popularity 
gained by the success of the recently conducted colour-bar campaign and is using 
this regained popularity as a means of exerting pressure in officially recognised 
political organisations’.89 This was arguable reflected in the increase in Congress 
public meetings, with attendances regularly reaching over 1,000.90  
The boycotts brought into sharp focus the nature of the struggle in which 
Africans were involved with Europeans. It thus became a useful weapon for 
Congress since it relied almost exclusively upon grass root support to sustain 
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momentum. Perhaps deliberately timed to coincide with the rolling strikes on the 
Copperbelt and settler demands for Dominion status, a second more widespread 
outbreak of ANC-inspired boycotts of European and Asian shops took place in April 
1956. At first, owing to disagreements among the participants concerning the 
extent to which more ‘extreme’ tactics ought to be used, dissension appeared in 
ANC ranks, and Nkumbula called off the boycotts on 23 April. In May and June, 
however, they were resumed, this time more effectively and in a larger number of 
centres. In most cases, boycotts broke out in response to similar grievances as 
those expressed in 1954. They began in Lusaka and soon spread to Broken Hill, 
Chingola and later to Ndola and Kitwe. In each instance the European press 
reported that the boycotts were ‘100% effective’, a conclusion echoed in the 
Northern Rhodesian monthly intelligence digest.91  
Features of the Congress shop boycotts were also discernible in the beerhall 
protests that took place between 1954 and 1957. There, Congress sought to exploit 
‘local’ grievances arising over the issue of state regulation of the production and 
consumption of traditional-type grain beers outside beerhalls. For the authorities, 
beerhalls were a method of keeping African social behaviour within ‘acceptable’ 
and ‘moderate’ lines. To Africans working in Copperbelt towns in which beerhalls 
operated, they were seen as impersonal mass institutions that bred ‘crime and 
immorality’ and eroded traditional customs. They were, for many, a poignant 
symbol of African subjection to colonial rule.92 When drinking in beerhalls, it was 
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impossible for Africans to conduct their social and cultural rituals that were often 
the norm in African communities for the communal beer party. Resistance to state 
alcohol regulations initially took the form of ignoring them, with many instead 
choosing to drink within the confines of their own homes or areas in order to 
recreate as much as possible traditional drinking patterns. Women assumed 
responsibility for brewing and selling the beer, the setting in which it was consumed 
resembling somewhat of a village context. It quickly became an established 
occupation for women in towns and was one of the very few means at their 
disposal to support themselves and their families.93 Beerhall protest thus possessed 
a strong economic as well as social character.  
The first direct popular challenge to the beerhall monopoly system came in 
1954, again in Lusaka. There, competition from illicit producers had sharply reduced 
beerhall revenues and caused municipal officials to step up police raids on 
brewers.94 In April, the women brewers, working with the women’s wing of the 
Lusaka branch of the ANC, began holding meetings to complain about what they 
regarded as discriminatory state practices. Protest culminated at the end of May in 
a mass demonstration at government headquarters in the centre of Lusaka. Leaders 
of the protesters appealed to colonial officials for a modification of the beer 
monopoly that would permit women to brew beer for sale at the municipal 
beerhalls, arguing that since Africans were forbidden to consume white liquors such 
as whiskey and gin they ought to be free to produce and consume their own African 
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drinks. The District Commissioner informed the crowd that their demands could not 
be accommodated as the law forbade private brewing. According to the press 
account, after the DC withdrew, ‘the women rushed forward and adopted a 
hysterical attitude, and attempted to force an entry into the office’. The Northern 
Rhodesian police were subsequently summoned and used tear gas to disperse the 
crowd.95 In the months that followed there were sporadic recurrences of unrest as 
compound residents tried to enforce boycotts of the beerhalls.96  
Recognising the strength of African feeling over the issue, Congress 
organised a national campaign against beerhalls in 1957. Beginning in Lusaka in 
early July, the campaign caused considerable disorder in the Copperbelt, shutting 
down beerhalls in several key locations for extended periods. Pickets spread quickly 
from Lusaka to the Copperbelt where the boycotts gained almost total 
effectiveness.97 In Mufulira, more than ‘500 demonstrators blocked beer deliveries’, 
while in Luanshya the government was forced to call in paramilitary anti-riot forces 
to quell protests.98 The authorities found it difficult to respond to, or even 
comprehend the anger and militancy of African men and women. Officials 
ultimately concluded that such demonstrations were not spontaneous but well-
orchestrated manipulations of the beer issue by Congress leaders bent on whipping 
up African discontent.99  
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The ANC’s anti-Federation campaign was confined solely to urban regions. 
Party leaders were equally concerned to mobilise in the countryside, seeking where 
possible to exploit discontent arising from the imposition of ‘oppressive’ state 
conservation legislation. The zeal with which authorities sought to implement 
conservation measures reflected an official obsession with the safeguarding of their 
colonial resources for capitalist interests. As the Copperbelt grew in wealth, and as 
the need for copper increased with America’s strategic stockpiling programme for 
the Korean War, the need to feed Copperbelt workers became a key priority. The 
principal focus of state-sponsored development schemes was thus geared towards 
maximising crop production and conserving natural resources. The departments for 
Agriculture, Game, Forestry and Fisheries launched several initiatives during this 
period in order to meet wider development aims. For the Agricultural Department, 
the introduction of conservation measures such as rotation of crops and planting of 
fertilising legumes were the key means of conservation. In the Mweru-Luapula 
region, Luapula Province, the Fisheries Department introduced the Lagreed Law in 
1953, a measure intended to protect species of commercially valuable fish, such as 
Luapula salmon, by extending the closed season from 1 January to 31 March.100 The 
implementation and heavy-handed enforcement of legislation proved particularly 
irksome for a community dependent upon fish for their subsistence and 
livelihood.101 
For those living in rural regions, subjection to agricultural restrictions 
created unnecessary hardships. It was also, some felt, a blatant violation of African 
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birth rights. The implementation of rural development schemes accordingly 
attained political significance, one that Congress became keen to exploit. This was 
not simply a matter of the colonial state infringing upon agricultural practices, ANC 
propagandists argued, this was an attempt by settlers to reserve for themselves the 
resources of the land before it was eventually taken from Africans. ‘A colonist is 
land grubbing’ Nkumbula told the people of Northern Rhodesia. ‘He knows that the 
entire economy of the colonial peoples is primarily agricultural ... He does 
everything possible to impoverish them to make the colonial poor so as to force 
him into his hands’.102 This was an easy message to translate: Federation meant 
domination by Europeans and the spread of discriminatory policy that would 
displace Africans from their land. The convergence of these issues in the early 
1950s, accentuated by the forced movement of thousands of Tonga speaking 
Africans in the Zambezi Valley to make way for the Kariba Dam scheme – to less 
adequate and less fertile land no less – undoubtedly worked in Congress’ favour. In 
so doing, party activists were able to encourage swathes of people to defy fishing 
and game restrictions and to abandon recommended soil conservation practices.103 
In some regions, widespread non-cooperation made difficult state enforcement of 
their policies, and the threat of violence against officials employed to oversee 
compliance with regulations caused several provincial authorities to back down.104 
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Between 1954 and 1957 in the Mansa District of the Luapula Province, for instance, 
restrictions on hunting and fishing were lifted and rural development effectively 
stopped. 
As Jotham Momba has demonstrated, however, participation in Congress-
inspired rural protest was not at this stage universal. Rather, it was highly 
dependent upon socio-economic differentiation among the peasantry.105 In regions 
where there existed a high concentration of peasants that benefitted economically 
from state interventionist policies, such as the Improved Farmers Scheme (IFS), 
launched in Southern, Central and Eastern Provinces in the later 1940 and early 
1950s, support for Congress was at best lukewarm. The IFS entailed giving exclusive 
extension services and agricultural credit to those peasants who were willing to join 
the scheme and adhered strictly to the methods of crop husbandry prescribed by 
the Department of Agriculture. In addition peasants joining the scheme were able 
to purchase farming implements at subsidised prices, also receiving a 'bonus' of 
K2.70 per acre cultivated that other peasants did not get.106 The scheme was for 
some clearly beneficial. Those participating in the IFS, for example, had an average 
annual income of K80.00, while those outside it averaged K30.00.107  
When the ANC attempted to discredit the government by attacking the IFS, 
they subsequently failed to arouse those comparatively well-off, self-improving 
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peasant farmers whose interests were likely to have been adversely affected by 
participation in the ANC-led non-cooperation campaign. Between 1953 and 1956, 
many Africans continued to register for membership of the scheme leading many 
contemporaries to conclude that Africans in rural areas remained generally 
unmoved by Congress propaganda.108 As Bishop Pailleaux of Fort Rosebery claimed 
in February 1957,   
The mass of the African population in rural areas is more or less unaware of 
political problems and procedure ... In fact, the Congress claims to be the 
mouthpiece of African opinion in Northern Rhodesia. In reality, it is the 
extremists within it who are vocal, and give the impression that they are 
supported by the whole African population.109 
 
Indeed it was only when the state reduced bonuses paid to IFS members and 
limited the period in which farmers could draw this bonus to five years — a result of 
the decrease in world copper prices — that opposition was raised by disgruntled 
farmers. Their response, rather than turn to Congress, was to form their own 
farmers associations which sprang up in areas of the Southern, Eastern and Central 
provinces. This did not mean that wealthier peasants alienated themselves entirely 
from the anti-Federation struggle; issues such as land loss, hardship caused by taxes 
and general discrimination in the provision of services affected all Africans. Where 
they differed from others was that their involvement in the ANC was qualified 
precisely by the degree of state support they obtained in improving their position 
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Intensification of the Anti-Federation Struggle, 1957-58 
 
Congress actions proved hugely successful in mobilising Africans in a campaign of 
civil disobedience in Northern Rhodesia after 1956, a year that marked an 
intensification of the campaign to achieve secession from Federation. Undoubtedly 
precipitated by Malvern’s statement that he hoped to soon achieve Dominion 
status for the Federation, both Kaunda and Nkumbula urged Africans to unite in 
order to form a force that no military power could break.110 In a Congress circular, 
Kaunda instructed Congress branches to ‘arrange big protest meetings’ and ‘pass 
resolutions demanding to know what was meant by His Excellency’s remark that he 
wanted rid of the Colonial Office as quickly as possible’.111 Both leaders warned 
against the continued marginalisation of Africans in governmental affairs and hoped 
that Britain would stick to its promise that Africans would not be forced into an 
‘alliance’ with the Federal Government.112  
The passing of the 1957 Constitution Amendment Act and subsequent 
decision to ignore the veto of the African Affairs Board represented a critical 
turning point. Before 1956, Africans identified themselves primarily as ‘British 
Protected Persons’. Despite having been ‘sold out’ over Federation, Congress 
leaders continued to ‘trust that the Colonial Office will stand by us ... there is 
nothing else we can trust’.113 After the passing of the 1957 Act, the tone and 
language of Congress literature changed drastically. Coinciding with the granting of 
independence to Ghana, which ‘intensified the feeling of nationalism among the 
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people’, Nkumbula, Kaunda and their counterparts became more assertive in their 
claims for Northern Rhodesia’s secession.114 ‘We must have a government which is 
a true representation of the people’, Nkumbula told his supporters. ‘We don’t beg 
this country from anyone ... It is your country, it is mine. I say it is the country of the 
Africans’.115 The fierce debate over proposals to entrench settler ascendancy 
provided a fruitful pretext for arousing African emotions, particularly among the 
youth. For the first time since the ANC had embarked upon its mobilisation 
programme, party activists could point to a tangible manifestation of the inherent 
contradictions of ‘partnership’ which, in turn, provided the basis for a ‘national’ 
appeal. ‘The simple fact of the matter as it appeared to Africans’, wrote Harry 
Franklin, Member for African Interests to Lennox-Boyd, was that the ‘Europeans 
were intending to unify and consolidate themselves, so as to maintain and increase 
their power and dominance over the black people, a line of action easily 
understandable by Africans in view of the history of their own tribes. Nothing that 
has happened since Federation has done anything to shake this view’, he said. 
Much had happened to ‘strengthen it’.116  
The escalation of Congress-inspired political agitation was especially 
apparent in the Northern and Copperbelt Provinces. The change in Congress 
emphasis, J.C.M. Ng’andu, the ANC’s Northern Province Provincial Secretary 
observed, had marked an upturn in fortunes for the ANC in the north. ‘Both corners 
of the [Northern] Province have been awakened by the national bell’, he said. 
‘Between two and six branches were being registered each week and the Kasama 
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district was enrolling members from 40-65 a day’.117 The ANC’s progress had been 
so impressive that the District Commissioner in Kasama had tried to introduce a 
system of forced labour ‘as a weapon to make people hate Congress’.118  
Taking place soon after the declaration of a state of emergency on the 
Copperbelt, the ANC’s campaign occurred at a particularly volatile moment. 
Municipal beerhall boycotts, stepped up by party activists in July, were regarded by 
authorities as the starting point from which more extreme demonstrations took 
place. The first and most obvious reason for this belief was the degree of 
organisation that characterised the boycotts, an organisation that involved the 
employment of women for picketing, and an opportunism that enabled Congress to 
take advantage of acts of hooliganism committed by gangs of youths to spread 
disaffection across the region. In the field, the rapid growth of protest often 
resulted in political activities extending beyond the reach of party headquarters. 
Junior party officials were accordingly provided with sufficient latitude to interpret 
party policy and conduct operations as they saw fit. From the perspective of the 
authorities, the rise of the Action Group, the ‘strong arm’ of Congress led by W.K. 
Sikalumbi, was a worrying development. Not only was the Group held responsible 
for the deployment of intimidation to enforce compliance with Congress non-
cooperation, but it indicated that many of the ‘more aggressive’ Congress leaders 
were beginning to gain an upper hand in the party.119 Most concerning, however, 
was the notion that the Action Group was functioning independently of directives 
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from ANC leaders. ‘I do not think that the Action Group is operating under 
instructions from Congress headquarters and I do not think the various branches of 
the Action Group are operating on any coordinated plan’, wrote Governor Arthur 
Benson. 
I believe that, having thought up the Action Group, Congress headquarters 
have virtually no control now over what the Action Group branches do. If 
Britain raises an army it must either let that army do the fighting or else 
occupy its time in a post-training period ... No such way of keeping 
enthusiasm alive in Action Group branches has been thought up either by 
Nkumbula or anybody else. When Harry Nkumbula decrees a boycott of 
beer halls therefore local Action Group branches go into action of their 
own accord.120 
 
Nkumbula had created in the ANC a ‘frankenstein’ that was now ‘beyond his 
control’, the Northern News reported in September. The whole basis of the 
boycotts had now changed. They had a ‘look of nationalism, naked and 
unashamed’.121 
In rural areas too, Congress displayed a renewed determination to 
undermine the government. Seeking to maximise discontent arising from changes 
to the IFS, ANC propagandists skilfully manipulated the situation to encourage a 
number of improved farmers from deregistering from the scheme. ‘There is no 
doubt that the influence of Congress in the Southern Province is at present 
extremely strong’, reported intelligence officials.122 ANC attacks on state 
intervention policies precipitated widespread, non-cooperation civil disobedience. 
In Chief Mwansa’s area, Congress convinced many that the government’s cattle 
inoculation scheme would be carried out by men instructed to sterilise cows and kill 
bulls. When cattle inoculations were scheduled to begin on 29 April, four village 
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headmen failed to produce their animals and were fined £5 each. Over 400 villagers 
congregated to protest and were dispersed only after persuaded to do so by the 
Police Mobile Unit.123 The most serious expression of Congress militancy occurred 
on 10 September in the Gwembe Valley. The ANC had been active in the area for 
months, seeking to exploit discontent manifesting from forced eviction of Tonga 
villagers from the low-lying areas in the path of the rising Lake Kariba, by 
encouraging non-compliance with the scheme. When security forces were deployed 
to remove those refusing to accept their fate, riots erupted resulting in the death of 
nine African villagers. This was followed in Lusaka and Broken Hill by a spate of 
arson attempts, a train derailment and yet further boycotts.  
The year 1957 can therefore be seen as extremely important for nationalists 
in Northern Rhodesia. First and foremost, this was because the proliferation of 
urban-rural protests that erupted across the territory had involved a much wider 
demographic of people than hitherto, including some improved farmers and high-
ranking chiefs. As Walima Kalusa has shown, rising popular militancy in 1957 deeply 
affected those previously ambivalent to participate in Congress’ anti-Federation 
campaign. In his study of Chief Kalonga Gawa Undi X of the Eastern Province, Kalusa 
demonstrated that for many chiefs, the increase in political temperature in their 
jurisdictions made difficult the adoption of an indifferent or hostile attitude 
towards Congress.124 Given the extent to which Native Authorities and Native 
Courts were used by the colonial state as a means to forestall Congress progress in 
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rural areas, imploring them to ban nationalists and to arrest, prosecute and 
imprison ANC ‘agitators’ in their jurisdiction, the support of chiefs undoubtedly 
helped facilitate an increase in political activity in particular areas. Kalonga Gawa 
Undi X, for instance, gave support to Congress by taking advantage of the law that 
permitted paramount and senior chiefs in the territory to nominate appointees to 
Native Authorities. Unsurprisingly, Nkumbula and Kaunda later came to recognise 
the indispensability of the chief to the nationalist struggle and paid close attention 
to keeping them ‘on side’ in key locations.    
Perhaps the real significance of this period however lies in the manner in 
which participants in ANC protests interpreted their actions as forming part of a 
much wider struggle. In her memoirs, Foster Mubanga, then a teenager who began 
working for the ANC in 1957, described how her first party assignment was to 
picket the beerhalls in Mikomfwa Township in Luanshya on the Copperbelt so that 
people would stop drinking beer and attend the Congress party meeting. On the 
morning of 12 July, Mubanga, with her female ANC colleagues, positioned 
themselves at the entrance to the beerhall. When people began to arrive, they 
found the women ‘angry and unsmiling’; they were performing a duty, Mubanga 
told them, ‘because we don’t want anyone to enter’. After a short while, three 
policemen came and asked why the women were creating a disturbance. ‘You have 
no authority to stop anyone from drinking beer if he has his own money’, the 
European policeman told them. ‘I order you to leave this instant. If you don’t leave, 
we will shoot’. Some women became fearful and began to give excuses to leave. 
Many stayed. When more police were called and began to fire tear gas, the women 
stood firm. Noticing that the women had not moved, the police moved in to arrest 
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Mubanga and the others. They were released from custody later that day and told 
to return on 17 August for trial at which the women were convicted and put on 
probation.125 The events that transpired on 12 July were distressing for Mubanga, 
but it ‘did not matter what happened to us’, she said, ‘because we had declared 
that we would suffer for our country’.126  
As Mubanga’s insightful account indicates, for many people this was no 
longer a struggle against African discrimination in the localities; this was a struggle 
for African freedom, for the nation. It was a time in which the protest against white 
settler domination was replaced by the adoption of a nationalist programme. The 
year 1957, Arthur Wina, who later became a key figure in the United National 
Independence Party, remarked in 1960, was a crucial phase in the history of the 
independence movement. It marked the highest point of the anti-Federation, 
‘protest’ movement and at the same time the birth of a ‘truly nationalistic’ 
movement under determined leadership.127 But whilst it undoubtedly provided 
ANC activists with renewed impetus to increase calls for African self-government, it 
also created division within the party that later manifested in open conflict. 
  
A contradiction in terms: Nationalist protest and the undermining of the 
‘national’ message in Northern Rhodesia 
 
One could be forgiven for thinking that by the end of 1957 the ANC’s prospects 
appeared to be bright. Not only had Congress raised popular antipathy to the 
proposed Federal and territorial constitutional changes, but the party’s leaders 
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appeared to have created a political programme that spoke to a wider 
demographic. Beneath the surface, however, there existed friction within the 
movement, rooted in ethno-regional differences that that threatened to divide the 
party. These became especially apparent once disagreement rose to the fore over 
Congress tactics. The ANC was in many respects a veritable patchwork of ethnic and 
socio-economic groups. Whilst Congress leaders endeavoured to overcome these 
boundaries by uniting the waged workforce in the Copperbelt and its vast Northern 
hinterland with the rural-based agricultural producers in the Southern and Central 
Provinces under a ‘national’, anti-Federation agenda, the party’s mobilisation 
strategy served merely to entrench existing divisions. Tension erupted following 
Nkumbula’s statement on the Northern Rhodesian government’s 1958 draft 
Proposals for Constitutional Change in Northern Rhodesia, which appeared to 
suggest the ANC’s willingness to work within the narrow constitutional confines of 
the controversial Benson constitution.128 Considered by the National Executive 
Council of the ANC not to be exhaustive enough to pass for a true representation of 
African opinion, a sub-committee of six was elected to issue a more appropriate 
response.129 The NEC’s actions appeared to Nkumbula as a challenge to his 
leadership and in early 1958, with opposition growing, he began purging the 
Congress of those openly opposed to him. This was considered a ‘grotesque’ and 
‘unconstitutional’ action by the ANC’s organising secretary in Fort Jameson who 
remarked that Nkumbula was beginning to undermine the very basis of ‘freedom’ 
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and ‘African unity’ upon which Congress had been founded.130 Amos Mwembe was 
not a lone voice in the party. Nkumbula’s ‘intrigue and malicious gossip’, wrote the 
members of the Luapula Provincial Executive Council, had ‘put Congress to a 
wreckage point, decomposing it to pieces in all its affairs’.131 Especially irksome to 
officials in the Province was the perceived notion that Nkumbula was spending 
funds collected for the party on ‘beer and women’.132 With votes of no confidence 
in his leadership being passed by a number of provincial executives and open 
attacks from demoted officials receiving wide publicity the press, Nkumbula, 
presumably with a view to reasserting his authority over the Party, announced he 
would seek re-election at a general conference to be held in October.133  
In mid-October, Kaunda’s return from Tanganyika and India provided the 
anti-Nkumbula faction with the incentive required to make an assault on the 
President’s leadership. The pivotal moment came during the NEC session at the 
ANC Conference on 24 October when Kaunda, Simon Kapwepwe, Munu Sipalo and 
a number of top officials walked out of the meeting in protest. On 26 October, the 
split was formalised. Nkumbula was re-elected to the presidency of the ANC, while 
the anti-Nkumbula bloc reconvened at Broken Hill two days later to formally launch 
the Zambian African National Congress. Kaunda was elected President, Paul 
Kalichini, Vice-President, Kapwepwe, National Treasurer, Sipalo, General Secretary, 
Walter Sikalumbi, Deputy General Secretary and Sikota Wina, International Publicity 
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Officer. The choosing of the name of the new party was itself significant, 
deliberately intended to sway disaffected ANC supporters. As Robert Makasa 
remarked,  
‘We unanimously agreed that it would be unwise for us to come out with a 
completely different name which would not be easy for our supporters to 
pick up quickly. Since the people were used to the name ‘African National 
Congress’, our task was to find a name which should be as near to African 
National Congress as possible but at the same time without creating 
confusion among our supporters’.134  
 
The reasons publicly advanced by ZANC’s leaders for the split focussed 
predominantly upon Nkumbula’s political failings. He was, Kaunda wrote to his 
friend Thomas Fox-Pitt of the Anti-Slavery Society, a ‘tired’, ‘moderate’ leader 
whose ambivalence to challenge the colonial authorities and work within 
constitutional parameters laid down by the government revealed an underling 
‘political despondence’. ‘He has brought us all to a standstill’, Kaunda wrote, 
‘because he does not see how Africans can get through their present set of 
problems’.135 At local ANC meetings Kaunda was far more vociferous in his 
condemnation of his former ally. Describing his time with Nkumbula in London in 
1957, from which Nkumbula infamously returned to Northern Rhodesia on the eve 
before an important meeting with the Colonial Secretary to discuss constitutional 
arrangements, Kaunda told followers in Mikomfwa that their leader was 
‘preoccupied with beer and women’. He had done ‘nothing’ while in England, 
instead indulging in the ‘white woman’ that attended to him. ‘Was this fair?’, 
Kaunda asked, ‘do you want a leader who behaves like this?’.136 Other ZANC 
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cohorts echoed Kaunda’s criticism, utilising similar language to lambast their former 
President. He was ‘lazy’, a ‘drunkard’ that had ‘done the country down’; many had 
‘completely switched him off the front line in the fight for African freedom’.137  
Given the absence of contradictory evidence, historians such as David 
Mulford are not necessarily wrong to propose that the split in the ANC owed much 
to the changing requirements of the nationalist leadership, which required, above 
all else, a ‘well-organised and highly disciplined movement led by men imbued with 
a spirit of self-sacrifice and commitment to the struggle’.138 It is crucial, 
nonetheless, to look beyond justifications so obviously designed to legitimise the 
split from the ‘father’ of African nationalism. To concur with Giacomo Macola, the 
ANC-ZANC divide was perhaps more a consequence of the shifting entho-regional 
dynamics of African nationalism, closely interwoven with contemporary politico-
economic circumstances, which facilitated the rise of competing interest groups 
each seeking to assert their primacy over the national movement.139   
Whilst local protest had played an essential role in rebuilding Congress 
prestige, it ostensibly allowed for particular regions to dictate the pace at which 
they agitated for change. In the politically charged atmosphere of the Copperbelt 
and Northern Provinces, Congress branch leaders consistently advocated a more 
militant course of action. Whilst their President repeatedly emphasised his desire to 
win African freedom, urban-based members grew ever more disillusioned with 
Congress’ direction. Not only was the President seemingly ‘ignoring’ the ANC in the 
north, many complaining that he only visited the area to canvas for votes, but his 
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leadership was seen to possess a distinct bias towards the rural south.140 Lacking 
direction and coordination from the centre, and growing increasingly frustrated at 
the failure to achieve constitutional and socio-economic concessions for Africans, it 
was easy for many branch officials to take matters into their own hands. The 
increasing pressure from Congress’ urban cohort to increase political agitation was 
regarded by many in the Tonga-speaking regions of the Southern and Central 
Provinces as an overt challenge to their place within the movement. Their concerns 
were evident in a letter sent by Tonga militants in the ‘Choma Action Group’ to 
Munu Sipalo in August 1957, warning him that the Tonga tribe did not fear the 
Bemba in the north ‘trying to become the leaders of Congress.141  
With his support largely emanating from the south, a product of his 
Southern Province roots and deep personal affection for the region, Nkumbula’s 
response to the urban challenge was to re-emphasise the primacy of Southern 
Province concerns in the national struggle. This came to be reflected in his fixation 
over the Land Question, notably in the anti-Kariba resettlement campaign, and his 
attempts to forestall urban-based militancy by calling off the municipal boycott 
campaign in April 1956 and September 1957. It was Nkumbula’s concern to appeal 
to his Southern-Central supporters that caused him to take the controversial 
decision to participate in the Benson elections. This was not because Nkumbula 
agreed with the proposals, but because many self-improving, Southern Province-
based peasant farmers upon whom Nkumbula was reliant for authority in the face 
of criticism from the north were unlikely to have countenanced the type of radical 
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opposition necessary to alter them. Unable and unwilling to accept this position, 
Congress’ more militant urban-based cohort opted to break from the ANC. It was 
not a decision taken lightly, but in order to advance their position it was deemed 
essential for progress that new organisation was formed, one more capable of 
representing their interests.    
Put simply, the ANC-ZANC split was not solely a consequence of conflict over 
tactics. Rather, division had its origins in underlying tribal differences which 
Congress activists had failed to overcome in the construction of the anti-Federation 
campaign. The course of nationalist politics in Northern Rhodesia in the late 1950s 
thus presents somewhat of a contrasting picture. Whilst Congress leaders had 
experienced some success in reigniting popular fervour against the Federation, it 
was apparent that the national programme was being steadily undermined by 
competing ethno-regional forces that were driving the movement apart. Despite 
attempts by the ANC to transcend existing ethno-regionalist boundaries by creating 
a focal point for popular anger in the localities, it became increasingly difficult to 
weld together such forces once it became apparent that they were being driven by 
‘local’, region-specific issues. Whilst interpretation of the ‘national’ anti-Federation 
message remained generally consistent throughout the territory, the ways in which 
Congress members worked towards achieving the party’s goals was conditioned by 
the ethno-socio-economic composition of the regions in which the party operated. 
Ultimately, this created an untenable situation for which the only recourse was the 
fragmentation of African nationalism. The future for the ANC and ZANC at the close 
of 1958 was uncertain; the split had cast a long shadow over African politics and 
valuable momentum had been lost from the struggle. But, in spite of the 
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tumultuous events that had transpired at the October ANC National Conference, it 
is essential that the achievements of nationalist politicians are not overlooked. 
From nothing, Congress leaders had fostered resentment against the colonial state 
and had laid the foundations upon which mass nationalist sentiment was built. The 
ANC-ZANC divide ought to be interpreted, then, as a point of transition, the 




The years 1953-1958 were a period of unprecedented growth for the Congresses of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By 1958, African opposition to Federation was 
both vocal and widespread. This owed much to the efforts of the ANC and NAC in 
translating the anti-Federation message to Africans at grass roots by exploiting local 
grievances and linking them intimately to the issue of settler domination. Despite 
the growth of political sentiment among the African masses at this time, however, 
historians have questioned whether Congress-inspired protests formed part of a 
genuine, ‘national’, struggle, or whether they were simply expressions of local 
discontent. For historians such as Robert Rotberg, local protests in no way 
represented a ‘national’ struggle. Resentment of European domination, Rotberg 
argues, undoubtedly existed, but the mere expression of African hostility to alien 
control was not sufficient proof of the existence of nationalism.142 Writing in 1985, 
Kees Van Donge supported Rotberg’s view. The ostensibly local focus of ANC and 
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NAC mobilisation campaigns, he suggested, meant that participation in the anti-
Federation struggle was highly dependent upon differing socio-economic and 
ethno-regional circumstances and, as such, individuals were striving to achieve very 
different goals. This consequently inhibited the construction of a genuine ‘national’ 
programme to which all could subscribe.143  
The intention of this chapter has been to challenge these ideas. Whilst the 
motivations for participation in the anti-Federation struggle was subject to regional 
variation, the fact that Federation was regarded as the source of local problems 
would at least suggest that ANC and NAC leaders had created a sense of a shared 
‘national’ grievance. Forms of local protest encompassing large groups of people 
gave Africans common experiences, a sense of common history and, in a similar 
manner to the experiences of the Indian Congress, a common language. Although 
Africans had yet to identify themselves as ‘Zambians’ or ‘Malawians’, the 
Congresses had by 1958 succeeded in bringing together Africans, for the first time, 
in a mass protest movement against the state.144 At a time in which both 
Congresses were struggling for support and to stimulate African interest in ‘high 
political’ matters, the exploitation of local tension thus performed a crucial 
function, a means by which Congress could bring together the people of Central 
Africa, transcending ethno-regional and socio-economic boundaries.145 The 
emphasis on popular fears of land alienation or white domination were rooted in 
historical experience, but they did speak to a much broader constituency and, as 
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such, held the potential for overcoming parochial boundaries. It was this shared 
sense of identity which established the basis for the emergence of mass 
nationalism. Here, parallels can be drawn with Benedict Anderson’s argument 
pertaining to nationalism, which was not defined, he suggests, by the extent to 
which individuals affiliated themselves to the boundaries of a particular territory. 
Rather, the ‘nation’ took shape through the visible, ritual organisation of popular 
protest. Whilst most inhabitants within a particular territory were strangers to one 
another, individuals were bound together in an ‘imagined community’, in emotional 
solidarity as well as in a sovereign political entity.146   
By 1958 African leaders had succeeded in bringing together the educated 
and uneducated, the urban and rural, in a struggle for African socio-economic and 
political equality. This was no mean feat given the obstacles facing African 
politicians in 1953, an aspect that the historiography has a tendency to neglect. It 
cannot be said that nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was by the 
end of the period altogether cohesive, however. Although tactics deployed to re-
awaken the African masses had rebuilt Congress prestige, they gave rise to divisions 
that would later come to fatally undermine the premise on which the national 
struggle had been conceived. The thesis will examine these developments in much 
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3  
British Anti-Colonialism and the 
Development of Nationalism in Northern 






As suggested in the previous chapter, despite the failure of the Congress parties of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to achieve meaningful African political advance 
in the Federation between 1953 and 1958, Congress leaders had nevertheless 
succeeded in mobilising vast swathes Africans to the anti-Federation cause. In so 
doing they were not only able to imprint upon the minds of policy makers in 
London that African nationalism was a growing force in Central Africa, but were also 
able to stake their claim to the national dispensation then materialising.1 
Historiographically, the early success of the African National Congress [ANC] and 
the Nyasaland African Congress [NAC] political mobilisation and anti-Federation 
campaign rested almost entirely upon the initiative of the small cohort of educated 
African politicians. It was their role in linking together local protests which helped 
translate complex political arguments against Federation into easily understandable 
terms, creating the basis for a genuine ‘national’ movement. What has remained a 
relatively unexplored facet of this process is the extent to which both Congress 
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parties relied upon external agencies, notably British anti-colonial sympathisers, for 
support in achieving their political and popular mobilisation objectives.  
That the crucial correlation between British anti-colonial and national 
constituencies has remained overlooked undoubtedly lies in the 
compartmentalisation of knowledge in Imperial and Africanist historiography. Even 
those studies that have explored in depth the impact of the anti-colonial movement 
upon the anti-colonial struggle say very little about the extent to which these 
individuals and left-wing groups engaged with, and influenced, the trajectory of 
nationalist politics on the spot.2 This has resulted not only in the tendency to regard 
nationalist development as a process confined to the territories in which nationalist 
movements proliferated, but has similarly resulted in the tendency to discuss the 
work of British anti-colonialists within an exclusively British context. The intention 
of this chapter is to provide a necessary corrective to these prevailing 
historiographical trends.   
By virtue of a sustained campaign waged on behalf of Africans in Britain, and 
by providing financial assistance and organisational advice, anti-colonialists handed 
nationalist leaders an important boost in the fight to win African political 
advancement. In serving as a conduit between the periphery and metropole, anti-
colonialists helped legitimise the anti-Federation struggle, at the same time winning 
for the ANC and the NAC status as the representatives of African political opinion in 
their respective territories. By 1958, these parties and their leaders, Harry 
Nkumbula and Hastings Banda, were seen by the British government as being those 
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with whom future negotiations over African advancement would have to take 
place. Anti-colonialist actions, then, cultivated for the Congresses a degree of 
respectability in Britain and the West, something that not only gave Congress 
leaders confidence in pushing forward with their anti-Federation agenda, but 
something that would decisively alter the pattern of nationalist engagement with 
the wider international community in the early 1960s.     
 
Anti-Colonialism in British Politics and the Engagement with African 
Nationalism in Central Africa, 1953-1958  
 
The establishment of the Federation in Central Africa helped stimulate a much 
wider awareness of colonial issues among sections of the British left. It was, as 
David Goldsworthy suggests, a time of deepening liberal concern at the 
entrenchment of European settler ascendancy over African majorities, and, more 
specifically, the British government’s lack of initiative in halting this process.3 During 
the early 1950s, the issue caused swathes of British left-wing ministers and political 
activists to call for a fundamental reappraisal of Britain’s colonial policy. This 
resulted in the formation of organisations dedicated to providing colonial subjects 
with a prominent voice in the metropolitan legislature that might otherwise have 
remained unheard.4 Two of the most prominent were the Africa Bureau, formed 
under the directorship of Reverend Michael Scott in 1952, and the Council for the 
Defence of Seretse Khama5, later to evolve into the Movement for Colonial 
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Freedom [MCF] under the leadership of Fenner Brockway in 1954.6 Established with 
a remit to deal exclusively with African affairs, the Africa Bureau’s principal 
objective was to serve as an intermediary between Africans and the British people, 
at the same time assisting Africans in their opposition against ‘unfair discrimination 
and inequality of opportunity’ in Africa.7 The Bureau’s activities in support of its 
goals came down in practice to the presentation of information and arguments 
designed both to mobilise opinion and to influence policy makers.  
The MCF defined its role in similar terms, and like its predecessor, the 
Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism [COPAI], the Movement’s main objectives 
were primarily geared towards establishing among influential sections of British 
society a paternalistic approach to Britain’s management of its colonial peoples. 
Although essentially a partisan institution, the Movement was part of a great 
tradition of dissent in British politics. It subsequently drew into its membership 
large numbers of predominantly left-wing individuals including over 100 Labour 
MPs, some of whom even chaired MCF committees. At its peak, the MCF could 
count among its affiliates 38 Constituent Labour Parties and a considerable number 
of high profile Labour sponsors including future Prime Minister Harold Wilson, 
future Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood and the indefatigable anti-colonial 
campaigner and MP for Blackburn, Barbara Castle. The immediate purpose of the 
MCF was to create a ‘psychological revolution’ throughout the colonies and in 
Britain in order to ‘create goodwill’ and ‘release the energies of the people into 
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channels of social reconstruction’.8 Colonial people had ‘lost confidence in Britain’, 
millions had been ‘sacrificed to the interests of white settlers’, and unless change 
was forthcoming, the hope of regaining their confidence would be irrevocably 
‘destroyed’.9 
 There were clear distinctions between the Africa Bureau, the MCF and 
existing colonial research groups such as the Fabian Colonial Bureau [FCB]. Whereas 
the FCB served mainly as an advisory body that sought to influence colonial policy 
‘from the top’, a corollary of its close links with the Labour Party, the Africa Bureau 
and the MCF functioned more as an anti-colonial crusade. Whilst the FCB usually 
worked in isolation, to proceed by discussion and research and to achieve its ends 
through private contacts, the Africa Bureau and the MCF were eager to form links 
with wide sections of the community and to supplement their private activities with 
large-scale public campaigns. As such, both groups were prolific in publishing 
pamphlets, leaflets, newsletters and information bulletins for the general public 
and in arranging mass public meetings during times of crisis in the colonies.   
 The upheaval caused by the inauguration of the Federation in 1953 and the 
subsequent rise in membership of anti-colonial organisations, many of whom were 
also Labour MPs, increasingly brought pressure to bear on the Labour Party to 
respond to developments. By 1955, Labour’s back-bench MPs, over half of whom 
were sponsors of the MCF, could no longer be treated as simply another pressure 
group. Although the highest command, including Hugh Gaitskell, who became the 
Party’s leader in December 1955, shunned contact with the Movement, at least two 
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of the second-echelon men, Nye Bevan, architect of the Welfare State, and Harold 
Wilson, then serving as Labour’s spokesman on finance, were themselves among 
the sponsors. For a body that remained unaffiliated to the Party, this represented a 
significant overlap. A clear expression of the renewed impetus given to Labour’s 
colonial policy from the back-benches could be seen in the formation of four 
‘working parties’ to draft reports on plural societies, economic aid, the smaller 
territories and colour discrimination.10 What emerged from these discussions was 
the need to expand the work of the Party’s Commonwealth Sub-Committee. ‘Over 
the past two years most of the colonial policy writing we set ourselves has been 
completed and now forms a body of specific policy’, remarked Commonwealth 
Officer John Hatch, ‘we now need time to take stock and overhaul our 
administration in order to maintain closer and more regular contact with other 
socialist parties throughout the Commonwealth’.11 
The Federation had in its initial ideological incarnation been the inspiration 
of Labour-Fabian progressivism. As chapter one has argued, it was a measure 
intended to preserve African future political development by staving off pressure 
from settlers for amalgamation and moderating radical tendencies in African 
protest exhibited during the anti-Federation campaign. Even before the Federation 
came into existence, therefore, the Labour Party had been reluctant to criticise a 
scheme it had initially championed, albeit in a different form. With a number of 
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Labour Party members joining the anti-colonial crusade in the mid-1950s, indicated 
by the fact that in 1954 over 88.5 per cent of all Labour’s colonial questions 
emanated from MPs affiliated to anti-colonial bodies, and with the Federation 
failing to live up to preconceived expectations, Labour’s leadership felt obliged to 
respond to developments in Central Africa.12  
The publication of The Plural Society in June 1956 marked Labour’s official 
arrival at a position that the anti-colonial left had unofficially advocated for some 
years, a commitment to egalitarian democracy for plural societies.13 Whilst the 
document acknowledged that multiracialism might serve as a ‘transitional phase’, it 
explicitly stated Labour’s hope to abandon the Conservative government’s current 
policy in multi-racial colonies, which was based upon ‘racial difference’ as opposed 
to ‘human identity’, and to ‘forget race and colour’, since this would be the ‘truest 
safeguard of racial minorities’.14 The document was important not merely because 
it implied Labour’s adherence to the aims of anti-colonial bodies such as the MCF 
and the Africa Bureau, but because many Labour supporters, including the FCB, 
believed that it committed the Party to a goal ‘scarcely distinguishable’ from that of 
indigenous nationalists.15 Given that both the NAC and ANC had been campaigning 
for the removal of Federation, this was not necessarily true. Labour’s support for a 
more proactive advancement policy in the colonies did, nonetheless, indicate that 
the issue of indigenous rights to self-government was not simply the goal of handful 
of idealists in British politics. No longer could MPs such as Brockway be regarded as 
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mere back-bench fantasists; rather, they came to be regarded as articulating the 
opinions of a major political rival. 
 
Anti-colonial Activities and Nationalist Development in Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
 
The anti-colonial response to the decision of the Conservative government to 
override African opposition to the Federation in 1953 was to step up the campaign 
for increased African representation. As John Hatch, Labour MP and member of the 
FCB’s Working Committee, wrote, ‘practical and serious’ measures were needed to 
‘develop the political consciousness and political organisation of Africans’ in order 
that a vehemently anti-British strain of colonial nationalism, similar to that 
developing in Kenya, was prevented from rising to the fore.16 Hatch’s comments are 
significant, not because they indicated a willingness to help Africans, but because 
they point to a hyper-sensitivity among British anti-colonialists to preserve as many 
indigenous ‘friends’ in the colonies with whom Britain might in future work 
alongside to ease the transition to independence. Here, parallels can be drawn with 
Nicholas Owen’s work on the British anti-colonial movement and Indian 
nationalism. In seeking to ‘organise’ Indian nationalists, Owen suggests, British anti-
colonialists were attempting to cultivate a type of nationalism that fitted 
comfortably with their existing beliefs and their sense of how authentic progressive 
movements were supposed to work.17 In so doing, they hoped to prevent the rise of 
extremist anti-British nationalism that would more than likely result in the exclusion 
of British influence in India for years after independence.  
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It was not until African leaders seized the initiative that anti-colonialists took 
a proactive approach to assist the ANC and NAC. Part of the reason was because 
anti-colonialists remained sensitive to the accusation that they, rather than Africans 
themselves, were driving the movement for African advancement. As Director 
Michael Scott remarked to his colleagues in the African Bureau, Africans had to be 
the ‘driving force’ behind the anti-Federation campaign.18 For their part, Congress 
leaders were especially keen to look beyond Central Africa for assistance. Support 
from external agencies would be crucial to Congress’ future success, remarked 
Secretary General Kenneth Kaunda in a circular to the ANC’s British ‘friends’ in 
September 1954:  
What next cannot be answered by a handful of men and women who are at 
the top of the Congress. It’s a delicate question and as such, it needs men 
and women of various calling to come together and do something about it. 
Know then, Friends, that whether you be individuals or organisations, you 
are being asked to help us with this big venture into the unknown. This is 
being sent to you because of the interest that we think you have in our 
development and we would very much appreciate your advice on what you 
think we should do to help our people advance politically, economical and 
socially’.19 
 
In both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the first priority of anti-
colonialists was to seek, where possible, to assist in the ambitious mobilisation 
campaigns of the NAC and ANC.20 The situation facing the Nyasaland Congress was 
regarded as particularly ‘desperate’. The ‘appalling weakness’ of Congress 
organisation, Colin Legum, a prominent anti-colonial and anti-apartheid activist 
then working as a reporter for The Observer, noted, precluded information from the 
periphery reaching the British press. Worse still was the inability of the Congress to 
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either control or direct a large-scale campaign on the basis of their present 
resources. ‘There is unquestionably a deep feeling for Congress among the people’, 
he said, ‘but it is not canalised or under effective control. People keep telling me 
that they are waiting for a lead from Congress, but the lead doesn’t come’.21 
Circumstances in Northern Rhodesia were somewhat more hopeful, yet the party’s 
programme remained a cause for concern. What was needed, remarked Thomas 
Fox-Pitt, a former District Commissioner in Northern Rhodesia then serving as 
Director of the British Anti-Slavery Society, to his friend Kaunda, was to imprint on 
the minds of Congress leaders the need to evolve from a protest movement into a 
mass political party so that the African people were ‘conscious of its lead in their 
lives both on local level of village politics and in the wider range of national and 
Federal subjects’.22 This was framed in a series of proposals put forward by the 
Africa Bureau for the ANC in February 1955. If Congress was to win for Africans 
political and socio-economic equality, the document suggested, ‘it must see to its 
organisation; establish a branch in every town and village and organise regular 
provincial and national conferences’. The key to this transition would lie in a 
transformation of the Congress programme. Intrinsically ‘negative’ attacks on the 
government and imperialism had to be replaced by a ‘programme of Positive 
Action’ that would commit the Congress to working towards securing political and 
socio-economic reform for all African citizens.23 
To facilitate this transition, the aforementioned British anti-colonialists 
adopted several approaches. Since their inception, both the ANC and NAC had 
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suffered chronic financial difficulties, a problem exacerbated by government 
legislation banning the raising of funds without requisite permits.24 Congress 
leaders repeatedly lamented the lack of means to distribute copies of Congress 
newsletters en masse subsequently inhibiting them from widely propagating their 
national campaign. In the party’s early years, the ANC relied almost entirely upon 
donations from well-wishers to function. In August 1951, for instance, it was only 
the £10 donated by Fox-Pitt that made it possible to distribute 200 copies of an 
anti-Federation memorandum that Congress President Nkumbula had recently 
submitted to a delegation of four visiting British MPs.25 Raising the funds necessary 
to ensure the continuation of Congress operations on a day-to-day basis, therefore, 
became a central platform in the British anti-colonial campaign. Acknowledging the 
difficulties experienced in passing news and opinions to ‘influential persons’ in 
Britain, the Africa Bureau, the FCB and the Anti-Slavery Society each separately 
offered to publish and distribute ANC and NAC material on their behalf.26 In 
addition, provisions were made to raise funds to provide both Congresses with 
loans or gifts required during times of crisis or need. In 1953, for example, when the 
NAC sought legal advice to challenge the imposition of the Federation, the Africa 
Bureau provided the Congress with a loan of £30 to settle their account with Privy 
Council Appeal Agents.27     
Another important function of anti-colonialists was to intervene in individual 
cases of discrimination against Africans. In 1954, for example, Mary Benson of the 
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Africa Bureau wrote personally to Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd to enquire 
whether Edwin Chibambo, a prominent NAC organiser in Blantyre then under a 
Restriction Order at Port Herald, could be provided with better housing.28 As 
revealed by Lennox-Boyd’s reply, approaches of this manner would, on occasion, be 
successful. ‘The Governor informs me that Mr. Chibambo has moved into a Class ‘C’ 
African house, which is the best type of dwelling provided at Port Herald for African 
Civil Servants’, Lennox-Boyd wrote. ‘If he wishes to have his entire family with him, 
arrangements will be made to build him a suitable house’.29  
Campaigning on behalf of individuals might only have been a small way in 
which anti-colonialists hoped to improve the African predicament, but their actions 
had much greater relevance to the situation Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By 
acting as a conduit between the metropole and the periphery, representing 
Congress interests in Britain, nationalist leaders were not only provided with an 
official mandate from which the anti-Federation campaign could be fought, but also 
with ‘high political’ patronage. It was arguably the elevated status accruing from 
connections with prominent left-wing political figures in Britain that won for both 
parties an audience with British government officials, who soon identified them as 
the principal articulators of African political grievances. As G.H. Baxter of the 
Commonwealth Office reluctantly admitted, by raising the profile of the anti-
Federation struggle, anti-colonialists succeeded in ‘building up the self-importance 
of racialist leaders’, legitimising their claims for African enfranchisement and 
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consolidating the Congress position in Central Africa by enhancing their status in 
the ‘eyes of Africans in their territories’.30  
Perhaps the most important anti-colonial intervention at this time, however, 
was the advice given to Congress leaders to moderate the campaign for African 
advancement. Only by such means, it was felt, would nationalism be given a veneer 
of respectability in the eyes of British and colonial authorities that might later 
translate into tangible constitutional concessions. Congress leaders were thus urged 
to preserve the British connection by continuing to emphasise Britain’s continuing 
role in ‘guiding’ Africans towards advancement. To give the impression that Africans 
were ready to abandon the British connection, wrote Fox-Pitt to Kaunda, would do 
nothing but convince sceptics in British official circles that Africans would begin to 
follow an extreme ‘anti-British’ course if given greater responsibility.31 In Congress 
literature and future plans for action, he continued, Congress must endeavour to 
appeal to Britain’s paternalist sensibilities, playing-up Britain’s responsibilities as 
African ‘protectors’.32  
The adoption of such tactics, Michael Scott commented, would do much to 
help nationalism ‘control itself’ and to ‘impose its own limitations’.33 This was 
especially important, given the concerns that communists were allegedly ready to 
exploit unrest in Central Africa.34 Considering Federal Prime Minister Roy 
Welensky’s own attempts to exacerbate the potential for communist 
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encroachment, claims that appear to have been deliberately engineered to 
heighten Britain’s sensitivity to Soviet Union expansion into the colonial empire in 
this period, it was imperative that Congress leaders were advised to appear 
‘moderate’, ‘reasonable’, and predisposed towards British influence.35 As Fox-Pitt 
told Dixon Konkola, the ANC’s Deputy National Secretary, in April 1957, what was 
needed was a ‘clear statement of determined policy’ from Africans pertaining to 
the unacceptability of the constitutional safeguards in the Federal constitution, 
which ought to be based on the premise, not of obtaining ‘African’ citizenship, but 
of obtaining citizenship for ‘British Protected Persons’.36  
Until the passing of the 1957 Constitutional Amendment Act, an act that 
gave the Federal government greater autonomy in handling the Federation’s 
external affairs and guaranteed that the British would not amend or repeal any 
federal act, both the NAC and ANC generally adhered to advice given by their anti-
colonial allies.37 Nkumbula himself was extremely sensitive to any potential external 
criticism that might damage the ANC’s prospects. In December 1955, for instance, 
Nkumbula wrote to Simon Zukas, friend and supporter of the Congress who had 
been deported to Britain in 1953, that Dixon Konkola, Justin Chimba, Edward 
Mungoni Liso and Robinson Puta ‘could not lead Congress because they were in 
contact with Communists’.38 Whilst this was reflective of the internal dynamics of 
the struggle for supremacy in Congress, (Konkola later suggesting to Zukas that 
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‘Harry wanted me out’), it nevertheless pointed to a prevailing belief that Congress 
needed to appear to all intents and purposes a ‘moderate’ political party.39 Thus, 
whilst it was widely acknowledged that the actions of the Colonial Office in ‘selling 
out’ Africans over Federation had ‘suddenly pushed us into dark times’, the British 
ought still to be ‘trusted to stand by us’ since there was ‘nothing else’ Africans 
could trust.40  
Having initially struggled to come to terms with the proliferation of anti-
colonial national movements, largely on the premise that nationalists lacked the 
rudimentary political knowledge that was deemed essential if nationalists 
themselves were to achieve greater constitutional rights, signs that Congress 
leaders were formulating their own political programme by incorporating 
suggestions made by their British allies brought the British Labour Party into greater 
contact with the Congress parties in Central Africa.41 Coinciding with the publication 
of Plural Society, Labour Party leaders resolved to strengthen ‘friendship ties’ with 
the Congress parties of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.42 Support for the 
Congresses was expressed in the direct questioning of the racial policies of the 
Federal Government. James Johnson, Labour MP for Rugby and notable spokesman 
for the Party on colonial affairs, wrote frequently to Welensky after visiting Central 
Africa in early 1957, lamenting the failure of Federal authorities to provide a lead 
for Europeans to ‘bridge the gap between the colours’. Whilst Welensky countered 
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that observers in Britain did not understand the day-to-day difficulties of dealings 
with Africans, Johnson argued that the failure to encourage African political 
development would only serve to inflame tensions in Central Africa. 
Honestly, Roy, your people are completely failing to awaken a response in 
the minds and hearts of Black men and their women ... If your people fail to 
give leadership in this regard ... you are consigned to continuing racial 
tension and political uncertainty. I am immensely concerned by this – if your 
leadership does not get the response, then this grand concept of white and 
black living together will be finished and its effect on Central Africa 
catastrophic.43 
  
The Party’s most significant activity, however, was not its canvassing of 
politico-moral arguments on the Africans’ behalf in public, but in providing the 
Congresses with informal tutelage in the principles of mass party organisation, 
tactical advice on dealings with government officials and assistance in the drafting 
of political programmes. To ensure that Labour members were well positioned to 
operate on their behalf, MPs consistently advocated the need for Congress leaders 
to keep sympathisers in Britain informed of developments in Congress policies. In 
February 1957, a critical time in which anti-colonialists were formulating a strategy 
to prevent the imposition of the Constitution Amendment Act, John Hatch 
reminded Kaunda of the ‘tremendous importance’ of regularly informing the 
Labour Party ‘of the present conditions and the policy of the Congress’ so that the 
Party was well placed to act in Congress’ interests.44 The most notable 
manifestation of the policy to assist the Congresses was the advice given to Kaunda 
during his sojourn to Britain in mid-1957 to study party organisation, a visit from 
which he returned ‘reinvigorated’ with a sense of how an organisation should be 
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run.45 The actions of the party were hugely appreciated by African political activists. 
Writing to Fenner Brockway, Frank Chitambala, the ANC’s Secretary in the Eastern 
Province, extended his ‘national thanks to the Labour Party’ and stated that 
Africans ‘have to hope and pray that may God rise up the Labour and be in 
power’.46  
 
The Struggle against Federation at Home: Anti-colonial Activities in 
Britain, 1953-58 
 
The anti-colonial campaign in Central Africa was predominantly geared towards 
stimulating African development. The campaign in Britain was geared towards 
holding the Conservative government accountable for its policy towards Africans in 
Central Africa. For the MCF in particular, its role was to act as a pressure group in 
the metropole and it was upon this basis that the Movement offered its services to 
the ANC.47 With a distinct presence in Parliament, anti-colonialists concerned about 
the government’s policy in the Federation could place Central Africa in the 
spotlight. Questions asked by MPs in regards to colonial issues enabled MPs to 
pinpoint topics, to compel ministerial answers and to challenge these answers; and 
since questions were asked and answered continually they also provided a steady 
supply of material for colonial newspapers and other organs of publicity.48 Indeed, 
it was said that copies of Hansard became a ‘best seller’ in Nyasaland.49 Apart from 
this general consideration, Parliamentary questions provided the best means for 
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exposing and criticising the policies and actions of the British government at times 
of controversy. This not only heightened government sensitivity to the 
repercussions of their policies, but it also forced ministers to account for them in 
Parliament, an arena in which the government would be unable to avert the critical 
gaze of those sympathetic to the African cause in the British polity.  
Before 1957, the anti-colonial Parliamentary campaign had largely centred 
upon isolated incidents that revealed the increasing inability of the Colonial and 
Federal authorities to promote African advancement. When the Constitutional 
Amendment Act was proposed, and the subsequent decision made to ignore the 
veto of the African Affairs Board, however, criticism of the Federal and British 
government’s record in Central Africa intensified. In a series of impassioned 
debates in June 1957, the Labour frontbench and its anti-colonial contingent 
reminded Parliament that Africans could not be abandoned to the whims of white 
settler supremacy Federal Government; Britain was still obliged to exercise a 
degree of influence over Central African affairs and to promote the establishment 
of a full democratic machinery.50 As John Dugdale, Labour spokesman on Colonial 
affairs and staunch opponent of Federation remarked in June, 
We have certain duties to protect African interests over a very wide field. 
We may think that they do not need to be protected and that the 
Government of Central Africa will conduct its affairs so that there will be no 
need for us to exercise that power, but we must recognise that we have 
that power and that we would use it if necessary, so we should discuss 
matters pertaining to it.51 
 
 Timed to coincide with a debate in the Commons, the Africa Bureau and the MCF 
held several committee meetings to discuss the proposed changes to the Federal 
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constitution. The resulting resolution, later sent to the Earl of Home, who had 
replaced Lord Swinton as Commonwealth Secretary in April 1955, condemned the 
decision to ride roughshod over African rights.52  
This Council condemns the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
Constitutional Amendment Bill 1957 and the Electoral Bill as measures 
which will in fact diminish the already meagre African representation in the 
Federal Assembly, and is dismayed at the recent statement by Lord Homes 
signifying the intention of the Government to ignore the advice of the 
Federal African Affairs Board and give approval of the Bill.53  
 
The sheer magnitude of the issue, and the extent of African discontent to 
which it gave rise, was sufficient to provoke a tense debate in the Commons on 25 
November 1957.54 Arthur Creech Jones, Labour’s former Colonial Secretary and 
founding member of the FCB, and Barbara Castle, MP for Blackburn and member of 
the MCF, questioned the legitimacy of British actions and emphasised that Africans 
were in fact gaining little from alleged attempts to ‘increase’ African 
representation. ‘Why’, asked Creech Jones, ‘does the Government persist in this 
policy in the face of African opposition and after such a shabby deal for the 
Africans?’55 Labour’s position in the debate was informed by the visit of a Labour 
delegation, led by Shadow Colonial Secretary James Callaghan, to Central Africa in 
September. At the end of a three week tour, Callaghan declared at a press 
conference in Salisbury that universal suffrage was the ultimate objective for 
Central Africa.56 Under the terms of the 1957 Act, however, this would not be 
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possible since the Bill’s major purpose merely increased the size of Federal 
Assembly thereby ‘decreasing African representation’.57  
The championing of African rights in Parliament was not only a means by 
which the British left could hope to pressure the government into changing the 
basis of its policy in Central Africa. It was also considered as an important way in 
which anti-colonialists could hope to alter the basis of traditional right-wing 
perceptions of African nationalism. Whilst policy makers were not naïve enough to 
think that Africans in the Federation would remain isolated from developments in 
African politics elsewhere, it was widely held that genuine African nationalism had 
yet to take root. The expression of political discontent at this time continued to be 
regarded by the Conservative Party rank and file as nothing more than the 
articulation of discontent among the educated minority.58 This was a perception fed 
by the colonial administration. As October 1957, officials such as Sir Robert 
Armitage, former Governor of Cyprus who had replaced Geoffrey Colby as Governor 
of Nyasaland in 1956, continued to view the Congresses as generally 
unrepresentative of the views of the African majority. ‘The true facts’, he stated, 
‘[is] that their membership is small, and in terms of numbers their whole-hearted 
supporters are comparatively few. The influence wielded by Congress is out of all 
proportion to the paucity of its membership’.59  
In sum, relatively little had changed in official circles since the early 1950s 
regarding attitudes towards African political development. Whilst it was generally 
accepted that African political aspirations would in the long term have to be 
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accommodated, there remained a general reluctance to accept that what was 
emerging in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was genuine African politicisation. It 
was still too inextricably linked with the anti-Federation struggle and simply too 
impatient to be considered worthy of encouragement. As Fenner Brockway 
remarked in April 1956, it was the intention of the MCF to challenge these views 
and create a ‘new way of thinking’ in regards to the political development of 
Central Africa. This would be a ‘hard task’, but one ’worth doing’ if the Africans 
were granted opportunities for advancement. This would not happen overnight, 
Brockway added, but would be a very gradual process.60 
One of the key means by which Brockway and his anti-colonial campaigners 
hoped to bring about the revolution in thinking towards African nationalism was to 
give wide publicity to African objections to the Federation. The hope was that 
sufficient public pressure could be brought to bear on the government to change 
the basis of Britain’s policy, which might, in turn, help the government to recognise 
the legitimacy of African claims for the franchise. Between 1953 and 1958, letters 
to the press, petitions and pamphlets containing material written by Congress 
leaders circulated with monotonous regularity emphasising the right of Africans to 
an equal say in government in a region in which they were the majority. Stopping 
short of comparing the situation to South African apartheid, it was nevertheless 
emphasised that the failure to acknowledge the legitimacy of African objections to 
the way in which colonial and Federal authorities were managing African 
development was tantamount to Britain neglecting its responsibilities to its colonial 
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subjects.61 Although not yet politically mature, African protest could with positive 
encouragement from the British be directed into moderate channels. As Michael 
Scott wrote in a carefully worded letter to the Colonial Office, 
If African organisations were strong and well organised, they could turn the 
tide. They are not, however, and their uprise [sic.] is made difficult by 
government attitudes who refuse to acknowledge their existence. It is 
therefore only intervention from outside which can now turn the tide. 
Having failed to encourage ‘Partnership’, the UK Government has surely a 
strong moral and political obligation to guide Africans onto a path from 
which they can develop and advance.62 
 
To continually ignore African development would result in the very thing that 
Britain was trying to stave off: anti-British nationalism. ‘African nationalism is 
steadily rising’, an Africa Bureau letter to the Colonial Secretary read, ‘but it is not 
yet ‘Black Nationalism’. It is still non-racial and demands only non-racial equality. If 
the government continues to ignore African opinion, ‘‘Black Nationalism’ will follow 
and Partnership will not be practical possibility for much longer’.63  
Attempts to bring about a greater understanding of nationalism also served 
as a valuable counterweight to the overwhelming pro-settler bias prevalent in 
government circles during the 1950s. To policy makers in London, the preservation 
of the delicate balance in Federation was the ultimate panacea, not least because 
they believed that the steady evolution of ‘partnership’ continued to offer the best 
solution for the intractable multiracial problems of southern Africa.64 The success of 
Britain’s policy goals in the region rested at least in the short-term upon the 
                                                 
61
 For just some examples of the press statements and petitions sent to the Colonial Office, see RH, 
AB 231/7, ‘Labour Party Press Statement on Central Africa, 27 Mar., 1958, which was circulated in 
widely circulated in The Times, Daily Telegraph, The Observer, and The Manchester Guardian. See 
also SOAS, FP, PPMS 6/6/2, Petition to Commonwealth Secretary, 23 Dec., 1957. 
62
 RH, AB 233/6, Note to the Colonial Office, Michael Scott, 20 Aug., 1957. 
63
 RH, AB 231/7, Africa Bureau Paper to Colonial Office, ‘The Situation in Central Africa’, 24 Sept., 
1957. 
64
 Miller, J.D.B., Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953-1969 
(London, 1974), p.178. 
Page | 154  
 
preservation of settler primacy in the region. Settlers did, after all, hold all 
prominent economic and governmental positions in Central Africa, and as such the 
future prosperity of the Federation would rest entirely upon their influence. 
Perhaps most importantly, the extent to which Britain could share in this prosperity 
would depend on the perpetuation of goodwill between settlers and the British. 
Given the reverence for the ‘imperial connection’ shared between Rhodesian 
settlers and some sections of the British right, it was very much hoped that faith in 
the capacity of settlers authorities to look after African political development would 
in future pay dividends.65 Doubts over the viability of promoting Africans were 
fuelled by the Federal Government, who persistently emphasised the dangers of 
accelerating African advancement before they had reached ‘acceptable’ levels of 
development. What the British government had to face, Welensky argued, is that 
the vast majority of the African population was ‘still very primitive’, and its 
leadership ‘largely immature and given to extremism’. It was unlikely, given the 
circumstances, he continued, that Britain could hope to achieve its goals of a 
peaceful transition to Dominion status without the ‘stabilising influence’ of 
‘staunchly pro-British white settlers’.66 
For some historians, the failure to prevent the passing of the Constitution 
Amendment Act in 1957 pointed to the ineffectuality of the domestic anti-
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Federation campaign.67 But despite failing to precipitate a far-reaching reappraisal 
of African development in the Federation, anti-colonialists did manage to give 
greater exposure to the Federation’s problems. ‘Although we did not succeed in our 
immediate aim’, wrote Jane Symonds of the Africa Bureau to Kaunda, ‘I think we 
did succeed in awakening people to some of the dangers threatening Central Africa, 
and therefore we can hope for better things in 1960’.68 
Indicative of the success of the anti-colonial campaign was the growing 
sensitivity of the Federal government to the growth in popularity of anti-colonial 
sentiment. By 1956, for example, the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau’s 
Director, Bob De Quehen, wrote to Welensky expressing his fear that anti-colonial 
‘Fabian ideas’ were beginning to gain influence in Whitehall, which in turn were 
having ‘an adverse effect upon the friendly feelings which were once accorded to 
the Federation’.69 David Cole, head of leading public relations firm David Cole and 
Partners hired by Welensky to investigate the Federation’s public image, echoed De 
Quehen’s sentiment. Rising British interest in African welfare, he warned, was likely 
to inhibit the chances of the Federation being granted Dominion status. Welensky 
and his United Federal Party could therefore expect to lose ground to the more 
extremist Dominion Party, which disagreed with Welensky’s alleged conciliatory 
stance towards the Federation’s African citizens at home.70 
Fears over the growth of a more liberal approach to African advancement 
gaining ground in Britain were not entirely unfounded. By 1957, certain sections of 
the Conservative party, notably the Bow Group, established in 1951 as an extra-
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parliamentary forum for young Conservatives, were beginning to advocate that 
African nationalism was a genuine political force in Central Africa, one that would 
need to be accommodated in the Federation sooner rather than later.71 Given this 
perspective, one might legitimately ask why in 1957 there was so much support for 
the Constitutional Amendment Act, which appeared to all intents and purposes as a 
measure protecting settler interests. It is important to note, however, that many 
beginning to advocate a progressive approach towards African development saw 
the Act as going some way to improving the situation. It not only offered ‘suitable’ 
Africans the chance to participate in the franchise, but also provided opportunities 
for those not yet meeting the required qualifications. Most importantly, the 
compromise reached with settlers would reduce settler pressure for dominion 
status, thereby creating conditions conducive for the evolution of partnership.72 
This was far from representing a major alteration in government thinking towards 
African nationalism in the Federation, but it did signify that some within the wider 
Conservative party were prepared to concede that Congress demands could not be 
ignored if Britain hoped to achieve its goals in Central Africa.  
Unsurprisingly, the role of the Labour Party and the anti-colonial movement 
came under frequent attack by Welensky, who lambasted their ‘irresponsible’ and 
‘careless’ attitude which was serving merely to heighten African expectations and 
make Federation unworkable. 
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What contains the seed of discontent and even danger is the easy 
championship by some members of the British Labour Party of each and 
every African ‘cause’, whether substantial or not and at times in complete 
disregard of the principles they themselves earnestly follow at home. The 
result is that the African is being led to believe that he need only look to 
London to have his wishes satisfied and it is unfortunate that in some 
circles in London there is no discrimination between reality and unreality in 
considering African aspirations.73   
 
Sensing that not enough was being done to counter Federation’s increasingly 
negative reputation in London, Director of the British South Africa Company Ellis 
Robins wrote to Welensky complaining of the weakness of Federal public relations. 
What was needed, he said, was a hard-hitting propaganda campaign to target the 
less intellectually inclined members of the Commons.74 Following protracted 
discussions, a pro-Federal pressure group named the Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
Committee was established in London in May 1957.75 Its primary objective was to 
seek to influence opinion in Britain so as to achieve ‘full self-government within the 
Commonwealth’ for the federation in as ‘practicable and expedient a manner as 
possible’.76 
   
Anti-colonial Relations with the NAC and ANC, 1956-58 
 
As has been shown, the task of British anti-colonialists in altering the trajectory of 
Federal politics was constrained by the British government’s commitment to 
upholding the delicate racial balance in Central Africa.77 Their predicament was 
made infinitely worse by the perception that their activities contributed to stoking 
the embers of tension between Africans and settlers. In 1957, for example, G.H. 
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Baxter lambasted the publication of inflammatory statements to the press and 
‘unhelpful’ letters to the Colonial and Commonwealth Secretaries that were 
‘embarrassing Ministers’, ‘annoying the Europeans’ and ‘encouraging the Congress 
leaders to whip up opposition in the north’.78 But in spite of the criticism from 
individuals in Whitehall, there is no doubt that anti-colonial support was an 
important feature of the anti-Federation struggle. This came to be reflected in the 
sentimental attachment that developed between Africans and their British allies, 
expressed in literature and song. A particularly poignant poem entitled ‘Scott the 
Blackman’, written soon after Michael Scott’s deportation from Nyasaland in 1953 
by NAC member Hartwell Soloman, is symbolic of the deep and often personal 
connections that existed between the two groups, especially during the formative 
years of the Congresses.   
Long live Scott / Champion of the black man; / Though you are white! / You 
are our dearest brother, / For the cause of our land.  
We had David Livingstone! / Who died on our lands, / Then Joseph Booth 
our friend, / Was deported at last, / All for the cause of an African. 
Then, what is this Federation? / That causes Inkosi Gomani, / To be 
deported and prosecuted! / Scott deported for our good cause! / Alas! Is 
this British justice 
What shall Scott say? / Saw Nyasaland Police! / Using tear gas and shooting 
at him, / And the defenceless African women; / The wrongs we bear shall be 
redressed.79 
 
Events following the Federal Constitutional Amendment Act represented 
something of a turning point in the nationalist-anti-colonial relationship particularly 
between the Labour Party and the Congresses. Whilst anti-colonialists had raised 
the profile of African nationalism in the metropole, the bypassing of the African 
Affairs Board and the failure to prevent the 1957 constitutional changes indicated 
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to some Congress leaders that little was being achieved by adopting the policies 
advocated by their British supporters. One of the key questions confronting ANC 
and NAC officials, therefore, was why Africans ought to continue to frame their 
objections to the Federation in the context of being British ‘protected persons’? As 
Kaunda told the Colonial Secretary in mid-1957, the British government displayed 
such an erroneous appraisal of the feelings of the African people that many had 
begun to doubt Britain’s capacity to look after African interests.80 As nationalists 
themselves gradually became more assertive, there thus emerged a quite distinct 
divergence of opinion and approach between the Congresses and their 
metropolitan allies as to how best to achieve African advancement. These 
differences became apparent in the decision of ANC and NAC leaders to abandon 
the idea of achieving gradual African advancement within Federation, something 
that most anti-colonial supporters still maintained was the best means for African 
progress. Secession under African majority governments within the shortest 
possible time was now the primary objective. Only by such means, Hastings Banda 
wrote to Kaunda in May 1958, could Africans achieve their freedom: 
Judging from what I have seen and heard in Britain, if we stand firm, we 
should be able to dismantle the Federation. I get this impression, even 
when talking to some of the Conservative people ... I do not think your 
views and ours in Nyasaland are any different. I think you hold the same 
view as we do in Nyasaland, namely, that Federation is against our political 
interests and must therefore be dismantled. I have made public statements 
here, in which I have emphasised that you and we mean to get out of the 
Federation at the earliest possible time ... I hope to work in close and 
friendly cooperation.81 
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Banda’s plea for closer cooperation between the Congresses reflected the 
growing belief that the struggle for freedom in Nyasaland would be strengthened 
by uniting other anti-colonial liberation movements interested in his country’s 
struggle.82 Both Nkumbula and Kaunda shared Banda’s judgement. In a joint letter 
to the editor of The Times in May 1957, they admitted to being ‘distressed’ at the 
lack of interest shown by the British people in regards to the decision of the British 
government to grant concessions to Welensky. This was, they argued, a prelude to 
apartheid, an altogether profound attempt to draw explicit links with the South 
African regime.83 In January 1958, the ANC tentatively explored the possibility of 
winning support elsewhere, sending several circulars to prominent international 
human rights organisations, including the New York-based International League for 
the Rights of Man. The next two years would be decisive in determining whether 
Nyasaland and the Rhodesias would traverse the path of the Union of South Africa. 
As such, much would depend upon the influence the Congresses could bring to bear 
upon the situation. ‘This will of necessity depend upon careful planning which 
cannot be done by a handful of men and women as it needs considering all walks of 
life’, the circular stated. ‘It therefore calls for interested people drawn from all 
those different spheres to put their heads together’.84  
Congress pleas for external assistance not only indicated the extent to which 
the Congresses were beginning to develop a more assertive national programme, 
but also reflected a declining faith in the capacity of British anti-colonialists to act 
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decisively on Africans’ behalf. From roughly mid-1957, Congress’ metropolitan allies 
bemoaned the lack of information received from the Federation. ‘There are never 
any strong demonstrations against Federation reported here’, Fox-Pitt told JCM 
Ng’andu, ANC’s Provincial Secretary in Kasama, and ‘the British people are 
beginning to believe that there is not any real opposition to the Federation’.85 John 
Hatch had earlier expressed similar concerns, imploring Kaunda to keep him ‘fully 
informed’ of the progress and policy of the Congress in order that pressure could be 
could be applied to the British government. ‘I have not heard from you for many 
months now’, he said, ‘and so have no idea, apart from press reports, of how things 
are with you and your colleagues. Please do write to me immediately to give me a 
full picture of what is happening in Northern Rhodesia’.86  
The situation materialising closely mirrors Nicholas Owens’ observations in 
regards to British anti-colonial activities in India.87 As nationalists became more 
determined to win self-government for themselves so they adopted vocabulary and 
techniques less familiar to British anti-colonialists. This new method of self-reliance 
had unwelcome implications for the work that the British supporters of Congress 
had traditionally undertaken, leading eventually to a widening gulf in their 
respective agendas. Whilst Congress leaders were advocating immediate African 
self-government, certain members of anti-colonial organisations, such as Peter Lake 
of the Africa Bureau, continued to argue that Africans’ best interests would be 
served by adopting a ‘restrained, tolerant and sympathetic attitude’, at least until 
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the Federal Constitution was up for revision in 1960. The Federation needed to be 
given ‘a fair chance to work’.88  
Whilst such views were undoubtedly influenced by the belief that 
Federation still offered the best solution for Central Africa’s complex racial 
problems, there is every reason to suspect that they were also intimately related to 
reports of the growing militancy of Congress protest, which pointed to a lack of 
political experience at the top. Continued faith in the capacity of the Colonial Office 
to act in the interests of Africans had arguably restrained both Congresses from 
carrying out a more vociferous campaign against the Northern Rhodesian and 
Nyasaland administrations. Following the deterioration in relations after 1957, 
however, there was a noticeable increase in Congress agitation that accompanied 
the respective ANC and NAC calls for full enfranchisement and secession. Reports 
on the spot began to paint a disturbing picture. In Northern Rhodesia, Congress was 
becoming ever more radical; if Africans were unable to achieve their goals by 
constitutional methods, it was feared that the party would soon adopt a policy of 
violence to achieve the desired result.89 In Nyasaland, meanwhile, there had been 
‘no reduction in the fierceness of the opposition to the Federation since the early 
1950s’ and, increasingly, the Nyasaland African Congress was beginning to deploy 
‘violent and extreme methods’ including ‘intimidation, arson and violence against 
Europeans’ to make their presence felt.90 Throwing their weight behind both 
Congresses at this juncture was thus regarded as unrealistic by many anti-
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colonialists, chiefly those within the Labour Party and the MCF. To have done so, 
Peter Lake remarked, would have been tantamount to sanctioning the rise of a 
form of African political extremism intolerant of the presence of the white settler 
community, making a clash between white and black in Central Africa a ‘distinct 
possibility’.91  
Attempts to convince Africans of the need to operate within a constitutional 
framework were reflected in persistent appeals to the NAC and ANC to participate 
in the 1958 territorial elections. Advancement within Federation was considered 
eminently more preferable than immediate self-government for the African 
community, a move that was likely to catalyse racial conflict.92 Until at least early 
1959, therefore, anti-colonial bodies persistently re-iterated the importance of 
‘partnership’, urging the British government to encourage the Federal Government 
to pass legislation that would improve African advancement prospects.93 In a 
Labour Party statement in March 1958, which appeared in several major British 
newspapers including The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Observer, and The 
Manchester Guardian, for example, it was argued that Africans must be provided 
with ‘concrete proof’ that the principles of ‘partnership’ were being operated. Only 
by such means could Federation endure.94  
The reluctance to support the militant stance taken by the ANC and NAC 
might have primarily been geared towards preventing racial conflict, but it also 
owed much to domestic political considerations. For many Labour MPs it would 
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have been potentially problematic for the Party to have committed to a secessionist 
policy in the Federation lest its room for manoeuvre be restricted in Central Africa 
should it win the next British General Election, scheduled for 1959. As Arthur 
Creech Jones stated, Labour’s policy needed to remain as flexible as possible so as 
not to alarm or isolate either African or settler opinion.95 To abstain from making a 
policy declaration was in the interests of all concerned, and it was upon this basis 
that Labour’s attitude to the Constitutional Review Conference in 1960 would be 
decided.96 Some within the Party disagreed with Labour’s official stance. One of the 
most vocal opponents was Anthony Wedgewood Benn, MP for Bristol and active 
member of the MCF, who believed that ‘a specific timetable’ ought to be worked 
out for the transfer of power so as to ‘achieve a psychological revolution’ and ‘set 
the people free to work towards its realisation’. 97 
Labour’s refusal to put secession on the agenda for 1960, or make any 
statements pertaining to it, certainly bought the Party a degree of leverage, but it 
curtailed the capacity of the anti-colonial movement to speak freely against the 
Federation. At the same, it compromised the Party’s relations with Africans of the 
northern territories. Frank Chitambala of the ANC even went so far as to suggest in 
1958 that collaboration with the Labour Party had been a ‘monstrous waste of 
time’ and that Labour’s colonial policies were no different from those of the 
Conservative government.98 As Kanyama Chiume of the NAC wrote in Venture, 
Labour’s attitude not only revealed the contradictions inherent in ‘an attempt to 
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rationalise a bad scheme’, but also a ‘lack of principle’. If Labour knew the 
Federation is bad, he asked, ‘why wait for a crisis before secession can be 
considered?’99 Disappointed as he was, Chiume believed that growing African 
scepticism over Labour’s involvement in Central African affairs had much to do with 
Labour’s initial role in the formation of Federation.  
We are not blind to the facts of history. Africans are aware of the fact that 
the Labour Party encouraged the sentiments for federation among 
Europeans in CA  ... It was also during the time of the government formed 
by the Labour Party that Nkrumah was imprisoned, India was partitioned 
and that the party scorned Dr Jagan who has now been returned to power 
again by his people.100 
 
Although both Sir Ungoed-Thomas and Sir John Hatch were perhaps right, 
therefore, when they said that Africans looked to Labour for guidance, this was not 
‘a blind gaze at the horizon’.101  
 The Congress programme for self-government was not entirely unsupported 
by British anti-colonialists, however. For those individuals who regularly engaged 
first-hand with African nationalist leaders, such as Michael Scott and Thomas Fox-
Pitt, both of whom had a deep understanding of the working of Central African 
politics, it was important that Africans were given the opportunity to determine 
their own future. Given that the combined acts of the British and Federal 
governments had ‘finally alienated’ African opinion in the Federation, Scott told T.F. 
Betts, Secretary of the FCB, anti-colonialists ought to support, rather than direct, 
the African anti-Federation campaign.102 If anti-colonialists were to continue to 
positively influence the course of events in Central Africa, they needed to adopt a 
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flexible approach and accept ‘unconstitutional’ protest as part of a necessary 
transition in nationalist politics. As Fox-Pitt argued, British anti-colonialists could 
not expect Congress activists to conform to moderate, ‘western’ ideals in their 
respective anti-Federation campaigns.  
We must be sure when we say that we stand on the side of the Africans that 
we accept their acts of resistance as inevitable. We must genuinely prefer 
resistance to acceptance of subordination. We may wish that it should be 
non-violent but it may not go that way and it is a cheat to say that we 
accept resistance only if it is peaceful. If we accept the rightness of the 
African cause we must hope for resistance, because it is only through 
African resistance that the authorities will take African protests as real  ... 
We must then accept resistance and accept the possibility of violence and 
we must respect those who go beyond moderation.103  
 
It was arguably this acceptance of more extreme forms of protest that 
encouraged many of the ANC’s metropolitan supporters to look favourably upon 
the formation of the Zambian African National Congress after the split in the ANC’s 
leadership in October 1958. Simon Zukas for one, exiled to Britain in 1953 for his 
activities in organising the ANC campaign against Federation, believed that ZANC’s 
entry onto the political scene provided an opportunity to form a more ‘dynamic, 
organised movement capable of legitimately claiming a role for Africans in 
government’. He hoped, therefore, that ZANC’s friends could help them a good deal 
in the party’s formative years.104 Fox-Pitt echoed Zukas’ conclusions. ‘ZANC’s split 
from the ANC marks a more serious movement within Northern Rhodesian politics’, 
he told Hilda Selwyn-Clarke on 6 December. ‘I have long thought Kenneth the sort 
of committed man needed to hold things together after [Harry Nkumbula’s] 
collapse as a popular leader’.105 ZANC’s entry on the political stage was thus 
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regarded as a positive development, one that would be vital in paving a new course 
for Africans in the Federation.  
It was not always certain, however, that Kaunda would inherit Nkumbula’s 
position as the leader of the African independence movement in Northern 
Rhodesia. In 1956, for instance, Fox-Pitt wrote that Dixon Konkola, rather than 
Kaunda, was the only real rival to Nkumbula for the leadership of Congress.106 
What, then, proved vital in turning the tables decisively in Kaunda’s favour, and 
why were British anti-colonialists prepared to seemingly abandon support for the 
ANC’s liberal-democratic agenda in favour of a more radical nationalist 
programme? Much, of course, was dependent upon the internal dynamics of 
African politics. Konkola, for his part, experienced somewhat of a personal collapse 
in mid-1957, having been removed from the Congress executive and resigning from 
his position as President of the Railway African Workers Union [RAWU]. But what 
set Kaunda apart from his political rivals was his own political rhetoric, which stood 
in stark contrast to that of the ANC which had in recent times become stagnant 
under Nkumbula’s guidance. This was apparent, Kaunda suggested, in Nkumbula’s 
decision to leave London on the evening before the ANC leaders were due to hold 
seminal talks with the Colonial Secretary over Northern Rhodesia’s constitution. 
ZANC represented progress, not stagnation. Kaunda himself went to great personal 
lengths to play up his differences with the ANC’s president, sending several letters 
to his friends in London in December 1958 offering a detailed discussion of what he 
viewed as Nkumbula’s political mistakes, a man that had brought the nationalist 
                                                 
106
 SOAS, FP, Box 13, 6/7/3, Fox-Pitt letter, undated but 1956. 
Page | 168  
 
movement ‘to a standstill’.107 Kaunda’s approach paid off. It was telling, for 
instance, that Kaunda’s arguments were echoed in correspondence between British 
anti-colonialists, who equally lamented Nkumbula’s failings.  
Contrary to the views of scholars such as Howe and Owen, both of whom 
suggest that anti-colonialists by the late 1950s were of declining importance to 
nationalists, Kaunda’s actions point to the value African leaders attached to winning 
external approval from metropolitan groups sympathetic to the African plight.108 
Whilst ideological differences still existed, they were clearly not seen as an 
insuperable barrier to a productive relationship during times of need. In late 1958, 
ZANC leaders were in a vulnerable position, the future was uncertain. In order to 
legitimise the decision to split from the ANC and ensure that he, rather than his 
rival, was regarded as the key figure in Northern Rhodesian African national politics 
in British anti-colonial and government circles, Kaunda was keen to put himself in 
the position of the ANC’s natural heir. Certain ideological differences would of 
course remain over the ways in which the Federation could be dismantled, but 
African leaders would continue to look towards the metropole for inspiration. The 
anti-Federation campaign could not be won in isolation. As will be shown in chapter 
six, these connections would prove vital in sustaining momentum behind the 
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Given the apparent failure of both the Labour Party and the anti-colonial left to 
alter decisively the trajectory of the British government’s policy in the Central Africa 
Federation, the belief has prevailed that anti-colonialists had a minimal impact 
upon colonial affairs. The intention of this chapter has been to provide a necessary 
corrective to these trends, firstly, to suggest that the development of African 
politics depended heavily upon external support between 1953 and 1958, and 
secondly, to propose that the success of the anti-colonial struggle ought not to be 
determined by focussing solely upon their metropolitan activities. 
Between 1953 and 1958, anti-colonialists not only provided nationalists with 
moral and financial support at a critical moment in their history, but helped also to 
elevate the status of the Congresses, identifying them as the representatives of 
African political opinion with whom the British government would have to 
negotiate in discussions over Federation’s future. As Kaunda later remarked in an 
interview with Harold Channer, the support given to his party at this time gave 
Africans a voice in Britain that would otherwise have remained unheard. ‘In those 
days’, he said, ‘it was not easy to go to Britain and appeal to the British people over 
the heads of the British government’.109 By campaigning on behalf of the Africans in 
Central Africa, anti-colonialists demonstrated that African nationalism was almost 
certainly not politically immature and was far from representing the views of only 
the educated elite; African nationalism was a growing force, beginning to win 
widespread support for its anti-colonial programme.  
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As nationalists became more assertive in the later 1950s, they found anti-
colonial restraint and sympathy towards the ultimate aim of ‘partnership’ 
incompatible with their own goals for African majority government and secession. 
Whilst this gave rise to ideological differences between anti-colonialists and 
nationalists, it did not create an irreparable split in anti-colonial-nationalist 
relations. As evidenced by the attempts of ZANC’s leaders to appeal to anti-colonial 
sensibilities in late 1958, nationalists would continue to look to the metropole for 
assistance even when there appeared to be a divergence in how Africans could best 
achieve political advancement. This indicated, above all, that close connections 
continued to exist between the Congresses and their British allies and, crucially, 
points to the importance of the anti-colonialists in helping to facilitate nationalist 
development in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The intention here has not been 
to attribute so large a phenomenon as the rapid growth of African nationalism in 
the later fifties to any cause external to Africa, but, given the extent to which anti-
colonialists had helped raise the profile of nationalist leaders and more widely the 
anti-Federation struggle, it is hoped that a case has been made to incorporate the 
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4  
African Nationalism and the Transition to 






The period 1959-64 represented a critical phase in the history of the Federation. 
The intention of the following two chapters is to account for the rise of mass 
nationalism in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia during this period. An attempt will 
be made to account for the reasons why, having been dismissed by the authorities 
before 1959 as representing but a small minority of African opinion, the 
governments of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Britain came to regard African 
political advancement as essential to progress and stability in Central Africa. Part of 
the reason lay in the rapid development of African politics, and the extent to which 
nationalist leaders were successful in building a truly ‘national’ programme that 
captured the minds of the African majority, giving rise to the belief that Africans 
could no longer be excluded from the decision making process.    
As chapter two suggested, whilst the Nyasaland African Congress [NAC], 
African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia [ANC] and later Zambia African 
National Congress [ZANC] leaders had made relevant the implications of African 
membership of the Federation at grass roots, their respective ‘local’ mobilisation 
campaigns made difficult the construction of a unified ‘national’ movement. Re-
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building Congress prestige by exploiting local grievances was simply too reliant 
upon the strength of anti-government sentiment at local level to stimulate 
widespread interest in the anti-Federation campaign. It also caused uneven political 
development, creating friction within both parties as competing factions rivalled 
one another for leadership of the anti-Federation struggle. This precipitated, in 
Northern Rhodesia, the infamous ANC-ZANC split in October 1958. The events of 
1959 provided somewhat of an impetus for change; in 1959 Africans everywhere 
had ‘experienced the state’.1 For the first time Congress leaders could point to a 
tangible manifestation of state suppression and what the future was likely to entail 
for Africans if Federation remained unchallenged. What was needed, therefore, was 
a national appeal, a programme to which all Africans could subscribe irrespective of 
ethno-regional or socio-economic differences. Chapters four and five will shed light 
on the ways and means by which first the leaders of the Malawi Congress Party 
[MCP] in Nyasaland and then the United National Independence Party in Northern 
Rhodesia [UNIP] were able to build and then win support for their respective 
national vision. This chapter will focus upon Nyasaland, chapter five will focus upon 
Northern Rhodesia. Together, they will contribute to the historiography by 
shedding much needed light on the methods used by both parties to mobilise 
Africans and how they subsequently became, by the early 1960s, the 
representatives of the African majority. Crucially, they will also seek to explain the 
evolution of the national programme. 
Whilst recent accounts, such as Joey Power’s Building Kwacha, and the 
edited collection of essays on Zambia, Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society 
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in Late Colonial Zambia, have done much to advance our understanding of the 
nationalist struggle, re-integrating previously marginalised groups into the 
nationalist narrative, many questions pertaining to the development of African 
nationalism, that is, a belief in a greater Zambia and Malawi and the desire to 
achieve independence for the respective nations, remain unanswered.2 How, for 
instance, did nationalist politicians mobilise the African masses? What methods 
were used to win the support of the politically uneducated and how did this alter 
the MCP-UNIP political programme and their vision of what new nationhood would 
entail for the people of Zambia and Malawi? Chapters four and five will endeavour 
to answer these important questions, emphasising the centrality of nationalist 
leaders in cultivating a political programme to which a wide variety of disparate 
interest groups could respond.  
But although nationalist leaders had by roughly 1961 succeeded in 
stimulating a greater consciousness of what new nationhood would entail for 
Africans, inherent problems rose to the fore when the fight against Federation was 
nearing its end. Given that the nationalist campaign had initially been conceived as 
a protest against Federation, how did MCP-UNIP leaders adjust when the fight for 
independence had been won? For the MCP and UNIP, a new focus for agitation was 
needed. For the MCP, new political rivals were to be found within the party itself. 
With independence on the horizon, it was imperative that absolute unity prevailed, 
that those dissenting voices who disagreed with President Hastings Banda’s 
growing hold over the MCP were silenced in order to ensure the continued 
dominance of the MCP over the national agenda. In Northern Rhodesia, it was the 
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continued existence of Harry Nkumbula’s ANC, in spite of its alleged financial and 
administrative weakness, that provided a constant source for discontent. After the 
formation of the UNIP-ANC coalition government in late 1962, the ANC became 
public enemy number one, the party’s presence threatening both UNIP’s position as 
the main representative for African affairs in Northern Rhodesia and, critically, 
UNIP’s claim to represent the Zambian ‘nation’. In both cases, the tendency 
towards violence created a climate in which tension, fear and suspicion thrived. 
Ultimately, it served to undermine the very premise upon which nationalism had 
been conceived: unity and equality for all.  
The entrenchment of inter and intra-party violence was a poignant symbol 
of the ways in which nationalism and political mobilisation had evolved. 
Paradoxically, it not only came to replace more traditional methods as a means of 
popular mobilisation but it also worked to the benefit of those struggling for 
national independence. Rather than causing the British to reconsider its chosen 
course of action for the Federation, it convinced many within Whitehall that to hold 
together the Federation was likely to precipitate a complete breakdown of civil 
order. The response to nationalist agitation was thus to negotiate with nationalist 
leaders, a policy that fuelled extremist tendencies. Africans came to believe that 
‘violence pays’.3 It is unclear whether the decision to grant rights of secession to 
UNIP and the MCP was motivated by a desire to disassociate Britain from the 
problems caused by the Federation and the failure to promote African 
advancement, or whether there genuinely existed an acceptance that the 
Federation had failed. What is clear, however, is that in failing to recognise the 
                                                 
3
 NA, CO 1015/2057, E. Leighton, Assistant Commissioner Special Branch, Northern Rhodesia, ‘An 
Assessment of the Current and Future Threat to the Security of the Territory’, 17 Oct., 1959. 
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extent of African political development in 1953, the British had created a popular 
force in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, imbued with its own centrality to the 
future of the nation and quite unprepared to consider anything less than full 
independence and secession. Before such issues are examined, however, it is 
crucial to establish the context in which these developments took place.   
 
Britain, Settlers and the Development of African Nationalism in 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, 1958-64 
 
By late 1958, Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were becoming 
increasingly impatient. African leaders had failed in their attempts to negotiate 
measures for African advance and with the Federal Review Conference on the 
horizon, at which it was anticipated Welensky would achieve his long-held ambition 
of dominion status for the Federation, an element of desperation began to pervade 
African politics. It was at this time that the leaders of the NAC, the ANC and the 
newly formed ZANC travelled to Accra, Ghana, for the first All African People’s 
Conference in December.4 Galvanised by the support of influential pan-African 
figures, NAC and ZANC leaders returned to their respective territories with renewed 
optimism. Plans were soon established to organise a more concerted attack on the 
Federation.5  
                                                 
4
 RH, WP 242/5, ‘An Assessment of the External Influence Affecting the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland’, 8 May, 1959. Special Branch surmised that all Congress movements within the 
Federation were greatly heartened and stimulated by the Accra Conference and were given the 
feeling of being part of some irresistible force’. The exception was the Northern Rhodesia ANC 
whose leader, Nkumbula, complained of being ‘shunned’ by Nkrumah and Hastings Banda in favour 
of the more dynamic Kaunda. 
5
 RH, WP 231/5, George Loft, American Friends Service Committee, ‘Report on the Accra 
Conference’, 23 Dec., 1958.  
Page | 176  
 
The early months of 1959 were punctuated by Congress-inspired unrest, 
especially in Nyasaland where frustration had continued to mount following the 
publication of constitutional proposals set out by Governor Sir Robert Armitage 
which fell far short of African expectations for an elected majority in the Legislative 
Council.6 The situation reached a climax in early February, when Philip Finney, head 
of the Nyasaland Special Branch, reported that senior NAC members had plotted 
during a ‘meeting in the bush’ on 25 January to murder senior government officials 
and initiate a programme of violence.7 Suffice to say that the perception of the 
breakdown of order in Nyasaland in early 1959, coupled with the pressure placed 
upon Armitage by Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, anxious to see a 
clampdown on African extremism, caused the Governor to take decisive action.8 On 
3 March Armitage declared a state of emergency and, under ‘Operation Sunrise’, 
1,322 arrests were made including those of NAC President Dr Hastings Banda and 
his lieutenants, Henry Chipembere, Kanyama Chiume, Orton Chirwa, and brothers 
Dunduza and Yatuta Chisiza.9 According to the subsequent commission of inquiry, 
                                                 
6
 Murphy, ‘Central Africa’, p. lxx. Under Armitage’s proposals, only 14 of the 29 members of the 
Legislative Council would be elected. 
7
 MNA, C[entral] A[frican] A[rchives], Mfilm 2072, F248 CAC/155/3/C(Int)/G(ops), Vol., 1, Director of 
Federal Intelligence Special Branch in Salisbury to Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 
Secretary for External Affairs, Secretary Home Affairs, Secretary Federal Treasury, Undersecretary 
for Defences, 18 Feb., 1959. 
8
 Colin Baker’s State of Emergency: Crisis in Central Africa, Nyasaland 1959-1960, (London, 1997), 
undoubtedly remains one of the most comprehensive and detailed analyses of the events leading up 
to, and immediately preceding the declaration of emergency in Nyasaland. See also Murphy, P., ‘A 
Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, Vol., 36, No., 4, (December 2010), pp.265-280. For a more recent account, see McCracken, 
J., ‘In the Shadow of Mau Mau: Detainees and Detention Camps during Nyasaland's State of 
Emergency’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 37:3, (2011) pp.535-550.   
9
 Cmnd. 814, Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, 16, Jul., 1959. 
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the Nyasaland government’s actions resulted in the death of 51 Africans and the 
wounding of at least 79 between 20 February and 19 March.10 
Events in Nyasaland had a profound effect on the political temperature in 
Northern Rhodesia. Concerned that the NAC ‘murder plot’ was part of wider 
coordinated strategy, Governor Arthur Benson took similarly tough measures 
against the Zambia African National Congress, which he regarded as more radical 
and less amenable to cooperation than Nkumbula’s ANC. Of particular concern was 
the extent to which ZANC’s campaign against government attempts to register 
African voters for the forthcoming elections to be held under the controversial 
Benson constitution was yielding great success.11 Targets set by the Government for 
voter registration fell far short of initial expectations. Whilst zealous efforts had 
brought an increase in African ‘special’ voters to 6,821, only 796 Africans were 
registered on the ‘ordinary’ role.  With the election set for 20 March, and ZANC 
threatening to continue its boycott at the polls, Benson came under increasing 
pressure to deal with the situation at hand. On 11 March, the Safeguard of Elections 
and Public Safety Regulations were issued.12 ZANC leaders were arrested and, in the 
early hours of 12 March, were sent into internal exile in remote rural bomas. Under 
section 21 of the Societies Ordinance, banning orders were issued against the party 
                                                 
10
 RH, DCP Box 5, Nyasaland Operations Committee reports. It does not quite do justice to the sheer 
scale of the security clampdown to simply mention the numbers of those either killed or seriously 
wounded during the emergency. Box 5 of the Devlin Commission papers contains numerous reports 
detailing the frankly astonishing nature of repression that went on during this time. The most 
disturbing incident occurred at Nkata Bay, in which twenty Africans, in a crowd of over 600, were 
shot by security forces for not dispersing after the Riot Act had been read. See, ‘Report on Incident 
at Nkata Bay’, 3 Mar., 1959.   
11
 Northern News, 10 Mar., 1959.  
12
 RH, AB 245/16, Broadcast by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, 12 Mar., 1959. 
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and its branches outlawed.13 To all intents and purposes the governments of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had eradicated popular nationalism. 
The episode of coordinated repression, which appeared to have been 
conducted with the assistance of Federal authorities, did much to damage Britain’s 
reputation. The findings of the Devlin Commission, set up by the Conservative 
government after a public outcry to investigate the causes of the Nyasaland 
disturbances, were published in the infamous Devlin Report in July 1959. Its 
conclusions were ‘uniformly bad’, wrote Armitage, making embarrassing reference 
to the ‘police state’ operating in Nyasaland during the emergency.14 Occurring at 
the same time as revelations of brutality at the Hola detention camp in Kenya, the 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan initially feared the Report would bring 
down his government. Now was the time he felt, that Britain ought to take a more 
proactive stance by encouraging African advancement. Two major developments in 
late 1959 pointed to a change of tact. The first came upon the appointment of the 
Monckton Commission, chaired by Sir Walter Monckton, in October 1959 to review 
the constitution of the Federation prior to the Federal Review Conference.15 The 
second came soon after the Conservative Party victory in the British General 
Election in the same month, when Iain Macleod was appointed to the position of 
Colonial Secretary.16  
Unlike his predecessors, Macleod came to office with a specific remit to 
accelerate colonial independence. As he later admitted in his memoirs, Macmillan 




 RH, A[rmitage] P[apers], Box 2, File 4, Memoirs, 1959. 
15
 HCD vol. 612, cc.668-809, 2 Nov., 1959. Macleod set out the objectives of the Monckton 
Commission during a Parliamentary Debate on 2 November, 1959. 
16
 See, Palmer, R., ‘European Resistance to African Majority Rule, The Settlers’ and Residents’ 
Association of Nyasaland, 1960-63’, African Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 288 (Jul., 1973), p.259. 
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‘knew very well’, and indeed ‘it was implicit in the offer’ that he was going to 
operate a different regime to his predecessor. His initial objective in Central Africa 
was to end the emergency in Nyasaland and release Dr Banda.17 Whilst there would 
be security risks, there was no other way to circumvent the present deadlock in 
Nyasaland. If the newly formed Malawi Congress Party had their hopes for Banda’s 
release disappointed, the authorities must be prepared for ‘a return to violence’.18 
After a series of protracted negotiations, arrangements were made to reduce the 
number of detainees to a ‘hardcore’ of around 50, further reduced to around a 
dozen during April. Banda was released from Gwelo gaol on 1 April, 1960. He was 
then flown to Nyasaland and promptly driven to Government House, Zomba, where 
he met Macleod and Armitage to discuss the Nyasaland constitution and to arrange 
a constitutional conference to be held in London from 20 July to 5 August. At the 
London Conference, agreement was reached for an introduction of an African 
elected majority in the territory’s Legislative Council, elections for which were 
scheduled to take place the following year.19  
To concur with Philip Murphy’s assessment, 1959 was a seminal year for the 
Africans of Nyasaland. Before the emergency, Hastings Banda was generally seen by 
the Nyasaland and British authorities as representing a small cohort of ambitious, 
self-seeking political activists. After the emergency he was recognised as the 
undisputed leader of a committed mass movement that had the support of almost 
                                                 
17
 NA, PREM 11/2586, Macleod to Macmillan, 29 Dec., 1959. 
18
 NA, CO 1015/2233, Colonial Office Memo, undated, 1960. The MCP was initially set up in 
September 1959 under the stewardship of Orton Chirwa and an exiled Southern Rhodesian, Aleke 
Banda. The MCP continued to hold Banda in the highest esteem and the party’s leaders had every 
intention upon installing him as their leader once he was released from detention. 
19
 Cmnd. 1132, Report of the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference, July, 1960. 
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the entire African populace.20 On 15 August 1961, Banda’s Malawi Congress Party 
won an overwhelming victory in the territorial elections, taking the entire lower roll 
and three of the higher roll seats, which later became five when the new 
government was appointed on 2 September.21 The major question was now how 
long before the MCP could lead Nyasaland’s secession from the Federation.  
Constitutional progress for Africans in Northern Rhodesia remained fraught 
with complications. The situation in the Protectorate in 1960 was especially volatile; 
the actions of the government in early 1959 had merely ensured a brief hiatus for 
nationalist politics, and soon after the (re)-organisation of former ZANC activists 
under the banner of the United National Independence Party [UNIP] in October 
1959, political agitation intensified. The months of August and September had been 
punctuated with violence, culminating in the murder of a European woman, Lilian 
Burton, whose car was stoned and set alight whilst she and her children were still 
inside.22 The root cause of the unrest, concluded intelligence officials, was the 
UNIP, formed from the embers of ZANC in October 1959, whose leaders had been 
active in ‘exciting’ and ‘inciting’ its followers since Kaunda had been released from 
detention in January 1960. The growth of ever more extreme forms of protest, 
officials claimed, was the mounting frustration at the failure of the Northern 
Rhodesian government to recognise the strength of African political sentiment.23 
African expectations for political advance were boosted by the publication of the 
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 Murphy, ‘Central Africa’, p.lxi. 
21
 The extremely poor performance of the United Federal Party under the leadership of Michael 
Blackwood made the allocation of seats on the Executive Council a sensitive issue. The UFP were 
eventually offered only one of the five elected seats. Blackwood rejected this, leaving the way open 
for the MCP to occupy all five 
22
 All three initially escaped from the burning vehicle, thought Mrs. Burton later died in Ndola 
Hospital from the injuries sustained in the attack. 
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 NA, CO 1015/1749, Intelligence Extract, ‘The African Nationalist Problem in Northern Rhodesia’, 
29 Oct., 1960. 
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Monckton Report on 11 October 1960, which recommended that steps towards an 
African majority ought soon to be taken if the Federation had any chance of gaining 
African acceptance.24  
Plans to reach a settlement consistent with Monckton’s recommendations 
were complicated by the intransigent attitude of the Federal government. In 
December, Macleod outlined a tentative plan to offer ‘the appearance of an African 
majority’. In a Legislative Council of 30 elected members, there might be 16 African 
and 14 European representatives, with a speaker and perhaps 4 officials. When put 
to Welensky, the plan was rejected outright.25 After a series of tedious negotiations, 
agreement was finally reached in June 1961. Under the scheme, there would be 45 
members of the legislative assembly, 15 elected by the upper roll, 15 by the lower 
roll and 15 by both rolls combined. The percentage of votes cast by each roll would 
be averaged, something that would, in practice, devalue the votes of the far more 
numerous and largely African lower roll. In every respect the proposals worked to 
the advantage of the European electorate and gave the impression that the British 
had once again allowed Welensky to dictate the pace of negotiations.26 The 
introduction of a Special National constituency for Asian and Coloured voters, most 
of who would qualify under the higher franchise, severely diminished the prospects 
of nationalist parties securing upper roll support in the National constituencies. 
UNIP angrily condemned the June proposals as a sell out to the Federal government 
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 Cmnd. 1148, Report of the Advisory Commission on the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
October, 1960. 
25
 NA, PREM 11/3485, Welensky to Macmillan, 14 Jan., 1961. 
26
 Murphy, ‘Central Africa’, p.lxxxiv, European influence was strengthened by the creation of an 
Asian seat, designed to keep 2000 Asians off the upper roll, and the stipulation that, as well as 
securing 12½ per cent of 400 votes, whichever was less, of the votes cast by both rolls, successful 
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and in July serious rioting broke out across the territory.27 Anxious to prevent the 
situation from getting out of hand, Macleod invited Kaunda for talks in London in 
mid-September, promising that the British would consider further representations 
on the June constitution, provided that the disturbances ceased immediately.28  
In October 1961, Reginald Maudling replaced Macleod at the Colonial 
Office. Despite facing opposition from the Federal government, in February 1962 he 
succeeded in lowering the voting qualifications for Africans sufficient to secure 
African nationalist participation in the elections to be held later that year.29 
Following months of campaigning by UNIP, and a series of negotiations and 
temporary alliances arranged by Nkumbula to secure the ANC’s continued survival, 
the conclusion of the second round of elections in December heralded a significant 
victory for African nationalism. UNIP obtained 14 seats, the ANC 7, and Welensky’s 
United Federal Party [UFP] 16. The formation of the UNIP-ANC coalition 
government quashed any lingering expectations that some form of Federal 
association between the Rhodesias might be preserved.30 
Secession was the core issue on the agenda in 1962. The attitude of Hastings 
Banda, who had won the 1961 elections on a secessionist platform, was 
uncompromising: Nyasaland would not consider any form of association, either 
formal or informal, with the Rhodesias. In October, R.A. Butler, recently appointed 
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 NA, CO 1015/2246, Hone to Macleod, Report on Situation in Northern Rhodesia, 30 Sept., 1961. 
28
 Mulford, Zambia, p.200. 
29
 NA, CAB 128/36/1, CC 17(62)5, 27 Feb., 1962. 
30
 In October and November 1962, the Cabinet had not yet been prepared to discard all hope of a 
Central African entity. Home argued that Federation was a sound concept, and the formal political 
association between the territories was the only means by which Southern Rhodesia could be 
prevented from aligning with South Africa. Duncan Sandys, in contrast, thought political association 
impossible. The two Rhodesias would vehemently disagree about external affairs and defence, 
critical elements of any political association. An economic association, along the lines of the East 
African common services organisation might be possible and beneficial, however. 
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as the Minister for Central Africa at the newly created Central Africa Office, 
reluctantly acknowledged that Britain’s capacity to influence a change in attitude in 
Nyasaland was ‘extremely limited’.31 Despite resistance from Welensky, Butler was 
convinced of the need to take the initiative lest Britain be forced to hold Nyasaland 
in the Federation against the declared wishes of the African people.32 In deference 
to the objections of the Federal government, the Nyasaland constitutional 
conference took place in December in advance of a formal acknowledgement by 
the British of Nyasaland’s right to secede. Over the next six months, the final stages 
of the British government’s abdication were, Welensky later reflected, ‘rapid and 
shameless’.33 Whilst the MCP prepared for the transition to independence, 
eventually to be achieved on 6 July 1964, Butler later acknowledged, after lengthy 
discussions, the right of Northern Rhodesia to secede on 29 March 1963.34  
A conference, held at Victoria Falls in summer 1963, divided up the 
Federation’s assets among its three constituents. The news was greeted with relief 
in Northern Rhodesia, where inter-party violence and friction within the coalition 
had become a common feature of daily political life. Preparations for the 
forthcoming general election, scheduled for January 1964, following UNIP’s request 
for a new constitution that provided for an expanded African franchise, began in 
earnest. UNIP launched a territory-wide campaign to register African voters and 
made a renewed appeal to encourage European support for the party. Undoubtedly 
aided by the ANC’s financial and administrative meltdown, UNIP coasted to victory, 
winning 69.9 per cent of the votes cast, securing 55 of the 65 seats in the territorial 
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 NA, CO 129/11, C(62)167, Cabinet memorandum by R.A. Butler, 25 Oct., 1962. 
32
 NA, CAB/129/111, Cabinet memorandum by R.A. Butler, 25 Oct., 1962. 
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 Welensky, 4000 Days, p.355. 
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legislature.35 As soon as UNIP’s majority was confirmed, the Governor invited 
Kaunda to form a new government. At the end of the year, the Federation was 
formally terminated, Northern Rhodesia achieving its long awaited independence 
as Zambia on 24 October, 1964. 
   
The Nyasaland Emergency and the Proscription of Congress in 
Nyasaland, 1959-1960 
 
As outlined above, the growth of the Nyasaland African Congress reached 
unprecedented levels in the late 1950s. Given the frustration then building among 
Africans in the territory, the All-African People’s Conference therefore took place at 
a critical moment. Calling upon the British to take decisive action and dissolve the 
‘discriminatory Federation in the benefit of all people [sic.]’, the Conference 
reinvigorated the anti-Federation struggle. Resolving to support Congress leaders in 
‘any way possible’, and pledging to support the adoption of violent tactics ‘in 
retaliation to exploitation and subjugation’, African politicians emerged with the 
feeling of being part of some ‘irresistible force’, a belief that ‘their time had 
come’.36 As Hastings Banda remarked to his followers soon after the Conference,  
I was always determined to fight Federation but I am now even more 
determined now since I have come back from Ghana. I went to a 
conference of All African people. There we were Africans from everywhere, 
East, West, North, South and Central. We not only got to know each other 
but we thought together. We dreamed together. We planned together. So 
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 Mulford, Zambia, p.327. 
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 RH, WP 242/5, ‘An Assessment of the External Influences Affecting the Federation of Rhodesia and 
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that whatever happened now, we are not alone. We have the whole black 
and brown Africa behind us.37  
 
Developments in late 1958 were accompanied by a discernible increase in 
political agitation in Nyasaland.38 In the Northern Province, where the NAC drew 
the bulk of its support, Congress activists stepped up campaigns linking 
discriminatory agricultural legislation to the ‘stupid Federation’. Federation meant 
land alienation, increased immigration and harsh agricultural rules.39 In Misuku, 
Congress attacked soil conservation measures, arguing that they represented yet 
further limitations to African freedom whilst in Karonga, one of the major cattle 
areas of the country, Congress told cattle owners to ignore irksome legislation 
forcing them to register their animals with the Veterinary Department and to stay 
away from dipping tanks.40 In each case Congress went to great lengths to 
emphasise that under a Congress government such legislation would be withdrawn 
immediately and Africans would again be permitted to cultivate their own land as 
they saw appropriate. As R.W. Kettlewell, Nyasaland’s Director of Agriculture, 
confirmed, the Congress campaign was largely successful. Widespread boycotts of 
agricultural rules followed and soon gave rise to the destruction of government 
property and intimidation of agricultural officials.41  
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 NA, CO 1015/946, Benson to Gorell Barnes, 1 Apr., 1955. 
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In the view of British intelligence officials, Congress had by early 1959 
succeeded in making the issue of Nyasaland’s participation in the Federation ‘an 
obsession’ in the minds of the great majority of Africans in the country even down 
to the ‘most humble villager’.42 The report added that the Northern Province was a 
virtual hotbed of political activity.43 Serious rioting broke out in several districts on 
8 February following a series of illegal meetings called by the local Congress 
leadership. According to a security assessment, all branches of Congress in the 
region were ‘engaged in activities to arouse people to illegal disturbances’.44 The 
degree of support was ‘100% in the Misuku area’ of Karonga and the standard of 
Congress leadership was reported as being ‘very high’.45 Integral to NAC unity at 
this time was Dr Banda himself, who had gained cult-like status since his return to 
Nyasaland in mid-1958. Banda was a figure that transcended tribal boundaries and 
cut across regional divides. At the time of the emergency, remarked John Mwanse, 
a former agricultural union official and MCP activist in Misuku in the 1960s, Banda 
inspired confidence in every African, attaining messianic status among his people. 
For a country in which Christian tradition was strong, the image of Dr Banda as a 
redeeming Messiah could easily be internalized and subscribed to by uncritical 
minds. This was symbolised, Mwanse recalled, in a parody of the Lord’s Prayer, 
eulogising Banda, which became a mantra for Congress supporters; 
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Our Banda, who art in Blantyre, hallowed be they name; thy kingdom 
come, thy will be done, in Nyasaland as in Ghana.46 
 
When Banda thus called for his supporters to intensify the anti-colonial struggle 
upon his return from Accra, they responded in kind. In January and February 1959, 
the number of illegal meetings more than doubled and reported instances of arson 
and sabotage became a prominent feature of Nyasaland intelligence reports.47  
The emerging Banda-centred political culture, with its strong Christian 
overtones, rooted in the traditional Chewa concept of male guardianship over the 
family—in which Banda was ‘Nkhoswe Number One’ for Nyasaland’s men, women 
and children—reinforced tendencies to resort to intimidation in instances where 
the NAC was unsuccessful in persuading Africans to tow the party line. To refuse to 
join the party, or to reject aspects of the NAC’s campaign, was tantamount to 
rejecting Banda, who had selflessly returned to lead his people to freedom.48 In the 
localities, intimidation took the form of threats, social ostracism, and in extreme 
cases, physical assault. Those not attending Congress meetings were warned that 
they were going to be either killed, or were going to be excluded, ‘chased away’, 
from the country when self-government came.49 An even more disturbing fate 
awaited known local supporters of Federation. Rex Moses told the Devlin 
Commission in Lilongwe that he was attacked in his own house on 28 February for 
commenting upon the ‘financial advantages’ that the Federation brought to 
Nyasaland. A Kwaca [freedom] gang, composed largely of NAC Youth League 
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members broke into his house, beat him, and cut open his forehead with a hand 
saw.50  
The increasingly radical nature of African nationalism owed much to the 
ambitions of the ‘younger men’ in Congress, such as Henry Chipembere, the Chisiza 
brothers, Du and Yatuta, and Kanyama Chiume, who recognised the counter-
attraction of violent policies that were likely to have brought ‘quicker results than 
Gandhi’s methods’.51 This manifested, the Devlin Report later concluded, in Banda’s 
inability, or at the very least, reluctance, to control his closest lieutenants.52 There is 
no concrete evidence to prove decisively this was the case, but there is every 
reason to suspect that Dr Banda was in fact very much aware of the propensity of 
his followers towards more extreme methods, and had sought to deliberately 
cultivate a political culture in which NAC leaders were given a freer hand in shaping 
a more radical policy in order to apply greater pressure to the Nyasaland 
government to provide greater opportunities for African constitutional 
development. As Henry Chipembere had long advocated, ‘some form of Mau Mau’ 
was needed to provoke the government into action.53 Congress protests had so far 
fallen on deaf ears and the NAC were not likely to have made significant headway 
with demands for an African majority. Given the extent of the NAC’s problems, 
Banda himself was surely beginning to see the benefits of adopting a more 
aggressive position. Following the All-African Peoples Conference, for example, he 
had personally emphasised the virtues of self-sacrifice in the struggle to achieve 
African freedom.  
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I mean to fight Federation from prison or from the grave and even in the 
grave when I am ashes and dust my ghost will come back and fight the 
damned Federation. My people, I don’t care what happens to me ... I 
promise you if, in order that Nyasaland may be free and independent, my 
blood, my life is required as sacrifice, I promise you can have it now.54 
 
These were not the words of a leader content with the current course of 
events. Rather they pointed to a man keen for action, keen to make a concerted 
impact upon his followers to commit themselves fully to the freedom cause. It was 
in all probability Banda’s decision to leave unchecked the actions and words of his 
NAC lieutenants that precipitated the adoption of a policy of violence and 
retaliatory murder of Europeans at the infamous ‘meeting in the bush’ on 24-25 
January 1959.55 Whilst Banda had arguably not anticipated the strength of 
government retribution in March, he clearly intended his party to make a statement 
that would cause the government to take Congress demands seriously. Banda had 
every opportunity to prevent the adoption of extreme tactics, but not once did he 
publicly steer his supporters away from radical methods. During the meeting in the 
bush, for instance, Banda requested to be excused during the time at which the 
Congress Central Executive Committee was to discuss a plan of action should he be 
arrested or assassinated.56 Whilst this might in part reveal Banda’s ambivalence to 
be seen by the government to acquiesce in the extremist tendencies of his 
followers, it also reflected his desire to bring matters to a head. The dynamic 
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approach that Banda had adopted since December 1958 could not be allowed to 
dissipate. The meeting in the bush might, therefore, be seen as a means by which 
the NAC hoped to stir the authorities into handing Africans constitutional 
concessions. The meeting was, after all, a very public affair.57 It took place less than 
a kilometre from the Limbe police lines, delegates travelled in an open truck, and it 
was even mentioned in the Nyasaland Times.58 It is surely legitimate to ask, 
therefore, if the NAC had planned to discuss violence, why had the meeting been 
given such wide publicity? 
The response of Nyasaland authorities to the NAC threat consequently 
meant that by mid-1959 African nationalism was in retreat; the NAC had been 
banned and its leaders removed from the political scene. The pattern of events 
following the Nyasaland emergency had proved incontrovertibly that power and 
influence remained squarely in the hands of the Colonial and Federal governments. 
Yet, whilst their immediate prospects appeared bleak, time in detention would be a 
valuable exercise for African politicians, providing an opportunity for reflection. 
Success in the future, some believed, would henceforth depend upon the extent to 
which their supporters could be made to embrace a truly national agenda. In order 
for nationalism to survive, a new approach was needed that was capable of 
transcending local concerns and tribal boundaries, one that would command the 
unquestioning support of all Africans.  
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Nationalism Revived: The Malawi Congress Party and Nyasaland’s 
Progress to Self-Government, 1960-63 
 
In spite of attempts to eradicate the NAC in early 1959, the continuation of 
emergency restrictions ensured that resentment against the colonial state 
continued to build at local level.59 Throughout the year, NAC orphans kept the 
colonial government ‘on their toes’ by tearing down anti-nationalist posters and 
forming small political cells. As John Mwanse remarked in interview, the emergency 
was not like issues that had faced Congress before; it was something that affected 
Africans everywhere. ‘It did not matter if you were a fisherman or a priest’, he said, 
‘government laws stopped Africans from living their everyday lives’.60  The impact 
of politics at the national level, however, was ostensibly rather limited at first, not 
least because NAC leaders remained in detention. It was arguably not until former 
NAC activist Aleke Banda returned to Nyasaland upon his release from a Southern 
Rhodesian gaol in July that African nationalism began to show signs of revival. Upon 
his return, Banda took up a position at the Trade Union Congress offices in Blantyre, 
and with the help of fellow sympathisers he established in November ‘Ntende pa 
Nchito’, later Malawi News, a mimeographed broadsheet of the labour movement. 
The Malawi News served a crucial function. It was not only the mouthpiece of 
former NAC leaders, but it played an important role in keeping alive nationalist 
fervour throughout Nyasaland in the early 1960s.61 ‘It was the only paper that I 
read’, remarked George Nyondo, a former civil servant and political activist in 
Zomba in the 1960s, and ‘it was all I read to others’.62 Together with Orton Chirwa, 
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released from detention by Nyasaland authorities in August, Banda entered a 
dialogue via a network of informants in prisons with Dr Banda. On 30 September, 
with Dr Banda’s approval, Aleke Banda, Chirwa, Sydney Somanje, Chechiwa 
Bwanausi and Augustine Mtambara established the Malawi Congress Party. Chirwa 
was appointed President-General and Aleke Secretary-General.63  
The foundation of the MCP marked a significant change in the character of 
nationalism in Nyasaland. Often regarded as the NAC by another name, the MCP 
quickly emerged as an infinitely larger party than its predecessor, more consciously 
‘traditionalist’ in its style, distinctly more totalitarian in its approach. Unlike the 
NAC, it drew much of its support from the Central and Southern provinces, regions 
that the NAC had previously struggled to penetrate.64 The MCP’s political objectives 
were twofold: first, to press for the release of detainees and an end to emergency 
restrictions; and second, to build public support for the new party on the basis of a 
commitment to self-government, secession, and independence.65 A central 
platform in the party’s agenda was the emphasis upon unity. Borrowing tactics used 
by ZANC in Northern Rhodesia, party propagandists claimed that it was only 
through membership of Malawi that Africans could obtain freedom from colonial 
oppression. 
The Malawi Congress Party is your Party. It is a mass organisation. It is the 
Party for all the children, women and men of this country. If you realise 
how vitally important it is at the moment for all the African people of this 
country to unity in their CAUSE for SECESSION FROM THE FEDERATION OF 
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RHODESIA AND NYASALAND, SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND INDEPENDENCE 
you will not hesitate to rally behind the Malawi Congress Party.66 
 
Within two days of its formation, more than 1,000 Africans had joined the MCP. By 
the end of October, intelligence sources claimed that the party had over 15,000 
members.67  
The rapid growth of the MCP of course owed much to the activities of 
former NAC activists at the local level, but it also owed much to the initiative of the 
MCP’s women’s league and youth brigade. The League of Malawi Women was 
formed in November 1959 under the leadership of Mrs Malanga and Vera Chirwa.68 
The League of Malawi Youth was formed on 24 December under the leadership of 
Jomo Chikwakwa and Constance Makata.69 Soon after the MCP’s establishment, 
party leaders relied heavily upon both groups to spread news of the new party and 
agitate for political change. Given the perceived reluctance of the authorities to 
arrest women, the LMW were regarded as being particularly important with 
regards to political activism, especially in public displays of party loyalty. This was 
apparent at an incident that took place in Mlanje in March 1960, which resulted in 
the reading of the riot act after a group of some 100 people, including women, 
marched on the village boma to demand the release of 13 male prisoners from 
detention. The protest escalated when a small group of women tore down the tents 
of the assistant district commissioner and the agricultural officer, who were there 
to encourage observance of agricultural rules. The women called for assistance and 
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in the ensuing melee, only men were arrested.70 The LMW’s most significant 
contribution at this time, however, was in its capacity to act as a propaganda tool. It 
was women that Hastings Banda encouraged to sing songs and dance for him at 
political meetings following his release from gaol in April 1960, something which 
made him ‘happy, very happy’, and it was Malawi’s women who Banda implored to 
line the streets upon his arrival at important events in order to provide a sense of 
‘occasion’.71 At a final MCP campaign meeting at Ndirande outside Blantyre in 1961, 
for instance, Lucy Mair described how Women’s League members lined the route 
by which the Doctor walked from his car to platform, the path carpeted with 
women’s cloths.72   
The LMW had a significant ceremonial function. The LMY, on the other 
hand, served as the MCP’s militant wing. Recruiting from the unemployed and 
disaffected, aged between 17 and 35, the LMY were well-placed in the opinion of 
intelligence officials for the staging of ‘demonstrations, intimidation, and the 
commission of acts of violence and general flouting of authority’.73 Soon after the 
LMY-led Ryall’s Hotel protest on 26 January, in which LMY activists used the 
opportunity presented by Macmillan’s visit to Blantyre to address guests at a civil 
luncheon to agitate against the continuation of emergency restrictions, Governor 
Armitage wrote to Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod stating that the LMY 
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represented ‘a clear potential danger’ to law and order in Nyasaland.74 By this stage 
the League claimed to boast a membership of over 25,000 distributed across 200 
branches, contributing to a ‘growing pattern of disorder’ sweeping through certain 
districts in the territory.75 
Both the LMY and LMW played an important role in stirring political unrest 
in key centres, making easier the task of the MCP’s interim leaders to (re)build 
momentum behind the anti-federation struggle. By December 1959, the MCP had 
52 branches: 31 in Southern Province, 18 in Central Province, and 3 in Northern 
Province. By January 1960, this had risen to 37, 28, and 12, respectively, and by 
February to 119, 53, and 51.76 Special Branch reported that the party had some 
67,000 members but admitted that this was probably an underestimate, so quickly 
were new members signing up.77 Figures printed in the Malawi News in September 
1960 put the total at over a million, though this could quite easily have referred 
only to the number of membership cards printed. By October 1961, the MCP was 
said to have extended to 2,784 branches, 1,842 MCP, 126 LMY and 816 LMW, with 
an estimated membership of over 100,000.78  
An intrinsic part of extending the MCP’s reach revolved around attempts to 
politicise Nyasaland’s trade unions. ‘Trade union leaders’, wrote Aleke Banda in 
March 1960, needed to ‘tighten up their buckles and get down to real work’, 
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standing shoulder to shoulder with Congress in the national struggle.79 As 
demonstrated in chapter two, few inroads were made into the small trade union 
movement prior to the banning of the NAC in March 1959. Even during the 
emergency, workers had displayed an ambivalence to involve themselves in 
political concerns.80 By 1960, however, the upturn in labour activity, indicated by 
the swell in trade union membership from the low figure of 1,300 in 1957 to well 
over 7,000, gave MCP leaders reason to think that the political momentum 
generated by the unions was worth harnessing.81 The rise in trade union 
membership was mirrored in the rise of labour disputes at this time too, from nine 
minor stoppages in 1955 to three trade disputes and 15 strikes in 1958 and on to 81 
disputes, 77 involving strikes, in 1960.82 
As Tony Woods suggests, support for the MCP varied in different unions. 
Whilst the Railway Workers Union remained cautious about adopting a more 
militant stance, the Nyasaland Transport and Allied Workers Union staunchly 
endorsed Congress. Aleke Banda underlined the close relationship between the two 
organisations when he lauded the Nyasaland Transport and Allied Workers Union's 
efforts ‘to do some honest, militant and real trade Unionism’ in June 1960.83 The 
number of MCP members present in trade unions is difficult to gauge, but it was 
nevertheless widely recognised that the party was beginning to play an important 
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role in creating a more radical class consciousness among rail and other industrial 
workers. By July 1960, for instance, the General Manager of the railways reported 
that an atmosphere similar to that witnessed before the 1959 emergency could be 
detected. ‘The whole field of labour is on edge and strikes or threats of strikes are 
made on the slightest provocations’. The root cause of the trouble, he added, was 
‘undoubtedly the Malawi Congress Party’.84 
 
The Growth of the MCP and the ‘Cult of Kamuzu’ 
Although the MCP’s growth was on the whole rather impressive, it was sporadic 
and in many areas dependent upon the existence of former NAC branches where 
there still remained at least some remnants of the old party organisation.85 Given 
the preoccupation with the campaign to end the emergency, attempts to adopt a 
coherent, long-term, political strategy were also lacking. The solution for the MCP’s 
interim leaders was to play upon Hastings Banda’s centrality to the national 
movement in order to draw together the people of Nyasaland. He would not only 
provide a point of continuity between the MCP and its predecessor, but would also 
provide an opportunity to maximise the political leverage gained from the 
imprisonment of NAC leaders. It was Banda that had shown a willingness to 
sacrifice himself for his people and it was Banda that personified the African 
struggle in Nyasaland.86 If people came to believe such rhetoric, it was felt that the 
Nyasa people would be prepared to make similar sacrifices.  
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In the initial instance, then, Hastings Banda himself would form the central platform 
to the MCF’s political and mobilisation programme. It was seen as a way, not only 
of uniting the people behind the party, but of developing a truly ‘national’ ideal to 
which all could subscribe. Soon after his widely publicised release from gaol and his 
appointment as MCP President in April 1960, he and his closest lieutenants 
embarked upon a process of consolidating his position in the Malawian polity, 
making synonymous the ‘cult of Kamuzu’ with the party’s fight for independence. 
This would help show that the MCP was not just a reincarnation of the NAC; it was 
Kamuzu’s personal party under which all who joined would be protected and under 
whose leadership the people of Nyasaland would be lead to their freedom. The 
cultivation of such ideas owed much to the work of Kanyama Chiume, whose ‘drive 
and tireless dedication to the task’ helped ingrain in the minds of MCP followers 
that Banda’s word was ‘law’ against which there could be no argument.87 
Everything in Nyasaland belonged to Banda; ‘to serve Kamuzu to death’ must be the 
motto of every sane nationalist in the country’, wrote Chiume to his leader in 
January 1961.88 This message was carried throughout the territory, both verbally by 
Malawi officials and in the columns of the Malawi News; the message was also 
echoed in songs sung by the LMW.89  
Zonse zimene, n'za Kamuzu Banda Everything else, belongs to Kamuzu 
Banda  
Zonse zimene, n'za Kamuzu Banda Everything else, belongs to Kamuzu 
Banda  
0Nyanja zonse? N'za Kamuzu Banda All the lakes, for Kamuzu Banda  
Ng'ombe zonse? N'za Kamuzu Banda All the cattle, for Kamuzu Banda  
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Ife tonse? Ndi a Kamuzu Banda All of us, for Kamuzu Banda.90 
 
Whether the Banda cult was initially adopted for purposes of political 
convenience, or whether MCP leaders genuinely felt Banda really ought to occupy a 
central place in the national dispensation is uncertain. What is clear, however, is 
that Banda himself believed that he could fulfil no other role. He was not brought 
back to Nyasaland to be a ‘front man to be run by young people no matter how 
brilliant they were’, he told Donal Brody in interview.91 In various speeches made 
during a protectorate-wide tour in which he was accompanied by Chiume and Aleke 
Banda, Banda inveighed against stooges, emphasising his own centrality to the fight 
for freedom. He was going to London to demand ‘self-government now’, and he 
was going to win for the people their freedom.92 With Banda seemingly Britain’s 
preferred interlocutor after 1960, in large part a corollary of the belief in official 
circles that only Banda was capable of controlling his own followers and dissuading 
them from pursuing an otherwise more extreme course, he could easily afford to 
inject a new ‘bitterness and venom’ into his speeches without fear of repression.93 
The only way to achieve African self-government was by supporting the Kamuzu 
and the MCP. If an individual elected to follow another path, they would find 
themselves marginalised and at worst, excluded, from the MCP’s vision of an 
independent Malawi.94  
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This somewhat exclusivist rhetoric filtered throughout every level of the 
party. Banda’s own assertiveness, and insistence upon claiming for Nyasaland self-
government at the forthcoming constitutional discussions in London in late 1960, 
instilled a new militancy into his MCP leadership cadres. In an article published in 
the Malawi News in October 1960, for instance, Aleke Banda warned that, ‘on 
matters that touch our independence, we are prepared to part company with any 
person who wants to oppress us – high or low placed. Bishop, Governor, politician, 
civil servant or any other person who stands in our way can be sure of an attack 
from us’.95 This was reflected most clearly in the MCP’s growing intransigence 
towards the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian [CCAP]. The CCAP had been 
valued supporters of the MCP’s predecessor. CCAP missions at Livingstone and 
Blantyre proved especially valuable to the NAC during the Nyasaland emergency, 
providing shelter for former NAC members and offering a forum in which Africans 
could discuss political matters away from the fear of state repression. Increasingly, 
however, the MCP came to resent the Church’s ‘political activities’. In April 1960, 
Aleke Banda spoke out against the ‘oppressive nature of church missions’, 
emphasising that it was no longer their place to involve themselves in MCP matters: 
We have made it clear that we are not against the spiritual teachings and 
activities of that Church. But this we must repeat – we are not prepared to 
allow the Church as a Church to get itself involve in party politics under the 
guise of religion. We do not care what Church it may be. The church has its 
realm and that is the spiritual realm ... The people of Malawi are not the 
people to play with. They know what they want and no bishop can deflect 
them from their course. We must repeat that here in our country of 
Malawi we are determined to rule ourselves.96 
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A little over a year later, the Special Branch noted that the CCAP wielded 
‘considerably less influence with the MCP than it did with the Nyasaland African 
Congress’.97 Roman Catholic missions also came under attack. On 8 July 1960, 
intelligence sources reported that a Roman Catholic mission was invaded soon after 
it had hosted the Governor. Its inhabitants were driven out and patients in the 
mission hospital were chased away, one of them allegedly a woman in labour who 
was ‘forced to give birth in the bush’.98 
The most forceful expression of the MCP’s new militancy came in a series of 
vitriolic speeches delivered by Henry Chipembere, Malawi’s Treasurer-General, 
after his release from detention in December in which he denounced the 
Federation and encouraged MCP members to take decisive action against those 
seeking to quash the party’s ambitions.  
I am going to propose that Malawi must adopt a more violent and more 
militant policy to crush federation ... those who want us to continue must 
be prepared to suffer, to put into operation our policy of positive action to 
crush federation.99 
 
He reserved his most vicious remarks for Europeans.  
If they come to you ... spit on the dog and urinate on him. We don’t accept 
these Europeans as friends, they are our enemies, they have been killing our 
people, they have the blood of our people on their hands … we reject their 
brotherhood and their partnership.100 
 
Chipembere’s words excited those who were keen to pursue a more extreme 
course of action. No more than two weeks later, the League of Malawi Youth were 
described by Captain Roach of the Nyasaland security services as being ‘increasingly 
truculent and hard to handle’, appearing ‘reluctant to follow the policy of non-
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violence’ advocated publicly by Banda whilst he was discussing Nyasaland’s future 
in London.101 Since the publication of the Monckton Report in October, Special 
Branch reported, intimidation had become widespread. The MCP was thus 
expected to ‘continue to use intimidation in the future to further its aims’, and 
despite denials by Dr Banda it was ‘unlikely’ that it would be abandoned as a 
political weapon.102  
There is little doubt that the MCP’s new militancy was a policy that 
percolated down from the very top of the party, rooted in Banda’s own insistence 
of his centrality to the struggle and the increasing intolerance with which leading 
party officials, such as Chipembere and Aleke Banda came to regard those who 
refused to subscribe to the MCPs national vision. Rather ironically, the ‘breakdown 
of order’ identified by Special Branch had the effect of enhancing Banda’s standing 
with the Nyasaland and British authorities, and, subsequently, his standing within 
nationalist politics. It is not entirely clear whether Banda turned up the political 
temperature in order to increase pressure on the Nyasaland government to resolve 
pressing constitutional issues, or whether he had done so as a means to root out 
those MCP members keen for a more militant course of action so that he could 
discern which members of his party were advocating a course different from 
Banda’s own, but either way, Banda certainly benefitted from the decision to allow 
the actions of the MCP’s radical cohort to remain unchecked. When plans were 
made by the British to arrest six MCP members including Chipembere by the end of 
December, some of Banda’s key rivals were removed from the scene at a critical 
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stage in the transition to self-government.103 Banda accepted plans to arrest 
Chipembere, acknowledging that ‘such matters must take their course’, and when 
his subsequent trial ended in conviction the next month, Banda made no effort to 
intervene or mitigate.104 By allowing his radical lieutenants to dig their own political 
graves, Banda put clear distance between himself and the radicals, effectively 
engineering a situation in which only he was likely to emerge as the man with 
whom the British could negotiate. This was undoubtedly a risky strategy, but the 
isolation, and later removal, of political rivals was one that would be frequently 
deployed by Banda over the course of the following years.  
Renewed MCP militancy in 1960 had several important ramifications for the 
MCP and Malawi’s future. One of the principal effects was to compel people into 
party membership. Naturally, this did not apply to all, but in several interviews 
conducted in Zomba during August 2011 it was clear that not all who joined the 
MCP did so because they genuinely subscribed to the MCP’s agenda. Rather, they 
did so because party membership offered safety; for themselves, and for their 
families. George Nyondo vividly described his position in the early 1960s. 
I joined Malawi, not because they offered freedom, but [because] I wanted 
to make sure my family were safe. Everywhere we were told that people 
were joining Kamuzu’s revolution and that soon he would lead us all to 
independence. Where we lived everyone was [a] party member. If I stayed 
away from party meetings and did not buy a party card I was afraid what 
would happen to us. We had heard stories of houses being burnt down and 
people being beaten by Malawi Youth. I did not want this to happen to my 
family.105 
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How widely Nyondo’s experiences were shared is almost impossible to determine, 
but it is important nonetheless to point out that for some, affiliation to the party 
was not always motivated by the belief that the MCP represented their political 
aspirations. To draw parallels with Daniel Branch’s findings in relation to African 
loyalists in Kenya during the 1950s, participation in politics was for many Africans 
conditioned by practical considerations.106 Some undoubtedly joined the MCP, for 
instance, because possession of an MCP party card offered protection and security. 
This came to be recognised by a small number of government officials such as G. 
Landreth, District Commissioner of Karonga, who remarked in 1959 that the 
creation of a climate of intolerance gave rise to the belief that ‘there would be Hell 
to pay’ if people were found to be on the wrong side. 
They have seen what has gone on in a place like Ghana. They might well 
feel, I think, that if they were on the wrong side when the government 
eventually came to the top, the government, having regard to the known 
habits of Europeans, would probably forgive them and let them get away 
with quite a lot whereas if they were on the wrong side and an African 
nationalist movement came out supreme then life would not be very 
nice.107 
 
 Whilst crucial to acknowledge that not all were willing subscribers to the 
MCP’s programme, it would be misleading to imply that a bulk of the MCP’s 
membership owed much to intimidation rather than being ‘won over’ by the party’s 
powerful, pro-independence message. As testified by the MCP’s overwhelming 
victory in the August 1961 elections, a vast majority of the African populace voted 
for the MCP on the secessionist ticket. Winning all 20 lower roll constituencies ‘did 
not surprise anyone’, remarked Lucy Mair, who visited Nyasaland to observe the 
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election, ‘but not everyone expected the very high poll of over 90 per cent in every 
constituency and the very small number of votes for the opposition’.108 Voting had 
almost the solemnity of a ‘religious ritual’; 
No police control was necessary. Most voters assembled at the polling 
stations an hour before the opening time of 6.30 a.m. and formed into 
silent queues. At one station in the Central Province, 400 voters camped 
out. People from the same village kept together and this made the checking 
of names easy. One or two hopefully offered rejection slips as evidence of 
their right to vote, but made no trouble when they were turned away. In 
the event, the MCP won all 20 lower roll seats and two of the eight upper 
roll seats in the Legislative Council. Soon after, Nyasaland’s new Governor, 
Glyn Jones, granted five, and later seven of the ten available places on the 
Executive Council to Dr Banda’s party. By the beginning of 1962, Dr Banda, 
nominally only the Minister of Land, Natural Resources, and Local 
Government, had emerged as Nyasaland’s de facto Prime Minister.109 
 
Malawi’s success of course owed much to the organisation of the MCP’s election 
campaign, which placed great emphasis on outlining to the people the party’s main 
objectives and the composition of the new legislature. This was, Mair suggested, 
‘the day of passing from slavery to freedom, the day of the departure of Israel from 
Egypt, led by the saviour, the messiah, Kamuzu Banda, who had already rescued his 
people from the hated agricultural regulations’.110 As outlined above, many might 
well have been pressed into voting for the MCP out of fear, but there were 
significant numbers to whom the vision of a Banda-dominated Malawi greatly 
appealed.  
 
Contradictions in Malawian Nationalism, 1959-1964 
 
Reflecting on the events of 1961, Henry Chipembere remarked that the year 
marked a ‘change in the mood of the people’, 
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When I went to prison [in December 1961] the people looked sad and 
diffident ... Now the people were wearing smiling faces. The servile [and] 
slave mentality, which had been artificially foisted on them ... has now 
disappeared for good. As a result you have springing up everywhere a spirit 
of self-reliance, initiative and independence of mind … Wherever we went 
we found schools, roads, dispensaries, bridges, built by the people on their 
own initiative and when I asked them ‘How do you manage to do all this 
since it was not happening before I went to prison?’, they all replied 
‘Ngwazi Kamuzu Banda has called upon us to work hard and this is our 
response’’.111 
 
From the remnants of the NAC emerged a new party, rapidly gaining a following 
amongst individuals and groups previously excluded from anti-Federation politics. 
African politicians had adapted to changed political circumstances in post-
emergency Nyasaland, conceiving of a ‘national’ political programme to which 
many more Africans subscribed than hitherto. Paradoxically, the actions of the 
British and Nyasaland governments, in seeking to eradicate what was perceived as a 
hostile strain of nationalism in 1959, gave it a decisive boost. It precipitated a 
reappraisal among nationalists as to the direction of the national movement, 
emphasising the importance of bringing together the masses behind a concept that 
transcended politics, socio-economic and tribal divides.  
 The 1961 elections had undoubtedly consolidated the MCP’s position in 
Nyasaland politics, establishing the basis from which African self-government would 
later evolve. From the perspective of MCP leaders, the struggle against Federation 
had been won; it was no longer a matter of ‘if’, but ‘when’, secession would occur. 
The colour bar would now be broken. Attention now shifted to consolidate the 
MCP’s position in the Nyasaland polity. For the MCP, the primary threat to the 
achievement of the party’s goals after 1961 came not from Nyasaland’s privileged 
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European settler community and the colonial state, but from those anti-MCP voices 
within the African community who presented an overt challenge to Banda and the 
MCP’s dominance. The message propagated by Malawi headquarters was clear: 
‘the Party intends to rule in Nyasaland and will brook no opposition from any 
quarter’.112  
Tensions within African politics eventually burst through the surface in the 
years before independence.113 In January 1962, for instance, Nyasaland intelligence 
sources reported that members of the Nyasaland African National Union [NANU], 
an opposition movement formed by former MCP activist Pemba Ndove in 1961, had 
been viciously assaulted in the Northern Province following Banda’s public 
denunciation of the party.114 In several separate incidents, prominent anti-MCP 
politicians including Chester Katsonga, John Machemba, and Douglas Mahone—all 
of whom had voiced concerns over Banda’s dominance in Nyasaland politics—were 
also assaulted by MCP and LMY radicals. As Julian Greenfield, Federal Minister for 
Law, claimed in July 1963, the irresponsible and intransigent attitude of the MCP 
was contributing to a general breakdown in law and order.115 The journal East 
Africa and Rhodesia echoed Greenfield’s unease, reporting that people were being 
beaten or set on fire for using insulting language about the MCP or for failing to 
produce party cards on demand.116  
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Matters reached a climax in December 1963, when Gilbert Pondeponde, a 
founding member of the Christian Democratic Party, was brutally murdered.117 MCP 
leaders were unapologetic. As Edwin Chibambo stated in the Legislative Assembly, 
‘no-one’ would be permitted to ‘disrespect the Kamuzu’; anyone found to be doing 
so would be ‘eaten alive’.118 By April 1964, over 2,000 assaults and almost a dozen 
deaths were alleged to have been committed by individuals associated with the 
MCP.119 As John McCracken suggests, given the extent to which the police had 
become tools of the MCP government, a corollary of the complex patronage 
network that arose from the policy to accelerate the promotion of African 
inspectors after 1961, the MCP’s anti-opposition stance came to be tolerated, and 
in some cases buttressed, by the authorities, now of course under the 
governmental authority of the MCP.120 Prior to the 1964 elections, for example, 
police arrested 12 protesters named by the Prime Minister’s Office who had 
harassed and threatened D.A.S. Chibingwe, Banda’s choice of candidate for Kota 
Kota. An unpopular choice from the outset, intelligence sources reported that on 19 
March Chibingwe was cornered for several hours in the district police station while 
armed protestors massed outside singing anti-Chibingwe songs.121       
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The effect of the MCP’s approach was to create a climate of intolerance in 
which silence prevailed and suspicion thrived. In a candid interview, Abikanile 
George, daughter of an LMW organiser in Blantyre, recalled that in her village, 
people became scared to talk about politics for fear of inciting trouble. ‘My mother 
and father told us not to talk about politics’, she said, ‘they told us that these times 
were uncertain and that if we were heard saying anything bad about the 
government we [could] be punished’.122 Perhaps more fundamentally, however, the 
extension of authoritarian policies suggests that the very nature of nationalism 
developing in Nyasaland from 1959 had undergone a fundamental change from the 
rhetoric espoused by the NAC between 1953 and 1958. It was gradually eroding the 
premise of African unity upon which the anti-Federation struggle had initially been 
conceived. The shift towards a political culture that precluded the expression of 
alternative views may have been a small price to pay insofar as ensuring MCP 
domination in the short term but it was done at the cost of long-term unity. 
Perhaps the ultimate irony then, is that the achievement of independence in July 
1964 did not bring complete freedom for all Africans. As the party began to 
strengthen its hold over the African polity by systematically removing its rivals from 
the national scene, the arena for competition and rivalry was transferred from 
outside the party to within it. As key individuals and interest groups within the 
party attempted to assert their own ideals about Nyasaland’s future, internal 
conflict rose to the fore. As Du Chisiza, the MCP’s Secretary General had predicted 
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before his untimely death in a car accident on 3 September 1962, difficulties were 
bound to arise once it became clear that Africans were soon likely to achieve their 
long-held goals. 
When it becomes clear that the party is due to accomplish its objectives, 
the problem of reconciling submissiveness to the top leader and individual 
initiative in the party of the second-level leaders arises. To a man who had 
been surrounded by submissive associates for a long time, the exercise of 
initiative by his associates is easily misconstrued as a sign of rivalry and 
disloyalty.123 
 
The divisions created from internal conflict within the MCP resulted in the 
marginalisation of key individuals once previously central to the development of 
African politics. They became, as will be shown, a replacement for the agitation 
once previously levied against the Federation, a point around which the people of 
Malawi could unite having lost the focal point for political agitation. Tensions within 
the MCP did not take long to materialise, beginning with the ignominious Cabinet 
Revolt of 1964. 
 
The ‘Cult of Kamuzu’ in Crisis? The Malawi Cabinet Crisis of 1964 and 
the Contradictions in Malawian Nationalism  
 
Central to disagreement in the MCP in the early 1960s was Dr Banda’s growing hold 
over the nationalist movement. As Chipembere’s call for militant action against 
Europeans in 1960 demonstrated, many senior Congress members were ambivalent 
about towing the Banda line. They were concerned not only that Banda’s 
cooperation with the British and Nyasaland governments would result in a 
constitution that fell short of African aspirations, but also that the concentration of 
power in one man was beginning to undermine their authority in the Malawi 
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Congress. Doubts over the ‘cult of Kamuzu’ were initially voiced by Chipembere and 
the Chisiza brothers, Yatuta and Dunduza, whilst in detention at Kanjedza in 1959. 
Andrew Ross, a CCAP Minister since 1958, frequently visited NAC detainees and 
later spoke of their concern about Banda’s synonymy with ‘freedom’. Whilst 
Chiume was singing ‘everything is for Kamuzu’, he said, ‘the Chisizas and 
Chipembere used to joke that there would be big problems if HKB came to believe 
it’.124 Disagreement was apparent in a series of speeches given by Chipembere 
during his tour of the Protectorate in late 1960. Refuting the notion that Banda was 
central to Congress, Chipembere emphasised that it was he and his allies who led 
Dr Banda and ‘NOT Dr Banda’ who leads them.125  
Division was also evident in concerns expressed over the perceived 
‘unequal’ distribution of power within the party’s leadership following the elections 
of 1961.126 Whilst the MCP had undergone something of a regional transformation, 
gathering much of its strength from the Southern and Central Provinces, this was 
not reflected in the Malawi leadership, which continued to be dominated by 
Northern Province-based politicians. Banda’s decision to personally nominate all 
MCP candidates for the elections accentuated the growing trend. The influence of 
the northerners reached a peak in September 1961 when Yatuta Chisiza was 
appointed the party’s Administrative Secretary, Kanyama Chiume as Publicity 
Secretary, Orton Chirwa as Legal Adviser, and Rose Chibambo as the Chairman of 
the Woman’s League.127 None of the influential Blantyre-based businessmen on the 
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National Executive Committee, Lawrence Makata, Sidney Somanje, and Lali Lubani, 
were selected by Banda, and by October 1961 the three men joined with the 
teacher Willie Chokani in founding a rival, southern-based bloc in Congress opposed 
dominance of northerners. Special Branch noted the ‘jealousy of Northerners’ 
among leading politicians from other provinces, and noted with interest Dr Banda’s 
seeming dilemma in dealing with the burgeoning conflict.128 Whilst continuing to 
‘refute’ claims that regional cleavages were characteristic of MCP politics, he 
appeared reluctant to resolve the situation. As the author of a Special Branch 
report noted, this worked to Banda’s  benefit in so far as he was able to make use 
of the friction between his closest lieutenants to ‘assert his authority more 
effectively’.129  
Tensions eventually boiled over in a Cabinet meeting on 26 August 1964, in 
which some of Banda’s ministers including Chipembere, Chiume, Yatuta Chisiza and 
Chokani challenged their President on several issues relating to domestic and 
external policy.130 In the domestic sphere, Banda was criticised for introducing the 
threepenny charge for hospital visits and for endorsing the recommendations of the 
Skinner Report, which undermined previous pledges to accelerate the 
Africanisation of the civil service.131 They also challenged Banda’s dictatorial 
leadership style, accusing him of nepotism. Particularly irksome was Aleke Banda’s 
growing influence in the party. By 1964, at the age of only 24, Aleke was given 
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responsibility for the lines of communication for the government and the party, a 
matter over which the discontented ministers had no effective control. Ministers 
also viewed with some concern Banda’s decision to improve relations with the 
‘racist’ regimes of Portuguese Mozambique and apartheid South Africa at the 
expense of preserving existing links with Tanzania and Northern Rhodesia, which 
was due to become independent in October.132 At the root of the crisis, those 
ministers that had played such a pivotal role in politicising Nyasaland during the 
1950s now found that they were being excluded from the country’s future. As Colin 
Cameron, the only European minister in the MCP-dominated government observed, 
‘all the ministers were seething with anger about Dr Banda’s dictatorial behaviour. 
It was as clear as daylight that there was serious trouble ahead’.133  
Matters reached a climax on 3 September when Banda dismissed Chiume, 
Chirwa and Augustine Bwanausi. In protest at the treatment of their cabinet 
colleagues, Yatuta Chisiza, Chokani and John Msonthi resigned. Allegations against 
the dismissed ministers were made public during a two-day session of parliament 
on 8-9 September. Banda labelled his former colleagues as ‘disobedient’ and 
‘disloyal’ rebels, singling out Orton Chirwa, Yatuta and Chiume for special 
condemnation.134 Chipembere defended the charges levied against each of the 
ministers. How could a man like Orton Chirwa, he argued, be accused of disloyalty 
when he was responsible for maintaining party discipline?135 His protestations were 
in vain. Dr Banda gained an overwhelming vote of confidence in Parliament, and 
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thereafter embarked upon a tour of the Central and Northern Provinces, publicly 
castigating the ministerial rebels. Banda warned people that they would be ‘meat 
for crocodiles’ if they continued to pledge their loyalty to the rebels.136 Banda told 
his people that the LMW, LMY and the newly created Malawi Young Pioneers, the 
paramilitary wing of the MCP under the leadership of Aleke Banda, had been 
instructed to look out for rebels and their supporters.137 ‘Make sure that 
Chipembere does not even make a nuisance of himself’, Banda told his activists, 
‘watch everybody who comes back from Tanganyika, or Zambia or even Rhodesia or 
South Africa. Watch every one of them! See what he is doing, listen to what he says 
and report him’.138 Popular songs that emerged at this time denouncing 
Chipembere and his rebel cohorts reflected both the extent of the people’s loyalty 
to Banda and the nature of the political climate developing at this time. 
Moto! Moto! Wayaka! Fire, fire is ablaze  
Moto, wayaka! Moto, wayaka! Fire is ablaze! Fire is ablaze!  
A Malawi? Malawians?  
Amalawi safuna: Malawians don't want:  
Chipembere, Kanyama Chipembere, Kanyama,  
Willie Chokani! Willie Chokani!139 
 
 Open conflict between the LMY, the MYP, and pro-ministerial rebel 
supporters was soon forthcoming. At a meeting convened by ex-ministers in Zomba 
on 10 September, clashes erupted between groups of civil servants and villagers 
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and pro-MCP activists. Conflict soon grew beyond police control; MCP offices in 
Zomba and national flags outside government buildings were set ablaze and 
government officials were brutally attacked.140 The ex-ministers, meanwhile, gained 
knowledge their arrests were being planned. With reconciliation beyond the realms 
of possibility, they sought asylum abroad. The exception was Henry Chipembere, 
who remained in the country to plan an armed insurrection at Mangochi in 
February 1965, which, in the event, was heavily quashed by security forces en route 
to the capital city to take over the government.  
Speaking later to Donal Brody about the events that transpired, Banda 
justified his actions in removing his former allies from the Cabinet by claiming that 
their ‘jealousy’ could not be tolerated. If permitted to continue, it would jeopardise 
the future of the nation.  
These people [MCP Cabinet rebels] were great politicians, but they and 
others were infected with the African disease of jealousy and backbiting. 
These are contagious diseases. As the top people exhibit the symptoms, 
these diseases spread through families, organizations, churches and any 
place else where the virus is unleashed. So, this is what I became aware of; 
the tentacles of jealousy and backbiting silently and destructively beginning 
to make its way through Congress ... In some cases, the disease was, sadly 
for the nation, not curable. These people, as brilliant as they were and, in 
some cases, still are, could not leave the diseases of jealousy and 
backbiting “outside the door to the theatre” ... so they had to eventually 
go.141  
 
As Colin Baker suggests, however, Banda’s motivations were more likely to have 
been a response to the fear that his popular lieutenants would begin to mount an 
effective challenge of his leadership than they were a fear over the MCP’s unity. For 
some time Banda had been aware of Chipembere’s attempts to inherit for himself 
the mantle of ‘minister for action’ and had been keen for him to stop him from 
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gaining public influence as seen in late 1960. In June 1963 Chipembere again made 
a series of inflammatory speeches, encouraging action against ‘stooges’ and urging 
a more radical course that would necessitate the exclusion of all Europeans and 
non-MCP supporters from Nyasaland once independence had been achieved.142 
The violence that accompanied his public utterances not only indicated that 
Chipembere was capable of stirring people to action, but also threatened to 
destabilise the political situation, potentially jeopardising the progress made by the 
MCP. Already, Chipembere’s actions had caused the European Civil Servants 
Association to petition the Secretary of State to take action to re-impose the rule of 
law.143 This incensed Banda, who in the Legislative Assembly on 9 July argued 
vehemently that the actions of radicals were ‘slowing down the march of Malawi to 
Freedom’.144 Given the circumstances, it was perhaps no surprise that Banda was 
again anxious to seize upon the opportunity to isolate and expel ‘dangerous men’, 
such as Chipembere, from his government. 
Banda’s response to the cabinet crisis was to embark upon a programme to 
insulate his regime from potential opposition by clamping down on freedom of 
expression. This was aptly reflected in the enactment of the Censorship and Control 
of Entertainment Act 1968, which made it a criminal offence to publish anything 
likely to undermine public confidence in the government. The Act also regulated, 
controlled and minimized freedom of speech and entertainment.145 As Cullen 
                                                 
142
 NA, DO 183/34, Nyasaland Intelligence Report, Jul., 1963. 
143
 Baker, Chipembere, p.60. For his part, Banda had been well aware of the course of events. Since 
February 1963 he had regularly received the monthly intelligence reports compiled by Special 




 The Censorship Board created by the Act controlled the making and exhibition of cinema pictures, 
the importation, production, dissemination and possession of undesirable publications, pictures and 
records’. The Act also placed Malawi’s only radio station under state ownership. 
Page | 217  
 
argues, the Act was to have a devastating effect on practice of parliamentary 
democracy. This was not only because of the loss of reflective ability by 
parliamentarians, but because it was subsequently considered dangerous to make a 
statement that might have been misinterpreted.146 As Pascal Mwale remarked in 
interview with Jones and Manda, Banda’s policies did little to indicate that 
Malawians had in fact achieved their freedom from colonial rule. 
We simply replaced Governor-general Glyn Jones with our own Dr Banda. I 
say this because most of the policies were simply a continuation of what 
the colonial government had done Banda used colonial modes of 
governance in the sense that he didn’t want people to question what he 
was doing, just like the British colonialists didn’t want us to question their 
policies. The British viewed us as barbaric and themselves as civilized. In 
the same light, Banda viewed himself as intelligent ... as the more capable 
person ... he didn’t think any other person could contribute to the 
formulation of better policies. So that is why he took a more or less solitary 
stance.147 
 
In conjunction with altering the basis of MCP rule, the crisis also precipitated 
fundamental changes to Banda’s preferred network of collaborators. Having initially 
sought their deposition during the anti-Federation struggle, Banda turned to the 
native authorities as a means to buttress his position. He strengthened the powers 
of the local, ‘traditional’, courts. Condemning the strict rules of evidence required in 
other countries, and praised Chewa law for taking a different view.148 The Local 
Courts (Amendment) Act of 1969 further entrenched traditional authority by giving 
Banda statutory power to regulate and reconfigure the ‘traditional’ landscape 
according to his own agenda, providing him with effective sanctions to enmesh 
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traditional elites in a web of patron–client relationships that in turn facilitated 
divide and rule strategies.149  
For many historians, the Cabinet crisis and Banda’s subsequent 
strengthening of legislation to limit opposition to his regime was a natural outcome 
of the inherent contradictions in Malawian nationalism that had been present since 
the early 1950s.150 As Terence Ranger observed in June 1960, if his first impression 
had been of ‘the strength and popularity of Malawi’, his second was of ‘Malawi’s 
problems’ that arose ‘for the very fact that Malawi is a national movement 
containing within itself so many elements which under other circumstances would 
be competitive or hostile’.151 In essence, Nyasaland nationalists had been held 
together by the anti-Federation struggle. Its removal thus presented a major 
problem for Banda and the MCP. As Du Chisiza recognised ‘disengagement’ from 
the anti-Federation struggle would mean that:  
Disengagement from political action really means that the thousands of 
people who are engaged in the political struggle with us will suddenly find 
themselves without useful tasks to perform. It will, in a way be a sort of 
anticlimax for them – and anticlimax which, if mishandled, might easily 
deteriorate into disillusionment.152  
 
In order to overcome such difficulties, the MCP attempted to create a common 
enemy against which the attentions and efforts of MCP members could be directed. 
It thus translated that after 1964 the ministerial rebels became men against whom 
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the party had to fight. Their legacy lived on through song and in stories; ‘it was ‘bad 
man Chipembere’ we were warned about in the early days’, Alile Puka stated in 
interview, ‘we were told that he wanted to kill our Kamuzu and that if we saw him 
or his supporters we must run and tell the authorities’.153  
The minister’s revolt therefore drew into sharp focus the extent to which 
new ‘rebel enemies’ had replaced Federation as a focus for political activism. It also 
marked the shift to a Banda-centred political culture that was to alter the political 
landscape in Malawi for years to come.154 Perhaps this was a response to the 
reverence with which Banda himself was held, or perhaps this reflected the very 
deep uncertainty that many felt over Malawi’s future. What it did show, however, 
was that the national edifice built by the MCP was arguably not strong enough to 
hold together disparate and competing elements in the Nyasaland polity once 
Federation had been removed. By 1966, Dr Banda had become the Ngwazi, the 
conqueror and the hero, the Lion of Malawi.155 There was no separation of the 
presidency from the government, the party from its leader, the politics from the 
law, and the state from the nation. ‘Everywhere he went’, Short describes, ‘the 
machinery of party and government surrounded him with pomp and ceremony. His 
portrait adorned the walls of shops and offices, tee-shirts and national dress worn 
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by members of the Women’s League’.156 A wealth of national institutions and 
facilities were established in Banda’s name; Kamuzu International Airport, Kamuzu 
Stadium, Kamuzu Academy, and Kamuzu Central Hospital, whilst people were 
compelled to celebrate ‘Kamuzu Day’ and his Excellency’s birthday. All these were 
fused and crystallized into Banda's personal political achievements and capabilities. 
Nobody else had the potential to offer an alternative.157 For MCP propagandists, 
Banda, rather than the party, became Malawi’s messiah, the MCP a vehicle through 
which Malawians could serve him. But the concentration of power in the hands of 
one man can, and in Malawi’s case, did, lead to several problems that eroded the 
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5 
UNIP, the ANC and the Transition to 







As the previous chapter has shown, the years 1959-64 arguably represented the 
most significant phase in the history of nationalism in Nyasaland. By 1964 there was 
little doubt that ‘nationalism’, in the sense that the majority of Africans in the 
territory subscribed to the MCP’s vision of the ‘nation’, participating in joint action 
to bring about a greater Malawi in as expedient a manner as possible, genuinely 
existed. In the short space of five years, Nyasaland’s Malawi Congress Party [MCP] 
had succeeded in transforming the political landscape. This chapter will endeavour 
to build upon some of the themes established in chapter four in relation to 
Northern Rhodesia. What will be noted, however, is that whilst the trajectory of 
nationalism in both territories generally followed a similar course, nationalists in 
Northern Rhodesia struggled to engender the sympathies of officials in the Colonial 
Office in spite of their post-1959 commitment to constitutional advance. The 
political situation was further complicated by the existence of two major nationalist 
parties vying for supremacy: Harry Nkumbula’s African National Congress [ANC] and 
Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambia African National Congress [ZANC], which later became 
Page | 222  
 
the United National Independence Party [UNIP], in October 1959. It is the intention 
of this chapter to account for the development of nationalist politics between 1959 
and 1964, identifying why UNIP rather than the ANC became Zambia’s first party of 
government at independence and how, during this period, UNIP was able to win the 
support, not only of a vast number of Africans, but the British government too.  
 
The Banning of ZANC and Nationalist Mobilisation in Northern 
Rhodesia, 1959 
 
The increase in nationalist agitation that took place in Nyasaland in late 1958 was 
mirrored in Northern Rhodesia. In its first few months, ZANC’s growth was slow; 
initial support for the party was small and its activities limited to Luapula and 
Northern Provinces, the Broken Hill area of the Central Province and Ndola in the 
Copperbelt Province.1 In late 1958, ZANC lacked both time and resources to 
organise extensively throughout the territory, a predicament made worse by a lack 
of publicity given to the party in the press.2 On 25 December, ZANC’s General 
Secretary, Munu Sipalo, emphasised the need for ZANC to adopt a new, far-
reaching, inclusive national programme. Continued opposition to Federation had 
not in itself been sufficient to cause its removal. The only way in which it could be 
dismembered was by uniting the African people behind a truly ‘national’ ideal.3 His 
comments marked an important turning point for his party. Thereafter, ZANC 
organisational tactics shifted. Whilst the emphasis on local grievances continued to 
be seen as an important means to build Congress prestige, it was the achievement 
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of an independent Zambia, rather than the removal of Federation, that became the 
central platform in ZANC’s mobilisation message. Only by the attainment of 
independence, under a ZANC government, could Africans be freed from oppressive 
white rule. In interview, Solomon Mwamba, a former UNIP activist in Lusaka in the 
mid-1960s, remarked that ZANC’s new national appeal was a powerful ideal, one 
that stirred Africans from ‘laziness’ and political inactivity. When asked if people 
genuinely understood ZANC’s anti-Federation campaign, Mwamba shook his head. 
‘No’, he remarked, ‘but Zambia, that was different. When people came to our 
village and told us that this Federation was stopping us from being free, and when 
these people told us that if we bought a ZANC card we would belong to Zambia, 
that was a powerful thing. We realised then that the Federation was truly bad as it 
was the only thing that stood between us and achieving our release from slavery as 
true children of Zambia’.4 Even the politically uncommitted could hardly fail to 
notice a change in political style. Political meetings became, remarked Chibesa 
Kampo in interview, not only a gathering to hear leaders speak, but an occasion to 
wear uniforms, a time for choral groups to sing songs of freedom and, above all, a 
time to develop a sense of aggressiveness and assertiveness. Each story and each 
meeting reinforced a central idea, ‘that we were better together than apart’, a 
recognition that ZANC’s predecessor, the ANC, had failed to unite the people 
against the Federation.5  
 In conjunction with a shift in political emphasis, ZANC’s immediate 
objectives in early 1959 were to prepare for the boycott campaign for the Benson 
elections, scheduled for March. ‘It provoked us to launch a big propaganda 
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campaign’, Robert Makasa recalled, ‘every party official went out to recruit’, using 
any means available to carry out the assignment. The phrase, ‘I can’t’, Makasa said, 
was ‘unknown to us’.6 As previously under the ANC, the renewed mobilisation drive 
hinged upon the capacity of party officials to involve local people in the 
organisation of political activities. Before ZANC’s formation, organisation at levels 
lower than the provincial administration was rather weak. Most political work was 
carried out by ‘professional politicians’ from the higher echelons of the party, many 
of whom had little or no affiliation with the socio-economic fabric of the area in 
which they operated. It was unsurprising therefore, that one of the first initiatives 
of ZANC’s national leadership was to build the new party’s profile at grass-roots.  
Organisation in urban areas was greatly facilitated by the recently created 
Area Boards, set up by the Northern Rhodesian government to provide a forum for 
African grievances in townships. Not only was there an overlap between local ZANC 
leaders and Area Board representatives, but the Area Board system of 
representation conveniently sub-divided townships into small wards, or political 
units, each with their own representatives. As political techniques grew more 
sophisticated, it was only a small step for ZANC organisers to take an existing ward, 
with its own sense of political identity, and break this area down into small sub-
units. Local branch leaders were then able to assign section leaders a sub-unit each, 
which they were then expected to ‘organise’ through frequent meetings. During 
these meetings, organisers were told to explain to attendees three main points: 
first, why ZANC had broken from the ANC; second, to explain why the party 
rejected the constitutional proposals put forward by the Governor; and third, that 
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the boycott of the elections to be held under the controversial Benson Constitution 
franchise would go some way towards the eventual achievement of a free 
‘Zambia’.7 As Kaunda explains, ZANC mobilisation was thus a highly planned 
operation: 
Every morning we met to report on the previous night’s successes and 
failures and then we would draw up the new scheme of work for the day. 
Where there had been success, we knew there was less need for 
concentration, except to check on the appointed organisers from time to 
time. Even if we were out of the headquarters there would always be 
someone junior to receive reports and report back to us. Our slogans 
became very popular. We invented and introduced easy slogans so that all 
our followers could repeat them. The more people you had shouting them 
the better for the popularity and membership campaign of the party. 
Within a few weeks, we grew to something very considerable.8  
  
Such tactics stood in stark contrast to methods employed by Harry 
Nkumbula’s African National Congress. Whilst the ANC was able to organise and to 
draw support from its traditional support base in the Southern Province, neither its 
organisational techniques nor its political style were sufficient to capture the 
attention of urban residents in the north. The party continued to rely largely upon 
the drama of the public meeting and the interest generated by national leaders 
coming to a locally organised rally. When the visits of national leaders were not 
forthcoming, testified by the sheer number of requests for leaders to tour the 
localities by local ANC members, party supporters had little incentive to organise.9 
As anthropologist Peter Harries-Jones recalled whilst conducting fieldwork in 
Northern Rhodesia in the early 1960s, outside the Southern and Central Provinces, 
day to day campaigning by the ANC was ‘not particularly onerous’. Those making 
contacts or selling cards were only expected to cover ten houses per day and even 
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then, the sheer size of some townships prohibited ANC teams from being able to 
organise membership effectively.10 The chapter will return to the theme of the 
ANC’s continuing presence in the Northern Rhodesian polity, and its role in shaping 
the national agenda, later. What is crucial to note at this juncture, however, is that 
ZANC, perhaps by virtue of its desire to make an immediate impact on the political 
scene, was certainly the more active of the two nationalist parties in operation.  
ZANC’s success in numerical terms was difficult to gauge since the 
registration of ZANC branches under the Societies Ordinance, the main tool for 
controlling nationalist parties, had not kept pace with its branch formation. The 
party was, nonetheless, considered by the Northern Rhodesian authorities as a 
potent threat to peace and stability in the territories. In the opinion of Governor 
Arthur Benson, the party’s anti-election campaign had severely undermined 
government efforts to register African voters, with figures at the close of 
registration still far below initial estimations. By February, only 6,821 Africans had 
been registered as ‘special’ voters, while just 796 Africans had been listed as 
‘ordinary’ voters.11 ‘Zambia’, argued Governor Benson, had caused ‘great unrest’ in 
the territory, spreading ‘uncertainty and fear’ among Africans. Its role in instituting 
a ‘reign of terror’ in the villages and towns at night, he said, had placed men ‘in fear 
of their lives’.12 This was not necessarily a true representation of the situation, but 
it nevertheless pointed to a deep suspicion of ZANC’s activities. 
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Under pressure from Welensky, who urged Benson to launch ‘a full scale 
onslaught’ on disruptive forces in Northern Rhodesia, banning orders were issued 
against ZANC on 11 March under section 21 of the Societies Ordinance and the 
party’s leaders were promptly rounded up and sent into internal exile.13 Scattered 
outbreaks of unrest followed in parts of Central, Copperbelt, Northern and Luapula 
Provinces, with over 40 reported instances of arson alone by the end of the 
month.14 The subsequent ‘Benson’ elections passed without major incident, and, as 
expected, Welensky’s United Federal Party swept the board winning 13 of the 22 
elected seats, 11 ‘ordinary’, and both African reserved seats. Harry Nkumbula, 
whose party was now regarded by the authorities as the lesser of two evils, won 
the South-Western seat for ANC, taking up a position on the territory’s Legislative 
Council following his nomination by the Northern Rhodesian government. Whilst 
ZANC had not made substantial gains during its short existence, it left an indelible 
imprint upon African politics.15 Having fought so hard to make their voices heard 
ZANC’s supporters were unlikely to be silenced for long. As Kenneth Kaunda 
predicted in a letter to his supporters in April 1959, 
They have banned the great name of Zambia but the greater name of 
freedom now is spiritual. It is beyond their reach and so they cannot ban it. 
We shall organise our people when we get out of detention in the name of 
freedom now. Africa, our mother must be free and it has fallen to our lot to 
free this part. Be of good cheer, we are just beginning.16 
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The African National Congress, the United National Independence Party 
and the Re-Emergence of African Nationalism in Northern Rhodesia, 
1959-1961 
 
The banning of the Zambia Congress temporarily threw nationalist politics into 
disarray.17 African politicians not in exile struggled to come to terms with the new 
political situation and, subsequently, were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to 
organise a single, unified, political movement capable of replacing the old party. As 
Makasa suggests, political fervour at this time was kept alive by ZANC’s 
underground supporters. 
[After the banning of ZANC], posters and letters were pasted on buses, 
trees and public buildings which read, ‘ZANC is finished’. What the racist 
imperialist government did not realise was that the party had a lot of 
support right from grass root level to the top. Our ‘orphaned’ members 
decided to go underground where they organised themselves into small 
tight groups which carried out a lot of activities which kept the colonial 
police gangsters on their toes. When the posters appeared reading ‘ZANC is 
finished’ they would go out at night and erase the words ‘is finished’ so 
that the following day the public found the word ‘ZANC’ wherever such 
posters had appeared!18 
 
Whilst their impact was generally limited, the actions of ZANC orphans indicated 
that there existed a cohort of committed ZANC members that the authorities had 
failed to press into submission. The formation of the United National Independence 
Party in August following the merger of the United National Freedom Party [UNFP] 
and the African National Independence Party [ANIP], both established in mid-1959 
in response to ZANC’s proscription, marked a crucial turning point for African 
nationalists unwilling to re-join the ANC. Led initially by Dixon Konkola and Paul 
Kalichini, the new party’s prospects were greatly enhanced following yet another 
split in the ANC in October 1959 which saw 120 ANC members, including the 
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influential Titus Mukupo and Mainza Chona, join UNIP in protest over Nkumbula’s 
failure to support African bus boycotts in Lusaka. Of more immediate significance, 
however, was his reluctance to preside over the unification of all African political 
movements in furtherance of the national cause.19 The chapter will return to 
examine the effects of the split on the ANC later, but suffice to say, UNIP’s 
acquisition of a cadre of seasoned political leaders and their ANC branches came at 
a crucial time. It not only provided the party with experienced politicians, but it also 
gave UNIP access to ANC branch resources.  
For many within UNIP, the ANC split again brought into sharp focus the need 
to build a strong, organised, nationalist movement with its support base rooted in 
the localities. Lacking both the finances and reputation to substantially increase 
party membership, UNIP leaders attempted to pick up where ZANC had left off, 
implementing plans for an ambitious cultural mobilisation programme which aimed 
to place the party at the centre of everyday life.20 But a change in political style, 
even if accompanied by the blending of ‘national’ with local concerns was 
insufficient to sustain a drawn out battle for independence, especially when the 
latter called for a political following which could be relied upon to demonstrate en 
masse when summoned to do so. The real constitutional fight, remarked Munu 
Sipalo, UNIP’s Secretary General, would be fought in homes and villages. It was 
here that strength would be needed to resist attempts to divide the party ‘by the 
deliberate creation of conditions which command the suspension of your 
judgement and your unanimous support for the imposed Federation 
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Government’.21 UNIP leaders would therefore endeavour to bring all Africans in the 
localities into as intimate a relationship as possible with the centre. As a Central 
Committee Report advocated, UNIP must become an integral part of African life. 
Let every family have a feeling that each married man in the family is some 
sort of chairman; each woman some sort of secretary and each first born 
some sort of treasurer in their organisation, linking up with the 
neighbouring families, then the village unit, branch, constituency, the region 
and then the full party and finally the country as a whole.22  
 
The concern for effective organisation persisted among UNIP’s top leaders, 
who, shortly after Kaunda’s release from prison in January 1960 and his subsequent 
confirmation as UNIP’s President, were active along the ‘line of rail’ and in the 
Luapula, Northern, and Eastern Provinces.23 In late February, some of UNIP’s senior 
leaders, including Sipalo, Simon Kapwepwe and Sikota Wina, toured Luapula 
Province for the purpose of establishing UNIP on a firm basis. On 19 February they 
addressed a conference in Chief Mulambo’s area in Fort Rosebery District, attended 
by approximately 150 delegates from all over the province. Referring to the 
formation of provincial, constituency, and branch-level committees, Wina explained 
that the principle of electing local UNIP officials would be discontinued, because it 
had in the past resulted in weak leadership at lower levels in nationalist 
organisations. Officials at all levels would now be selected by the provincial leaders 
and approved by UNIP headquarters.24 Any leader who showed weakness or 
disregarded the authority of UNIP headquarters, warned Wina, would be expelled 
from the party. Throughout the tour, all three leaders consistently advocated the 
need for provincial party officials and their subordinates at lower levels to improve 
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administrative standards. Party membership registers, financial records, and the 
regular reporting of provincial developments to UNIP headquarters were singled 
out as the most essential tasks, all of which required immediate and continuing 
attention. The objective, Kaunda wrote, was to make UNIP the mouthpiece of all 
the people’, to ensure that the party represented all that it purported to represent, 
‘so that each and every one would be ready to suffer, if necessary, together, in the 
cause of freedom’.25 
Building upon ZANC’s early work, the formation of political cells or 
‘sections’, which began in urban townships in early-1961, became a central feature 
of UNIP’s attempts to improve party organisation at the local level. Essentially small 
committees of local UNIP supporters which met on a frequent basis, ‘sections’ were 
given official recognition by party leaders as a key means by which UNIP could 
recruit at the neighbourhood level whilst at the same time providing a means by 
which existing members could be instructed about UNIP’s policy.26 In his study of 
UNIP politics in Mikomfwa, Harries-Jones described the process of section 
formation.  
Returning to Mikomfwa, organisers went through the township talking to 
those they knew to be loyal to the party. Those contacted were to 
communicate the information to relatives or others known to be politically 
reliable. When 10 to 15 people had agreed to form a committee, the 
neighbourhood contact made arrangements to meet in a particular house—
usually his own—to hold their first discussion. The organiser attended this 
first meeting to repeat the reason why it was necessary to form sections, 
emphasising that it was UNIP’s goal to make everyone a party card holder. 
Each of the 10 to 15 people was urged to strengthen the newly formed 
section by going out and enrolling five other members ... If section 
attendance began to rise in any one section, and meetings threatened to 
overflow outside, the section split in two.27 
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In order to boost section productivity, the branch, which oversaw section activities, 
could play upon an element of competition among the sections. Generally each 
section wished to be known for being strong in section affairs and was anxious that 
its inactivity did not become a matter of public knowledge among other sections. At 
the very least, such public knowledge would lead to the section and its officials 
being termed ‘useless’. As Harries-Jones suggests, UNIP activists at this time were 
highly sophisticated. The tactics developed were not those of a new party with little 
experience in political organisation. Rather, they represented a party determined to 
win the support of the people, driven by a new objective which, it was hoped, 
would bring together Africans against the colonial state. 
Improvements in party organisation undoubtedly provided a useful 
framework around which UNIP’s popular mobilisation campaign could be built. 
Similar to the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain in Guinea, UNIP’s drive to win 
new adherents was rooted in the extent to which the party could make its present 
felt at every level of society.28 As Anne McClintock contends, in regions in which the 
percentage of literate Africans was relatively small and the circulation of political 
propaganda limited, it was imperative that grievances, demands and political 
messages were transmitted to the masses through oral, visual and practical 
means.29 As expected, mass political meetings thus continued to play an integral 
part of this early mobilisation process.30 Writing to his friend Roy Welensky, the 
Federal Prime Minister, following a UNIP meeting on his Shiwa Ngandu estate in 
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April 1960, Stewart Gore-Browne, a former member for African interests on the 
Legislative Council remarked of the impact UNIP meetings exerted on the locals:  
You may, perhaps, smile but it was very moving, and I wonder if people, 
white or black, who regard this as something just worked up by a handful of 
agitators for their own end, have any real idea of what it means ... If that is 
happening in a quiet place like this, where we boast that we don’t know 
what the word ‘Politics’ means, it makes one wonder what the feeling is all 
over the country and in the industrial parts, and what the reaction will be to 
the big changes happening, or rather about to happen, close by.31 
 
This was not a mere gathering of people but a sincere event, more like a ‘church 
service’, which gave Africans a true insight into their importance to the national 
struggle. As Chona remarked in a UNIP circular, creating a collective spirit among 
the people would not only create a stronger movement for independence, but 
would also ensure that the party would not die in the event of another instance of a 
state clampdown on African political activity. There would be many arrests, many 
trials, many imprisonments and many appeals in the forthcoming months, but so 
long as people remained committed to UNIP’s cause they would achieve Zambia’s 
freedom.32 
Arguably the most notable manifestation of UNIP attempts to popularise its 
appeal for new nationhood by placing the party at the centre of African society was 
the UNIP Funeral Committee, a burial society set-up on the Copperbelt in early 
1963 to manage, organise and lead African burials. Initially received with great 
enthusiasm, the Committee, Kaunda stated, was to be for ‘all people of Zambia, 
UNIP members and non-UNIP members alike’.33 Crowds of between 4,000 and 
5,000 were common, and whilst large funeral processions permitted a 
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demonstration of party strength, as well as providing a suitable occasion to honour 
the departed, they crucially provided an opportunity to propagate the UNIP 
message. Following the institution of the Funeral Committee, the call to honour the 
dead was no longer signalled solely by the mourning cries of near relatives. It was 
transmitted by the Funeral Committee throughout UNIP sections on the night 
before burial, implied in the speech at the graveside by the party’s representatives, 
and repeated by the UNIP Choir during the funeral procession. Songs sung at the 
funeral, for example, moved from traditional refrains for the dead into political 
verse:  
 ‘Ba Kaunda naba Kapwepwe / Pokoleni calo kumbunu / Nkumbula asekela / 
mumulopa umwingi’ (Kaunda and Kapwepwe will take back the country 
from the White man. Nkumbula is only happy with a great deal of your 
blood).34  
 
The forthright political overtones served only to heighten the importance of the 
spirit of the deceased. The Funeral Committee also collected wood for the 
mourning fires, paid for telegrams to the dead man’s relatives advising them of the 
burial, and ensured that cars went to pick up relatives for the funeral. By virtue of 
its participation in funerary rites, the party began to exercise a role in which a 
political group enacted the part of the uterine brother. UNIP’s Funeral Committee 
became the ‘master of ceremonies’, the nearest male relative who organises the 
committing of the body to the grave. 
Although in many respects the rituals performed during the burial were 
entirely non-political in content, they played an essential role in linking the party to 
conduct of civil society. Keeping a record of attendees, for example, not only 
allowed the party to keep in close touch with UNIP members, but allowed party 
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organisers to create new constituents by sending invitations to non-UNIP mourners 
to join UNIP. Perhaps most importantly, as Walima Kalusa observes, political 
administrative duties of this nature allowed UNIP political entrepreneurs to publicly 
display their familiarity with the administrative procedures of the colonial state, 
and hence their own ability to rule.35 Funerals thus not only became an important 
means by which party organisers could emphasise UNIP’s presence everyday life, 
but also a means by which the party could convert mourners into patriots, laying 
claim to their time, their resources and loyalty, and in return, promise them 
political freedom in an independent nation-state. Perhaps more significantly, 
appropriation of local customs such as funerals was also a way of creating the 
notion that participation within the party offered authority within the local 
community and the promise of future reward. As Harries-Jones concludes, the 
Funeral Committee was a committee of the party, the organisation of a funeral was 
a party reward to the faithful, and the ‘composition of the obituary’ a means of 
mobilising mass political support. To labour for freedom was also deemed to be 
working for the common good.36  
Throughout the early 1960’s, UNIP made significant advances in Northern 
Rhodesia. The party had made concerted attempts to broaden its national 
programme and had been successful in rebuilding a membership base from which it 
could begin to mount an intensive campaign for African self-government under an 
expanded Northern Rhodesian franchise.37 Though UNIP’s strength varied in 
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different areas, branches had been established in every province, including 
Barotseland, which had previously remained isolated from politics. UNIP’s attempts 
to pursue a national agenda had also begun to win some support among 
Europeans, with both James Skinner, a Lusaka lawyer, and Merfyn Temple, a 
Methodist minister, joining the party in December.38 By UNIP’s own estimates, the 
party had a membership of 154,523 in 961 branches, with over 69,000 from the 
Luapula Province alone, where UNIP activists had been most active organising 
sections.39 These figures represented an impressive increase from those given by 
UNIP Secretary General to the Emergency Conference of UNIP in September 1960, 
which estimated that membership stood at 67,590.40  
  
The ANC and the Roots of Authoritarian Nationalism, 1959-61 
UNIP’s rise to the fore of African politics was in large part facilitated by the decline 
of Nkumbula’s ANC following the defection of the Titus Mukupo-Mainza Chona 
faction in 1959. Initial reactions to the formation of UNIP reflected the increasing 
frustration with which ANC activists had come to view the situation. Nkumbula 
blamed his ‘ambitious opponents’ for tearing apart the solidarity of the African 
movements against colonialism, and his colleagues criticised UNIP as ‘devil spirited’, 
being no more than a party of ‘juvenile delinquents’.41 In 1960, the ANC registered 
only 21 branches during the entire year and membership numbers by January 1961 
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were estimated to stand at less than at 60,000, half of UNIP’s.42 ANC leaders 
complained that the party was beginning to lose publicity, with the press no longer 
reporting on ANC meetings. ‘It is a sad state of affairs’, Job Michello, ANC’s National 
Secretary wrote to the Secretary of the Africa Bureau, ‘that the local press has 
completely disregarded us in favour of Mr. Kaunda’.43 The ANC’s prospects were 
made worse in September, when Nkumbula was sentenced to 12 months’ 
imprisonment on a charge of dangerous driving, following the death of an African 
constable.44  
The haemorrhage of members and subscribers to UNIP gave rise to 
insurmountable financial problems that crippled the party’s effectiveness at both 
the national and provincial levels.45 In several letters written to his colleagues 
following a tour of the Copperbelt in early 1960, the ANC’s Secretary General Job 
Michello alluded to the daily struggle of party activists, many of whom lacked the 
tools necessary to organise and mobilise and were in desperate need of 
propaganda.46 While Lusaka-based leaders could not tour the country as much as 
the threat posed by UNIP would have warranted, provincial officials had to cope 
with insufficient resources and the erratic payment of personal allowances and 
emoluments. In UNIP-dominated regions, where the costs and risks of political 
involvement were even higher than elsewhere, provincial officials were ‘hard to 
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find and harder to retain’.47 ‘Most new appointees would routinely hand in their 
notices after a few months in office or, at best, request a transfer to a less 
demanding area’.48 Letters to ANC headquarters complaining that the ANC were 
‘not amongst the chosen flock’ were characteristic of those received from across 
the territory.49 In addition, many party activists in the localities lamented the lack of 
leadership from the centre. In March 1961, Samson Chiphazi of the Lusaka District 
wrote to the ANC’s General Secretary complaining that he did not know what was 
happening throughout Northern Rhodesia and, as such, he was precluded from 
engaging in political activities. Chiphazi’s letter was indicative of innumerable 
requests sent by ANC members requesting that party leaders take a more active 
role in Northern Rhodesian politics.50 Exceptions to the rule were those officials 
operating in ANC strongholds in parts of Central and Southern Provinces who 
enjoyed a far easier time.  
To concur with Giacomo Macola, the ANC’s appeal was undoubtedly 
diminished by the failure of its leaders to find a coherent political philosophy to 
distinguish itself from UNIP. For more than two years after the formation of ZANC, 
the ANC leadership appeared to be ‘groping in the dark’, sending mixed messages 
to the future electorate and losing valuable ground to its rival.51 In January 1961, 
for instance, the ANC attempted to attack UNIP’s national credentials by calling into 
question its policy of ‘multiracialism’, accusing the party of ‘imperialist leanings’. 
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‘They are trying to please two masters’, wrote Nkumbula’s deputy, John Banda, ‘we 
have one master to please, the AFRICAN’.52 The contradictions inherent in Banda’s 
statement were obvious, especially since Nkumbula was widely accused of being a 
government ‘stooge’ following his appointment to the Legislative Council in 1959. It 
was arguably not until June 1961, when the party refused to join with UNIP in 
condemning the Macleod constitutional proposals that the ANC, by then under the 
interim leadership of former African Mine Workers Union President Lawrence 
Katilungu, showed signs of developing a coherent political ideology. By 
disassociating itself from the on-going protest, the ANC indicated that it was 
becoming a moderate, right of centre party.53 This came to be reflected in the 
party’s attacks upon UNIP’s connections with Russia, with whom Kaunda had 
allegedly entered an agreement to guarantee control of the copper mines after 
independence in return for financial aid.54 This stance, which rather ironically 
echoed Welensky’s accusations of ANC links with Communist forces in the late 
1950s, gave the ANC an ‘incontrovertible badge of moderation’, a political 
programme, and provided it with a chance to dispute Kaunda’s much publicised 
commitment to non-violence.55 
Given the extent of the ANC’s mounting problems, it is somewhat surprising 
that the party continued to play an important role in African politics. Throughout 
this period, its survival owed much to several factors. The fact that the ANC lost a 
bulk of its support to ZANC in Northern, Luapula and North-Western Provinces, for 
instance, forced the party to reconcile with the cohort of wealthy peasant farmers 
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in the Southern Province whom the party had previously tried to discourage from 
participating in government sponsored agricultural development programmes.56 It 
subsequently stopped its ‘smear’ campaigns against rich peasants who were 
members of the Southern Province African Farming Improvement Scheme, 
embarking upon a major reorganisation of the party throughout the Province in 
order to win the backing of those whose membership subscriptions would prove 
vital in continuing to finance the ailing party. It was perhaps the ANC’s international 
marginalisation at the Accra Conference, however, that proved most significant in 
forcing Nkumbula into a position which guaranteed the ANC’s short-term survival. 
Having been shunned by Ghana’s President, Kwame Nkrumah, and Hastings Banda 
at the All Africa People’s Conference, Nkumbula was instead compelled to seek an 
alliance with Moise Tshombe, the President of the secessionist regime in Katanga. 
Whilst Nkumbula had been ‘hurt’ by the decision of his former friends to lend their 
support to Kaunda, his disappointment was short lived.57 In mid-1960, Tshombe 
informed Nkumbula that he was prepared to use his resources to ease the ANC’s 
diplomatic isolation by ensuring the installation of a friendly government across the 
border. Following the meeting, a line of communication was opened between the 
ANC and Tshombe’s party, the former establishing an office in Katanga under the 
stewardship of Berrings Lombe, the ANC Deputy National Secretary. Whilst the 
alliance provided Nkumbula with an influential ally it also provided his party with 
crucial financial aid upon which the ANC came to rely for its existence. In 1961 
alone, it was estimated that Tshombe provided the party with over £14,000 and six 
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Land Rovers. By February 1962, the Central African Mail reported that Lombe’s 
work in Elisabethville and the Congress’ ever more open professions of support for 
Kantangese secession resulted in donations amounting to as much as £25,000.58   
The ANC’s presence presented somewhat of an ideological dilemma for 
UNIP in the early 1960s. From the very outset, UNIP leaders were convinced that 
‘the future was theirs’59; its political programme underlined its ambitions: UNIP was 
the only party that commanded the ‘respect confidence and unanimous support of 
the people’ and only by joining the party would African ambitions for a greater 
Zambia be achieved.60 The continued existence of the ANC, therefore, threatened 
and undermined UNIP’s ambitions. UNIP’s immediate response was to deny 
Nkumbula and the ANC full rights to political citizenship in the new national 
dispensation then taking root in Northern Rhodesia. This resulted in a series of 
spiteful attacks against Nkumbula and the ANC. Nkumbula was ‘finished’, an 
‘alcoholic wreck’ with no ‘intelligent’ following, whilst his party were ‘morally 
bankrupt’ and only survived because they were content to ‘dance to the tune of the 
imperialist puppet Tshombe’.61 These attacks reached their climax with the 
‘Catalogue of Nkumbula’s political masturbation’, an ‘incendiary pamphlet’ issued 
by the divisional headquarters of UNIP in the Southern Province.62 In a damning 
indictment of Nkumbula it labelled the former nationalist messiah a ‘political rat’, a 
gangster’, a ‘hopeless and thinkless [sic] roting [sic] politician’ who ‘delayed our 
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freedom’. In these circumstances, ‘thank God’, UNIP had come to ‘save our lot from 
entering into Harry’s Kingdom of tribalism, idiocy, drunkenness, uselessness and 
thinklessness [sic]’.63  
In adopting such a stance towards its political rivals, Macola argues, UNIP 
embarked on a ‘dangerous intellectual trajectory’, the endpoint of which was the 
‘vindication of intolerance, not only for open political opposition, but for 
independent expressions of civil society as well’.64 Kaunda’s subsequent insistence 
upon ‘absolute unity’ and the consistent restatement of UNIP’s mission to ‘save the 
people of Zambia’ thus reflected the party’s attempts to assert itself over the ANC, 
providing UNIP’s lower echelons with the scope to popularise a monolithic vision of 
Zambian society with little room for alternative views.65 The principle contribution 
of the ANC to the political landscape at this time, therefore, was to consolidate 
within UNIP ranks the adoption of an exclusivist national agenda, which condoned 
violence and intimidation as a means to buttress UNIP’s domination. This was to 
find its most prominent expression in the Cha Cha Cha riots in 1961. 
 
The Cha Cha Cha riots of 1961: the turning point for UNIP? 
Occurring soon after the Mulungushi Conference, at which over 4,000 UNIP 
delegates called for ‘Action Now’ against the Northern Rhodesian and Federation 
governments, the Cha Cha Cha riots represented something of a turning point for 
UNIP. The catalyst to the unrest was undoubtedly the failure to achieve African 
constitutional advance during discussions over a new constitution for Northern 
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Rhodesia. Initially, Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod had proposed that Africans 
would be given a majority of 16 seats in a Legislative Council of 30, a move that 
would at the very least be seen as progressive by UNIP’s leaders. Federal Prime 
Minister Welensky rejected Macleod’s suggestions outright, forcefully arguing that 
an African majority would soon lead to the dismantlement of Federation. Macleod 
responded in February, proposing that there might be 45 members of the legislative 
assembly, 15 elected by the upper roll, 15 by the lower roll and 15 by both rolls 
combined. In his own opinion, although unlikely to win universal approval among 
Africans, the so-called Macleod constitution was designed to establish racial parity 
in the legislature, at the same time forestalling a possible European coup while 
negotiating towards a majoritarian outcome.66 In June, Welensky consented to the 
changes. For many Africans, the June changes worked to the advantage of the UFP 
in every respect. The introduction of the Special National constituency for Asian and 
Coloured voters, most of who would qualify under the higher franchise, severely 
diminished the prospects of nationalist parties securing upper roll support in the 
National constituencies. To UNIP’s leaders it appeared as though the British had 
again caved in under pressure from the Federal government.67  
Reports of UNIP-inspired unrest and increased political activity became 
widespread after agreement over the proposed constitution was reached. In 
Lusaka, sporadic cases of arson, violence and intimidation accompanied beerhall 
boycotts and, before long, the situation deteriorated rapidly.68 By the third week in 
August, the first two parts of the Preservation of Public Security Regulations were 
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enacted in Luapula and Northern Provinces. UNIP and Youth Brigade branches in 
both areas, and on the Copperbelt, where the Preservation of Public Security 
Regulations had been in force since May, were declared unlawful and meetings 
were banned. Government reports on 1 September put the number of incidents 
resulting in the outbreak of violence since 24 July at 901, resulting in 1,400 
arrests.69 Thirty-eight schools had been burned, 34 in Northern Province alone; 
more than 60 roads had been blocked, 24 bridges destroyed or seriously damaged 
and 27 deaths had occurred, 20 of which at the hands of security forces.70 Among 
the 2,715 persons arrested before the disturbances ended in October, 1,753 were 
known UNIP supporters, 871 of whom were convicted.71  
Unrest stopped almost as suddenly as it began. In mid-September, following 
talks in London between Kaunda and Macleod, the Colonial Office announced its 
willingness to consider further representations on the proposed constitution, 
provided the disturbances ended immediately. Kaunda returned to Northern 
Rhodesia and appealed for an end to the violence.72 With a marked decline in 
incidents, the ban against UNIP in the Copperbelt Luapula and Northern Provinces 
was lifted on 1 November, and the Governor resumed his constitutional discussions 
with the territory’s various political groups the following week.73 Coming as it did at 
the height of the disturbances, and much to Welensky’s chagrin, Macleod’s decision 
could be regarded as nothing less than a clear UNIP victory.  
                                                 
69
 NA, CO 1015/2245, Hone to Macleod, ‘Incidents of Political Crime for Period 14 Jul., to 1 Sept., 
1961 
70
 Northern News, 14 Sept., 1961. 
71
 NA, CO 1015/2246, Despatch, Hone to Macleod, 5 Oct., 1961.  
72
 Northern News, 14 Sept., 1961. 
73
 NA, CO 1015/2246, Despatch, Hone to Macleod, 5 Oct., 1961. 
Page | 245  
 
The extent to which the riots of 1961 represented part of a deliberate 
strategy on behalf of UNIP’s leaders to force the Northern Rhodesian and British 
governments into negotiations over African prospects in the new Northern 
Rhodesian constitution is an interesting issue. For many historians, such as Thomas 
Rasmussen, the unrest simply represented the boiling over of tensions in the 
localities, which soon spread owing to the initiative of several more militant local 
UNIP leaders.74 Such an assessment was almost certainly based upon the official 
inquiry into the disturbances, which concluded: 
Whatever the instructions of the leaders of the party may have been, it is 
clear that the call for positive action was interpreted by the lower 
formations of the party as the signal for the adoption of violent methods.75 
 
What such accounts fail to acknowledge, however, is the direct stimulus given to 
unrest by UNIP leaders. In July, for instance, Kaunda told his supporters that they 
had been ‘sold down the river of white supremacy’, and that he would ‘strike at the 
very roots’ of the Federation until it was completely destroyed.76 In mid-August, he 
publicly burned his identity certificate as a form of protest at the deaths and 
violence which had occurred in the north. Whilst it is unlikely that Kaunda 
anticipated the extent of unrest that would take hold in UNIP-dominated provinces 
in mid-1961, there was every indication that it was a situation he had intended to 
cultivate in order to make UNIP’s presence on the national stage felt. UNIP claims 
for greater African advancement would not be compromised or diluted. As 
Northern Rhodesia’s Governor, Evelyn Hone, later wrote to Macleod, UNIP’s 
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President was supposedly well aware of the reaction his actions were likely to 
provoke:  
From his public pronouncements and from his actions, it is clear that 
Kaunda must have been aware that the lower formations of his party were 
likely to espouse violence on their own initiative, no matter what directions 
he or the other leaders of the party might or might not issue.77  
 
For Kaunda, personally, the adoption of such tactics would be dangerous. 
Not only did he risk the breakdown of order and potential permanent banning of 
his organisation, but he also jeopardised his reputation as a moderate in the 
opinion of the British authorities. The benefits to accrue from a period of unrest 
were, nonetheless, tangible and widely-acknowledged. Disappointment and 
dissatisfaction within UNIP ranks was continuing to build, coming to focus upon 
Kaunda’s alleged moderate approach. Whilst a spate of unrest might serve to vent 
these frustrations, allowing Kaunda to deflect criticism of his leadership, there was 
a possibility that they might also force the government to granting constitutional 
concessions to Africans in much the same way as the British had done in Nyasaland 
in 1959. As William Chulu remarked in interview, UNIP meetings at this time 
repeatedly cited Nyasaland’s experiences with great ‘excitement’, and emphasised 
the need for ‘sacrifice’ in the forthcoming struggle.78  
 It is unlikely that the plan for Cha Cha Cha had been clearly mapped out 
before Mulungushi. Evidence would seem to indicate, however, that UNIP leaders 
were aware of the potential benefits that a display of UNIP’s influence and 
supremacy might bring. That ‘positive action’ was carried out by the lower 
formations therefore ought not to suggest that there was a seeming ‘lack of 
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control’ from the top. The situation might have escalated beyond initial 
expectations, but UNIP leaders almost certainly played a significant role in creating 
conditions ripe for UNIP supporters to engage in forms of political agitation. By 
November 1961, UNIP’s actions had paid off. For the first time in the history of the 
Federation, British officials recognised that by continuing to isolate Kaunda and his 
supporters, they risked precipitating the breakdown of order. As Macleod remarked 
to Hone, 
I find it very significant that Kaunda has not allowed himself to be forced by 
his unruly followers to call for campaign of positive action ... I am very much 
afraid that if we leave him completely incommunicado now we shall 
inevitably force him either to join with the UNIP hotheads at the lower 
levels in violent campaign against the Government, or to withdraw from the 
Territory in which case his political influence is likely to be lost.79 
 
Contrary to the hopes of UNIP leaders that a moderate, non-violent, course 
of policy would pave the way to African advance, there was perhaps a sense of 
irony that the disturbances of mid-1961 acted as the catalyst for constitutional 
change. Work was still to be done by Kaunda and his colleagues, but from this 
moment it was no longer a case of if, but when, Africans in Northern Rhodesia 
would obtain self-government. After a series of protracted negotiations, the new 
Colonial Secretary, Reginald Maudling, who had replaced Macleod in October, 
announced in March 1962 that the new constitution for Northern Rhodesia would 
come into force after territorial elections scheduled for October of that year.80 On 5 
March, after much deliberation, the decision was taken by UNIP leaders to 
participate in the elections. The immediate task facing UNIP was thus to prepare 
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the party for the elections, to register African voters, and to lay the foundations for 
future self-government, a process which necessitated yet further reorganisation 
and centralisation of the party.81 
 
‘UNIP was everywhere’82: UNIP Organisation, Social Mobilisation and 
the 1962 Election Campaign, 1962 
 
Although the 1961 disturbances had shown that violence could be ‘encouraged’ by 
UNIP leaders, it had not necessarily been controlled.83 This was, in large part, a 
corollary of UNIP’s rapid growth during 1960, which had outstripped the capacity of 
its leadership to maintain effective internal communication and coordination of 
party policy. Though the practice of appointing executive members for all branch 
committees ensured loyalty to the centre, UNIP’s lower echelons continued to 
enjoy great freedom from central control.84 Responding to these concerns, party 
leaders set-up a subcommittee to investigate ways in which party organisation 
might be improved and extended so as to ensure more stringent control from the 
centre.  
Reporting in March 1962, the subcommittee stipulated that in spite of 
UNIP’s efforts, the existing organisational structure, comprising divisions, 
constituencies and branches was not only ‘cumbersome’, but failed to bring both 
top-level and subsidiary leadership into close enough contact with the ‘common 
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man’.85 Galvanised by the report, UNIP leaders attempted to remedy the concerns 
raised, embarking on a comprehensive reorganisation of party machinery. To tie 
UNIP’s lower formations more closely to national headquarters, the party’s eight 
provincial divisions were abolished and subdivided into 24 ‘regions’ covering the 
entire territory.86 Full-time organising secretaries, who bore sole responsibility for 
party activities and for constituency and branch-level groups in their respective 
areas, were appointed by and made responsible to UNIP’s Central Committee. In 
addition, youth and women’s brigades were brought into the main party body. 
While both youth and women’s brigades were the responsibility of their respective 
directors at UNIP headquarters, and though each had its separate organisation 
running parallel to that of the main party, brigade officials were brought under the 
supervision of party officials at regional, constituency, and branch level in order to 
ensure compliance with central directives.87 UNIP’s new constitution was specific 
on the point that ‘the brigades shall not take any separate action on political 
matters’, and the regional youth organiser, now a major figure in the youth 
brigade’s hierarchy, was required to perform his functions ‘in consultation’ with the 
regional organising secretary.88 A new director of youth, Hayden Banda, was 
appointed to facilitate the changes. As figure 5.5 indicates, UNIP leaders were 
attempting to create a highly sophisticated organisational structure, especially 
when compared to that of the ANC.  
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In conjunction with party reorganisation, UNIP’s National Council was made 
more representative. Whereas the Council had previously numbered roughly 50 
members, it was now expanded to include 72 elected delegates, 24 regional 
secretaries and the party’s leaders at national headquarters. Each region’s 
delegation comprised, in addition to the regional secretary, an elected delegate 
from the main body of the party and one from each of the two brigades.89 As 
Mulford suggests, however, these structural changes were probably less important 
than the attention given to training the men who would take over the newly 
created regional posts. Between late 1961 and April 1962, UNIP’s former division 
secretaries attended training courses in Ghana organised by Sipalo, by then serving 
as UNIP’s representative in Accra. Furthermore, Banda, who had been building the 
youth movement into a formidable cadre during 1962, initiated courses in both 
Ghana and East Africa for leading youth brigade officials who would eventually 
become second in command of the new regional organisations.90 
Structural changes were accompanied by a distinct shift in emphasis in the 
party’s recruitment methods. Sections at the local level were urged to become 
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more ‘community focussed’, abandoning ‘protection’ measures intended to ‘seek 
out those who wished to harm UNIP’ to instead assume the role of ‘friendly 
societies’.91 If a section attendee was imprisoned for a political offence, for 
instance, section leaders organised the payment of house rent and saw that a 
regular supply of mealie meal went to the wife of the imprisoned man. Collections 
of mealie meal also went from the section to the branch, where unemployed youth, 
whose parents were also out of work, could come to collect free food. A change in 
the focus of local organisation was almost certainly part of UNIP’s wider remit to 
place the party at the very centre of African lives. As Faith Pemba, a retired civil 
servant and former UNIP member who joined the party in Lusaka in 1961 recalled;  
We wanted to show that UNIP meant business. Not in a forceful way. That 
would only cause the government and the informers to tell the people that 
UNIP was a bad thing. The aim was to persuade people about UNIP from 
now on. We had to do this because soon UNIP would be the government 
and our leaders did not want opposition to the UNIP government. We had 
to make UNIP part of everyday lives. When people rose in the morning, 
UNIP had to be there. When they went to work, UNIP had to represent 
[them]. When they ate, UNIP had to supply the food. There was much to do 
at this time.92   
 
Implementation of UNIP’s reorganisation strategy varied according to the 
circumstances in regions in which UNIP officials operated. The reasons for such 
discrepancies are unclear, though they appear to be intimately related to the 
nature of competition UNIP faced from other political parties. There was far greater 
incentive for UNIP leaders to mobilise in regions where the party found itself vying 
for supremacy with the ANC. In Mufulira, Copperbelt Province, for example, UNIP 
organisers admitted that the area was an ‘ANC stronghold’.93 As such, party activists 
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in the region were instructed to ‘step up’ their organisational drive and warned that 
local branch leaders would be suspended if they were seen to ‘sit idle’ in the 
struggle against the ‘power-hungary’ [sic.] opponents of UNIP.94 Organisers in the 
region did not want for resources to perform their task. UNIP’s Copperbelt 
branches were generally well funded and UNIP officials regularly paid. The situation 
in large parts of the Western Province, notably Barotseland, in contrast, differed 
markedly. Branch leaders frequently complained of a lack of resources and the 
hardships they were forced to endure as a result of recurrent non-payment of 
allowances.95 This was not, Mainza Chona argued, a result of a lack of support given 
by UNIP headquarters. Rather it owed much to the reluctance of colonial 
administrators to ‘make life easy’ for UNIP activists who had, until early 1962, been 
restricted from registering branches in the area by the Barotse Native 
Government.96 In January 1963, D.M. Chikulo, Regional Secretary in Mankoya-
Lukulu, wrote to Kaunda lamenting the conditions where even ‘animals would find 
it difficult to survive’.  
It seems that the local white civil servants here have been given full 
discretionary powers to suppress the people in order to show them that our 
African majority government does not mean any change in administration ... 
We are not allowed to rent even rest houses. Worse still we are not even 
permitted to lease our own land on which to build our offices or to hold 
public or indoor meetings. Our movements are being regulated just as in 
the Zambia days, and indirect persecution of our supporters is still rife ... 
We cannot stand it any longer, and our endurance has now reached a limit 
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where even the patience of Christ cannot stand such monstrous imperialist 
machinations.97  
 
Requests for funds and complaints over working conditions were in part a 
reflection of the difficult circumstances in which many UNIP organisers were 
working, but they perhaps point to something altogether more profound. Isolated, 
poor and sometimes homeless, these men and women were clearly prepared to 
sacrifice themselves, and in some cases their dignity, for the UNIP cause. In April 
1963, Renford Lubasi wrote to the National Treasurer from Sesheke, Barotseland 
Province, requesting the sum of £7 to buy his wife a new dress or two. ‘My wife and 
I are almost naked’, he wrote, ‘and are a shamful [sic.] sight to look at. Some of us 
have always shown enthusiasm and determination to see our work through but as a 
married man with a wife moving half naked it is really a great trial. Something that 
no one can stomach’.98  
Whilst one must take into consideration the natural propensity to 
exaggerate hardship when appealing for additional funds, it is evident that many 
organisers endured difficult times for the sake of the party. As Foster Mubanga, a 
UNIP organiser in Mikomfwa, vividly described, working to mobilise the people 
required immense physical exertion, often for little financial reward. Walking with 
her three children from village to village, Mubanga revealed that she often went 
hungry and had to beg for water. ‘We were suffering’, she wrote, ‘walking on foot, 
hungry in the hot sun; and if it was raining, it was all the worse’.99 Stories of this 
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nature would suggest that for many, UNIP was not just a party; its propaganda not 
merely empty rhetoric. UNIP offered hope of a better future, one in which Africans 
could prosper as citizens with equal rights and equal responsibilities.  
For some, party membership was not solely a way of working towards a 
more prosperous future. Joining UNIP also offered increased social mobility in a 
society in which opportunities had been restricted. On the Copperbelt, where 
employment turnover was high, UNIP membership offered an opportunity for 
stability. It was perhaps for this reason that individuals petitioned the party in their 
hundreds, seeking appointment as UNIP organisers or administrators. Letters such 
as those from Tapson Mtonga, who wrote to UNIP headquarters requesting a job in 
‘active politics’ following the termination of his employment at Mufulira Copper 
Mines, were a common feature of correspondence with UNIP headquarters in the 
early 1960s.100 As Michael Monk, a former colonial administrator and UNIP 
sympathiser in Lusaka during the 1960s remarked,  
What the nationalists offered was a tangible future; a means by which 
people could better themselves. Under UNIP people felt that they wouldn’t 
be mistreated or exploited as they were under the white man. They would 
have better pay and better prospects ... By offering themselves as the party 
of ‘Zambia’, UNIP presented itself as the party of opportunity.101    
   
There were of course differing motives for joining UNIP for every individual, 
but on the basis of evidence collated during research for this thesis, it is clear that 
UNIP meant much more than the offering of opportunities to the disenfranchised. 
Those working for UNIP genuinely believed their actions had truly ‘national’ 
relevance. Ingrained into African culture, song and dance, to work for UNIP was 
comparable to working for God in the struggle against Satan, personified in UNIP 
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propaganda as colonialism.102 ‘Imperialism is the source of all evil’, declared an 
article entitled ‘Evil Imperialism Faces its Fate’ in the 1962 Voice of UNIP, the party’s 
official newspaper.103 Holding UNIP meetings in one’s home, or pasting UNIP 
posters to walls was not just the simple act of propagating the party, but, according 
to William Chulu, a former UNIP organiser in Mansa, Luapula Province, akin to 
‘doing one’s duty for Zambia’.104   
 
Mobilisation through intimidation: the origins of inter-party violence 
As UNIP began to consolidate its hold over the African people in Northern 
Rhodesia’s urban provinces, the propensity of its members to resort to intimidation 
of those openly rejecting UNIP’s vision of Zambia’s future became an ever more 
prominent feature of nationalist politics. Over time, such violence became 
something more symbolic than the expression of anti-ANC rhetoric, becoming as 
much a feature of UNIP’s national agenda as more traditional appeals to new 
nationhood. Deployed as a political weapon with ‘considerable success’, 
intimidation was not only a means to enforce adherence to UNIP’s national agenda 
but a way of fostering a ‘commonality of interest’ amongst UNIP members, unifying 
disparate ethnic groups in opposition to those standing outside the UNIP body 
politic.105 To engage in such activities was to partake in the building of the new 
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nation. Violence brought people together, united in one aim, creating among 
perpetrators a ‘brotherhood of UNIP’.106   
The most intense period of UNIP-inspired violence coincided with the ANC’s 
revival between late 1961 and 1962. Before his untimely death on 9 November 
1961, Lawrence Katilungu had done much to revitalise a declining party. Not only 
was the party making gains in UNIP strongholds, a corollary of Katilungu’s efforts to 
step-up organisation efforts on the Copperbelt, Northern, and Luapula Provinces, 
but the party was also beginning to gain a following among Europeans on the basis 
of its reputation as a moderate alternative to the more extremist UNIP.107 The ANC 
had, after all, accepted the constitutional proposals of June 1961, disassociated 
itself from the militant forces of Pan-Africanism, and, above all, had repudiated 
UNIP’s role in the 1961 disturbances.108 Katilungu’s actions during his brief tenure 
as the ANC president provided Nkumbula with an opportunity to seize lost initiative 
upon his release from gaol in January 1962. One of his first moves was to reposition 
the ANC squarely to the right of UNIP, which stood only for ‘totalitarian 
government’. The ANC offered an alternative path, one committed to ‘private 
enterprise’ and the complete freedom of the individual.109  
UNIP’s response to the ANC’s renewed drive for members was to re-
emphasise that those rejecting the UNIP path posed a concrete political menace to 
the party and nation. According to intelligence sources, UNIP spokesmen 
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repeatedly declared that the suppression of opposition was ‘essential to their 
success in the forthcoming Territorial elections’ and that people were constantly 
reminded of the need to ‘eliminate Congress by any means, including violence’.110 
Tantamount to condoning attacks on fellow African non-UNIP members, UNIP’s 
lower cadres became embroiled from early 1962 in a struggle to remove the ANC’s 
influence in UNIP strongholds. At the end of the year, the situation reached 
breaking point.  
In large part responsible for the intensification of inter-party rivalry was 
Kaunda’s decision to enter into a coalition with the ANC following UNIP’s 
disappointing performance in the Northern Rhodesian elections held in October. 
Having mounted a comprehensive campaign, which placed heavy emphasis on 
educating potential African voters in election procedures and creating for the party 
a new image in order to win European support, UNIP’s hopes for a majority were 
disappointed. Overall, UNIP won 14 seats on the Legislative Council, achieving 14.8 
per cent of votes on the upper roll and 78.2 per cent on the lower roll. Roy 
Welensky’s United Federal Party [UFP] achieved 15 seats, winning 70.5 per cent of 
the vote on the upper roll and 0.2 per cent on the lower roll, and the ANC 3.4 per 
cent and 21.3 per cent respectively, which gave the party five seats.111 No party had 
won a clear majority, and thereafter the two most popular parties, UNIP and the 
UFP, began a desperate campaign to convince Nkumbula to join a coalition 
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government.112 The ANC’s continued existence on the political scene had placed the 
party in a position of influence entirely disproportionate to its numerical 
strength.113  
Courting Nkumbula was initially regarded by Kaunda and his leadership 
colleagues as eminently undesirable. This was not least because it was felt that the 
ANC’s position of artificial strength had been garnered by virtue of a limited 
election alliance with the UFP, whereby in several National constituencies each 
party nominated only one candidate and instructed their respective supporters to 
cast the second of their two National votes for the allied party’s candidate. But 
although an unwanted complication, Kaunda appreciated that the only means to 
ensure an African government was for UNIP to ally with his ‘mis-directed friend’. 114 
After a series of protracted discussions involving several compromises, Kaunda and 
Nkumbula issued a joint statement on 16 November confirming their intention to 
set aside their differences. On 12 December 1962, the coalition was formalised and 
the ANC received three of the six ministerial positions in the formation of the first 
African-dominated government in Northern Rhodesia. Although a success for UNIP 
and its supporters, the coalition firmly consolidated ANC’s position as UNIP’s direct 
rival.  
Soon after the election, intelligence officials reported a ‘serious 
deterioration’ in the security situation in the Western and Eastern Provinces, where 
UNIP agitators had switched the focus of their attacks from the government to the 
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ANC.115 Between December 1962 and May 1963, 428 instances of violent crime 
were reported, almost half of which were said to have been the product of UNIP-
inspired intimidation.116 Many of the party’s provincial leaders, determined to 
‘eliminate Congress influence’ in their regions, did little to discourage UNIP 
members from engaging in conflict with those suspected, or known, to belong to 
the ANC.117 Party circulars continued to warn ANC members that UNIP’s victory was 
a ‘certainty’, and that ‘stern measures’ would be taken against those ‘ill disposed 
towards our government’.118 Stoking the embers of tension, rumours abounded of 
ANC attacks against UNIP members. In the south, recounted Soloman Mwamba, 
women and children were allegedly being systematically assaulted by the ‘evil ANC’, 
and if Nkumbula ever came to power, ANC would ‘come and kill us [UNIP] in our 
beds’.119 As minutes taken at a meeting of UNIP held by provincial officials in 
Mufimbilwa village demonstrate, local UNIP leaders responded by telling officials to 
organise the youth to ‘attack and fight with ANC’. Papers were to be pressed in 
every door of UNIP members saying, ‘Mwabombeni Mwabombeni’ [you are 
working] in order to know ‘who is our member and who is to be attacked’.120   
By neglecting to provide a necessary corrective to inflammatory rumours 
and statements uttered by the party’s local officials, and by neglecting to withdraw 
the membership of those convicted of violent crimes, UNIP leaders gave at the very 
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least tacit approval to the actions of those individuals at the fore of the anti-ANC 
campaign. For many within the party, these men had sacrificed their personal 
liberty for the national cause and should therefore not be punished for doing so.121 
The condemnation of the Northern Rhodesian police, freely accused by UNIP of bias 
towards the ANC, did little to alleviate tension.122 At a public meeting in Ndola on 
24 November 1963, Sipalo even went so far as to threaten those police responsible 
for the suppression and killing of UNIP members, stating that they would be tried 
for their crimes once UNIP had won the general election.123  
UNIP’s ‘frivolous and unprovoked’ attacks on Congress’ ‘peace-loving’ citizens 
did not take place without retaliation.124 In the early 1960s, Nkumbula did not shy 
away from occasionally condoning, or indeed encouraging, retaliatory violence. 
‘You have been too submissive and patient for too long’, he told party delegates in 
1962, from now on, ‘if you are attacked, you attack them too. Our policy is that if 
one Congress member is attacked in one District that means the Province and the 
whole of Northern Rhodesia has been attacked’.125 Nkumbula’s refusal to condemn 
all forms of political violence did much to stimulate a belief among provincial 
officials in Central and Southern Provinces that preventative violence, which took 
the form of a myriad of acts of daily intimidation, was the best possible means to 
defend the ANC’s position. Inter-party violence reached a crescendo on the 
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Copperbelt in June 1963, when ten Africans lost their lives after serious rioting.126 In 
the resulting commission of inquiry, it was concluded that ANC and UNIP leaders 
had each done much to cultivate a climate in which ‘suspicion thrived’ and ‘violence 
was condoned’.127  
According to A.S. Sichilaba, ANC Provincial Secretary in the Central Province, 
UNIP’s anti-ANC campaign had been hugely successful in diminishing support for 
the ANC in certain regions.  
UNIP methods of intimidation have been effectively used so much so that 
our members feel they are in danger. Nearly half of our members have 
failed to renew their membership. They are Congress in heart. They fear to 
come in open as ANC members. This leads to the thinking that ANC is dead. 
Heavy complaints have been put on the Provincial Staff and the Head Office 
that they have been neglected. This to a certain extent is a fair complaint. 
Here we should appreciate the courage of the members and their local 
Officials. They have taken a strong stand to withstand intimidation.128 
 
Contrary to such views, evidence would seem to suggest that UNIP did not succeed 
in diminishing ANC influence entirely. The party continued to hold substantial 
support in its traditional Southern and Central province strongholds and, where the 
party did lose support, this was seen to be a result of Nkumbula’s decision to join 
the coalition government with its closest rival than a consequence of UNIP 
intimidation. In the first instance, the formation of the coalition exposed the ANC to 
the threat of retaliation from the party’s former sponsors. Welensky was left 
‘bitterly disappointed’ by Nkumbula’s decision, and sought thereafter to work 
actively to undermine the party by lending support to the People’s Democratic 
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Congress, led by former ANC National Secretary, Job Michello.129 Even more 
damaging to the ANC’s future prospects was decline in the friendly relations with 
Moise Tshombe. After the end of the secession of Katanga in 1963, the deposed 
Tshombe became deeply wary of Nkumbula and, unsurprisingly, the amount of 
financial aid that had been so pivotal to the ANC’s survival, subsequently decreased. 
With the ending of such support, the ANC faced almost certain bankruptcy by mid-
1963.130 Creditors were foreclosing on debts and assets had been seized. By March, 
Nkumbula pleaded in an ANC circular for donations amounting to over £150,000 for 
the maintenance of the party alone.131  
UNIP’s anti-ANC campaign, then, was not entirely responsible for 
diminishing the ANC’s influence in Northern Rhodesian politics. What it did do, 
nonetheless, was to consolidate existing authoritarian tendencies existent in the 
UNIP body-politic, strengthening the belief among UNIP national and local leaders 
alike that the future belonged exclusively to them. Another somewhat less obvious 
corollary of the anti-ANC campaign was that it helped consolidate UNIP’s attempts 
at cultivating popular adherence to a ‘national’ agenda. In creating a common 
enemy, in the form of the ANC, UNIP leaders positioned the party as a ‘victim’, 
coming under attack from the ANC, the Federal authorities and the colonialists. As 
Sipalo wrote in a circular to UNIP Divisional secretaries in April 1961, UNIP 
members had to respond by ‘coming together’ to repel ‘forces that would do us 
harm’, denouncing, ostracising and ‘removing’ opponents of the nation.132 By 
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endorsing the suppression of anti-UNIP forces, party leaders thus created a 
‘community of violence’, one in which all UNIP adherents would be expected to 
participate. This was in many respects the construction of a ‘mass national 
commodity spectacle’, a display of party unity and strength, underlining the 
indefatigability of UNIP, in which all members could participate irrespective of tribal 
or ethnic differences. Once it became clear in 1963 that UNIP would in fact inherit 
the nation as its own, it was a spectacle that was soon to become the driving force 
behind UNIP’s nationalism.   
As Carloyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel suggest, inter-party violence provided 
a rallying point at a critical time in which division threatened to split the party once 
the main focus of UNIP political agitation, the Federation, had been removed.133 As 
Miles Larmer proposes in a recent study, UNIP was itself an ‘uneasy coalition’ of 
disparate discontents and aspirations, united by the desire to achieve new 
nationhood.134 In much a similar manner to the MCP, the removal of Federation 
and the granting of the right of secession caused confusion within UNIP ranks. Gone 
was the focal point for unity. The 1962 election campaign had for a time suppressed 
internal dissension, but disagreement rose to the fore soon after. This initially came 
to be expressed in the form of opposition to the decision to join the coalition with 
the ANC. In large numbers individuals wrote to UNIP’s National Secretary lamenting 
the decision to join with the ‘crook’ Nkumbula, ‘untrustworthy as satan [sic.]’, who 
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had ‘sold his soul to the Federalists’.135 This was clearly an issue that presented a 
series of moral dilemmas for UNIP’s members. As Provincial Commissioner R.E. Luyt 
observed in December, growing discontent soon began to threaten Kaunda’s 
position within the party. 
Kaunda is having considerable difficulties in his own party, and these 
difficulties are showing some signs of being serious enough to constitute a 
threat to his leadership. Part of the threat comes from tribal divisions 
among the top UNIP supporters, the ‘Lozi group’ having little love for the 
‘Bemba group’ ... Kaunda has had to face criticism and attack for allegedly 
being too conciliatory, particularly towards Europeans, and not generally 
behaving in as tough a way as some of his Lozi lieutenants would like.136 
 
 Tribal rivalry owed much to the manner in which political patronage was 
distributed. A recurrent complaint was that Kaunda and his closest Bemba allies 
were actively promoting the socio-economic and political advance of Bembas at the 
behest of other ethnic groups. The issue soon came to occupy the attention of ANC 
propagandists. ‘Kaunda is not a happy man’, read an ANC circular,  
He rejects allegations of tribalism in his party, forgetting purposely that 75% of the 
party’s funds is spent on education of his Bemba brothers and sisters overseas, 
paying for their hut rents in Africa and so on ... If some of the people do not believe 
my criticism, I should ask them to visit UNIP offices and see for themselves how 




With elections scheduled for 20 January 1964, the African coalition having received 
approval for a new constitution under an expanded African franchise, Kaunda could 
ill afford such division to foster, particularly when the ANC had seen ‘an important 
opportunity’ for targeting disaffected UNIP members.138  
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It was arguably for this reason that Kaunda sanctioned tough action against 
the Lumpa Church in the Northern Province in 1963. Conflict between UNIP and the 
followers of Alice Lenshina arose out of the perceived threat that the popular 
church posed to UNIP’s supremacy on the Copperbelt and in the Northern Province. 
Between 1961 and May 1962, the Lumpa Church was active on the Copperbelt. It 
was arguably UNIP’s disappointing performance in 1962 that precipitated the 
breakdown of relations between the two groups. With UNIP keen to ensure 
undivided loyalty, the Lumpa Church’s presence was increasingly seen to rival the 
party’s authority. This became evident in mid-1963, when Lumpa members stopped 
buying UNIP party cards and refused a UNIP request to stop meeting on Sundays.139 
In August, Jameson Chapoloko, UNIP’s ‘strongman’ Regional Secretary, attempted 
to engineer a local UNIP reaction against the Church. Sensing that UNIP 
headquarters would disapprove of violence against former supporters, Chapoloko 
wrote to Mainza Chona in Lusaka complaining of continued Lumpa opposition and 
stressing his desire to reach a ‘peaceful’ solution with the Church.140 On the same 
day, however, Chapoloko informed local UNIP activists that the Lumpa Church was 
no more than a ploy by the outgoing colonial administration to divide and 
manipulate Africans, and encouraged them to ‘drown Lenshina and her cult’.141 
Action against the Lumpa Church peaked in Chinsali District in December 1963, 
when several UNIP-Lumpa battles led to the deaths of ten people and the wounding 
of 100.142 Kaunda had been aware of the deteriorating situation, having visited 
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Lenshina in September to negotiate a truce between the two groups. But while he 
had attempted to promote reconciliation, the fact that Chapoloko was given a free 
hand in encouraging UNIP militants suggested that Kaunda was prepared to 
abdicate responsibility for a particular situation where it was deemed politically 
expedient to do so. As Gordon argues, this reasoning underpinned the decision to 
demand the disbandment, and later the crushing of the Lumpa Church in July 
1964.143  
The situation came to a head in late July following the UNIP Government’s 
decision to enact the Preservation of Public Security Act, prohibiting Lumpa church 
meetings. Kaunda travelled to Chinsali and there met with the Provincial Operations 
Committee. There, it was decided to despatch 2,000 soldiers from the 1st Northern 
Rhodesia Regiment [NRR] to deal with Lumpa members’ refusal to leave their 
village of Sione. On 30 July, armed with spears, bows and arrows, Lumpa members 
attacked the advancing NRR. Soldiers retaliated using rifles and machine guns, firing 
upon all those who resisted. According to official reports, over 1,000 Lumpa 
members were killed between July and August.144 The actions of the NRR were, of 
course, not the same as intimidation of opposition by UNIP members, but given 
that the NRR were despatched by Kaunda’s government it nevertheless 
demonstrates that some UNIP leaders remained anxious to eradicate potentially 
troublesome groups in the Northern Rhodesian polity. 
It was unlikely that Kaunda himself regarded violence as a legitimate 
mobilisation tactic, but there is little doubt that it served a vital purpose for the 
party during a critical phase in its history. By providing opportunities for individuals 
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to engage in displays of party supremacy, violence perpetrated against the ANC and 
former UNIP supporters brought together rivalling factions within the party. Whilst 
this gave the veneer of unity, it also convinced the British that African 
enfranchisement ought to occur sooner rather than later lest moderates such as 
Kaunda lose the initiative to more extreme elements.   
 
UNIP’s Anti-Opposition Campaign and its Impact upon Post-
Independence Politics 
 
The very nature of African nationalism that took root in Northern Rhodesia made it 
highly susceptible to internal division. As Joanna Lewis suggests, it was an 
enormous challenge to forge cohesion from parties ‘run on a shoe string’, in areas 
lacking a territorial consciousness but ‘riven by linguistic and religious differences, 
tribalism, and regionalism’.145 Part of the reason why UNIP was successfully able to 
weld together these disparate groups was in large part a corollary of Northern 
Rhodesian nationalism’s distinctly moral basis, which gave its proponents the 
power and ability to ‘mask internal conflicts’.146 Once the moral crusade had been 
won, however, it became increasingly difficult to maintain internal unity. In a similar 
manner to Hastings Banda’s suppression of internal opposition in 1964, UNIP’s 
campaign against the Lumpa Church provided at least some indication that similar 
polices would be adopted in Zambia after independence. UNIP leaders anticipated 
that disillusionment might soon proliferate once the party’s immediate objectives 
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had been achieved. In December 1964, Jonathan Ronnie Lupambo, told branch 
secretaries in Chingola,  
Since we attained our self government, every one of us has been thinking 
of himself as a satisfied man and woman. We came to get our 
independence in the sovereign state of Zambia as a Republic it then came 
to be even worse, and the song of the day has been, ‘we have got it’. 
Alright, we have got it. My question is, what have we got? Can not others 
get it from us? ... We shall never know where our enemies will come from. 
Therefore arise and start organising our people.147 
 
Contrary to the expectations of many UNIP leaders, independence was to bring 
disillusionment of a different nature. This came to be expressed in widespread 
dissatisfaction with the UNIP government. No sooner had the flag of Zambia been 
raised than the newly elected leaders had to contend with the ramifications that 
their hastily constructed national ideal would bring, now UNIP had been thrust into 
government. One of the earliest problems UNIP had to deal with was managing the 
expectations of the people, who had been led to believe that independence would 
bring opportunity and prosperity. Criticism of the government’s failure to address 
the demands of people in Luapula Province was expressed as early as 1964.148 On 
the Copperbelt, mineworkers clashed with UNIP in 1965-66, over demands for the 
transformational wage increase they saw as their just reward for their role in the 
nationalist struggle.149 Similar discontent was indicated in official documents 
presented to UNIP’s national conference in 1967, 
You told us to vote for UNIP and UNIP is governing, but what has UNIP, for 
which you suffered so much, done for you? ... You are living worse now 
than you were under Colonial rule ... UNIP believes in ‘Unto those who 
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have, more will be given and Unto those who have not, more will be taken 
away’.150  
 
Disappointment was particularly acute in the Northern Province, where 
many UNIP activists believed that their prominent role in the liberation struggle 
was not being adequately compensated in terms of both political appointments, 
and economic development. Part of the widening discrepancy between the 
expectations of UNIP leaders and activists owed much to the fact that, during the 
liberation struggle, the centre had little control over the way that local activists 
were introduced to the aims and ideology of the party. From the outset, UNIP’s 
programme was presented in terms of local grievances and in terms of the 
prospects of a better standard of living thereafter. Such promises mobilised young 
men into action, many of whom risked imprisonment and unemployment for their 
commitment to the party cause. But the stark realities facing UNIP once 
independence had been won rendered them obsolete. Now, remarked George 
Chewe, a UNIP activist in Kabwe, UNIP’s once loyal followers were forgotten, 
betrayed, ‘refused the right to participate in institutions created by themselves and 
are being called old politicians, illiterates, uneducated, and regarded as tools’. The 
people who were ‘hiding in the bush and under their beds for fear of torture’, 
Chewe said, ‘are today the masters of our hard fought independence’.151 
In the absence of a major crisis, such as that experienced in Malawi, UNIP’s 
response to criticism over the failure to deliver on expectations of post-
independence was to deny that the problems were a result of dissatisfaction with 
the party. ‘Agitation by Zambia’s enemies’, Minister Dingiswayo Banda argued, was 
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responsible for the ‘lack of enthusiasm’ currently permeating through Zambian 
society.152 Measures taken by the Youth Brigade in seeking to buttress UNIP’s 
influence suggest that party leaders were well aware of deepening divisions in the 
new Zambian party.  
Another prominent instance of the steps taken to enforce party loyalty was 
seen in UNIP’s decision to close shops in the areas in which party meetings were 
taking place. In March 1968, the head of the African Traders Association wrote to 
the UNIP Secretary General, voicing his disapproval of the measure,  
Our members' shops are closed deliberately by the so called Party Officials 
... African traders give unequal support to UNIP during the struggle and we 
are part and parcel to the bringing about of Independence ... we are UNIP 
and in no way subordinate to any UNIP ... Do you love anything given to 
you by force? If this behaviour cannot be stopped immediately, the Party 
should expect very severe reaction from African businessmen.153 
 
For many shop owners, here was an example of UNIP acting against its own 
supporters, those who had performed a central role in the achievement of the 
‘nation’. Disagreements of this nature created deep tensions within UNIP 
dominated Zambia. In 1971, they would lead to the entrenchment of one party 
rule. In Western society, inter and intra-party disagreement is traditionally 
accepted as a legitimate basis for party political difference; in Zambia, as has been 
discussed in relation to Malawi, this was regarded as a threat to the fragile bindings 
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Taken together, chapters four and five have shown that 1959 was a pivotal moment 
for African nationalism in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. After years of 
frustration and division, African politicians having struggled to translate the 
complexities of the anti-Federation campaign, the seminal events of the Nyasaland 
emergency and the banning of ZANC were hugely significant in making relevant to 
the masses the NAC, ANC and ZANC view that African membership of the 
Federation was likely to result in the permanent subjection of Africans to the whims 
of settler authorities. From this juncture both UNIP and the MCP found it much 
easier to develop a comprehensive and self-conscious nationalist ideology based 
upon a strong, indigenous, and distinctive ethnocentricity which soon came to be 
expressed in the fight for independence as opposed to the fight against 
Federation.154  
Thereafter, both parties embarked upon a process of fostering a genuine 
commitment to the ‘nation’, that is, the idea of a greater Zambia and Malawi which 
promised a better future, full enfranchisement, and socio-economic advancement, 
for the African majority. To reinforce the position of MCP and UNIP as the 
champions of new nationhood, emphasis came to be placed upon the centrality of 
the parties to the independence struggle. This left little room for confusion and 
interpretation, the path to independence and freedom from the imposed 
Federation could be achieved through party membership alone. The means by 
which both parties attempted to foster and propagate this rhetoric revolved around 
an ambitious cultural mobilisation programme which placed ‘the party’ at the 
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centre of African daily life. Holding regular meetings in the localities, imbuing local 
organisers with a notion of ‘duty’, organising funerals and utilising where possible 
traditional, tribal, concepts to reinforce the UNIP and MCP message were just some 
of the measures deployed by local and national activists to create a political climate 
in which UNIP and the MCP were conceived as the sole legitimate representative of 
African opinion.  
By drawing together widely disparate groups together under the UNIP and 
MCP banner and by engendering their participation in party activities, party leaders 
helped cultivate a sense of a genuine ‘nationalist’ sentiment. Whether this national 
sentiment was real or imagined, it was real enough to bind people together in an 
expression of commonly expressed cultural contents. UNIP was inextricably tied to 
the achievement of Zambia, the MCP to the achievement of Malawi. It engendered 
loyalty superseding personal gain, loyalty centred upon self-sacrifice. This was 
especially the case with UNIP.155  
Such methods yielded great success, the growth in both UNIP and MCP 
membership reaching unprecedented levels by 1961. But as the parties grew in 
strength and numbers, so too did the insistence that all who remained outside of 
the UNIP and MCP dispensation stood in opposition to the Zambian and Malawian 
nation. Whilst nationalist mobilisation was thus eminently successful in drawing 
vast numbers to their respective national causes, it simultaneously encouraged the 
growth of authoritarian tendencies which manifested in regular outbreaks of 
violence against anti-UNIP and MCP proponents. Increasingly, as has been shown, 
                                                 
155
 A notion that was widely propagated by UNIP. See, for instance, BL, EAP 121, UNIP 5/8/1/2/4, J.C. 
Ntambo, Regional Administrative Secretary, Broken Hill, to ‘All Regional Secretaries’, 6 Oct., 1962, in 
which Ntambo speaks of the extent to which the commitment of UNIP members to sacrifice 
themselves for the nation had brought for the people of Zambia their ‘cherished abjective [sic.]’. 
Page | 273  
 
violence came to supersede more traditional modes of mobilisation; it was not only 
a means by which the parties could guard against opposition, but it created a 
‘community of violence’, a sense that all who participated in it were in some way 
part of the struggle for the nation that was taking place at high political levels. As 
soon as it became clear that the anti-Federation battle had been won, anti-
opposition rhetoric became the focus for unity, replacing the Federation as a 
rallying point at critical moments.  
In both nations the national movement comprised a veritable patchwork of 
ethnic, class and cultural groups. They were fused together by the national idea and 
the desire to achieve African majority rule. For a time, all Africans were united 
behind the ‘national’ vision. But this was not sufficient to defuse such differences. 
As chapter two suggests, this owed much to the manner in which Africans were 
mobilised. With such heavy emphasis on building the movement from ‘grass roots’, 
and in seeking to build momentum for the Congresses by capitalising upon 
ostensibly local grievances, justifications for participating in the struggle were 
widely differing and thus dependent upon local conditions. However much African 
leaders wished to construct a ‘national’ movement, therefore, the seeds of 
difference were already deeply ingrained in the fabric of African society. 
Consequently, as the Federation began to collapse, rivalries rose to the surface. 
Expectations for independence were elevated and competing interest groups 
voiced their unease at the seeming exclusion from the nation which they too had 
laboured to achieve. When secession was finally achieved, the modus vivendi was 
lost. 
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Perhaps, then, it could be argued that disunity characterised African 
nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But in many ways this provides 
the wrong impression. As Lewis argues, in the early 1960s the British rushed to deal 
with those national-party para-bureaucracies that gave the impression of cohesion. 
They represented the ‘best bet’ for British officials anxious to secure Britain’s long-
term economic interests in the region after independence. The perception of 
African nationalism, then, at least from the British perspective, was one of unity; 
UNIP and the MCP thus ought to be commended for this reason. Nationalism in 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia was far more than a violent protest movement 
held together by repression and violence. It was a liberating force, opening 
opportunities for greater African participation in government and bringing into 
politics for the first time previously marginalised groups in the African polity. That 
the MCP and UNIP were able to mobilise on such a mass scale was hugely 
significant, that they were able to string together disparate groups and create a 
genuine loyalty to the ‘national’ cause, overcoming state repression and 
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6  
The Diplomacy of Nationalism: British 
Anti-colonialism and the International 







As chapters four and five indicate, nationalist mobilisation and the eventual 
achievement of independence in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was by no 
means a straightforward process. It was highly subject to regional discrepancies, 
dependent upon a series of events that nationalist leaders could not always control. 
An important yet often overlooked factor impacting upon the independence 
struggle after 1959 was the support given to the United National Independence 
Party [UNIP] and the Malawi Congress Party [MCP] by British anti-colonialists and, 
later, influential international governments and bodies sympathetic to the African 
cause. The intention of this chapter is twofold. Drawing upon some of the themes 
first explored in chapter three, the first half of this chapter will suggest that British 
anti-colonialists played a pivotal role in sustaining nationalist sentiment following 
the banning of the Nyasaland African Congress [NAC] and the Zambia African 
National Congress [ZANC], in March 1959. Their re-emergence to national 
prominence later in the year, as UNIP and the MCP respectively, owed much to the 
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campaign for African rights waged by groups such as the Africa Bureau, the 
Movement for Colonial Freedom [MCF] and the Labour Party, who provided former 
NAC and ZANC activists with crucial moral, financial and practical assistance which 
helped sustain momentum behind the anti-Federation campaign at a critical 
juncture. In so doing, British anti-colonialists ensured that NAC and ZANC detainees 
remained at the fore of the anti-Federation struggle, legitimising the anti-colonial 
campaigns championed by the new political parties, forged from the remnants of 
the defunct Zambia and Nyasaland Congresses. 
 Perhaps the most important contribution of anti-colonial activities, 
however, was that it imbued UNIP and MCP leaders with the belief that the 
independence struggle could not be won through the efforts of Africans alone. It 
would also depend, in part, upon the capacity of nationalist leaders to cultivate an 
expanded network of international collaborators upon whom they could rely to 
apply pressure to the British government to resolve Central Africa’s problems in 
favour of the African majority. Assuming a transnational approach, the second half 
of the chapter will endeavour to explore connections forged between nationalists 
and external collaborators after 1959 and how this ‘internationalisation’ of the 
independence struggle helped expedite the breakup of federation. For UNIP in 
particular, connections with sympathetic governments and organisations proved 
especially valuable in winning for the party domestic supremacy. By raising the 
party’s international profile, becoming the preferred interlocutor of the 
international community, UNIP not only improved the party’s financial position, 
enabling it to fight several important election campaigns, but it also helped to 
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convince the British that UNIP was, if nothing else, a well-supported, viable popular 
movement to whom power could be transferred. 
 
African Nationalism and British Anti-colonialism, 1959-60: Metropolitan 
Responses to the Nyasaland Emergency and the British Anti-Federation 
Campaign  
 
As chapter three has demonstrated, whilst anti-colonial organisations such as the 
Africa Bureau and the MCF played an important role in facilitating the development 
of nationalism in Central Africa between 1953 and 1958, both groups generally 
struggled to raise sufficient popular interest in Central African affairs to impact 
significantly upon the British government’s pro-Federation policy. In the later 
1950s, both the NAC and the African National Congress [ANC], from which ZANC 
and later UNIP evolved, subsequently began to doubt whether anti-colonialists 
would, in future, be able to act decisively in African interests. The declaration of the 
state of emergency in Nyasaland, and the implementation of restrictions against 
nationalist activity in Northern Rhodesia, however, marked something of a turning 
point for metropolitan anti-colonialism and African nationalism alike, strengthening 
anti-colonial-nationalist bonds and decisively altering the trajectory of African 
nationalist politics in the Federation.  
Occurring at the same time as the Hola Camp revelations, in which it 
transpired that 11 Mau Mau detainees had been beaten to death by prison guards, 
news of unrest in Nyasaland and the subsequent banning of the NAC, and ZANC in 
Northern Rhodesia, sparked widespread interest in the Federation. Fearing the 
permanent suppression of legitimate African protest, anti-colonial activists were 
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‘shattered’ by the events.1 The immediate response was to emphasise that the 
future of Africa lay with Africans and for reasons of both simple morality and of 
achieving mutual confidence and security, the British government ought to seek 
ways in which it could promote African advancement in Central Africa in as 
expedient a manner as possible.2 The anti-colonial campaign assumed a dual 
approach. As this section will demonstrate, in the metropole, the objective was to 
seek to hold the government accountable for the ‘drastic and distasteful measures 
being enacted in the name of the British people’.3 By such means it was anticipated 
that sufficient pressure could be brought to bear on the Colonial Office to change 
the direction of its policy towards the Federation. In Central Africa, meanwhile, the 
utmost assistance was given to African detainees and to those adversely affected by 
the repressive legislation enacted by the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland 
governments. By providing economic and moral support to NAC and ZANC 
detainees, it was hoped that momentum could be maintained behind the 
nationalist struggle, that Africans would not lose either the impetus or the incentive 
to agitate for political change once restrictions on political activity were lifted.  
The anti-Federation campaign in Britain assumed a multifaceted approach 
involving several anti-colonial bodies, notably the Africa Bureau, the MCF, the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau [FCB] and the recently formed Committee of Africa 
Organisations [COA], a London-based group set up to support exiled politicians 
from Anglophone Africa. Relying heavily upon contacts in Central Africa, especially 
Ministers from the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, such as Andrew Doig, to 
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provide them with a constant stream of information, these groups were anxious to 
relay developments on the spot to the British public. Letters appeared daily in 
major British newspapers questioning the legitimacy of the ‘murder plot’ on which 
the Nyasaland emergency had been justified whilst the British and Nyasaland 
authorities were heavily criticised for creating ‘deep and bitter division of opinion 
separating the Government from the people in Central Africa’.4 Deputations were 
repeatedly made to the Colonial and Commonwealth Offices urging them to 
recognise the failure of ‘partnership’5, and across the country meetings were 
convened at which African political leaders such as Kanyama Chiume were invited 
to speak, the largest of which took place on 8 April in the Albert Hall.6 In addition, 
anti-colonial pamphlets, such as the Fabian Colonial Bureau’s ‘Venture’, containing 
articles written by Africans were widely circulated, and several public protests were 
planned in order to make visible the extent of opposition to the Nyasaland and 
Rhodesian governments.7 In March, for instance, the MCF in conjunction with the 
CAO organised a picket of the Federal High Commission in London to ‘protest 
against the Tory government’s surrender to the white settlers of the Federation’.8 
The following month, the MCF’s London Area Council arranged a three-day ‘black 
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sash vigil’ to take place on Downing Street to campaign for an end to Federation 
through secession and independence based on universal adult suffrage.9  
The extent to which such public displays helped to raise awareness of the 
situation is difficult to assess accurately, but it is perhaps no coincidence that soon 
after respective public and Parliamentary campaigns were launched a number of 
anti-colonial organisations reported an increase in membership numbers and 
donations. In January 1959, the Africa Bureau’s secretary had reported that without 
substantial funds, the Bureau would cease to operate in ‘four or five months’.10 By 
June, however, the Executive Committee reported that the financial situation had 
‘substantially improved’ in no small part due to the ‘increase in Bureau 
membership’ and fund raising campaigns which had seen donations increase from 
just under £1,000 to approximately £9,500.11 The MCF reported a similar rise, with 
new Area Councils being established in several major towns and cities including 
Manchester and Norwich.12 The growth of membership numbers also facilitated the 
holding of large-scale public events, such as the ‘Africa Freedom Day’ concert held 
at St. Pancras Town Hall on 19 April, the ‘Africa! Africa!’ rally at Trafalgar Square on 
19 July and the much publicised ‘Central Africa Week’, held between 24 and 30 July 
during which prominent African speakers, including Chiume, visited MCF branches 
around the country raising awareness of the African struggle.13 
One of the major effects of anti-colonial activities was the stimulus it 
provided to the Labour Party, which came to assume a more decisive stance against 
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the federation.14 As Murray Steele suggests, as the Federation’s original architects, 
Labour had struggled to reconcile its anti-colonial goals with the anti-Federation 
cause.15 Whilst some, such as the Party’s Commonwealth Officer, John Hatch, had 
long argued that Labour should distance itself from the Federal scheme, Party 
leaders were generally of the opinion that Federation might still ‘work’ if 
opportunities for advancement were created.16 The declaration of the emergencies 
precipitated a change in emphasis, with local Labour parties throughout the country 
petitioning Party leaders to take a stronger line against the government and to 
demand a Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry.17 Whilst some remained 
ambivalent to guarantee that a future Labour government would solve Africans’ 
problems, MPs nevertheless felt more able to speak out against the Conservative 
Government’s record in Central Africa.18 This was revealed explicitly in the Party’s 
Central African Policy Committee [CAPC] statement in July 1959 that Federation 
had ‘failed’.19 This was a significant statement, one which appeared to mark a 
departure from the more cautious policy advocated in Plural Societies in 1956, 
which committed Labour to work towards making federation work. 
On 3 March, the emergency was debated in the Commons for the first time. 
James Callaghan, Labour’s Shadow Colonial Secretary, vociferously condemned the 
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Conservative attitude towards legitimate expressions of African protest. 
‘Collectively’, he said, the government ‘share responsibility for the unrest which 
exists in Nyasaland today’. For years they had known of the extent of African 
opposition to Federation but had done nothing to remedy African fears. People 
were living in ‘cloud-cuckoo-land’ if they thought that Africans in Nyasaland would 
‘sit quietly and wait until they have attained the standards set’ before they could 
have responsibility for their own government. In sum, Callaghan concluded, the 
Government had ‘grossly mishandled the whole situation’.20 Echoes of Callaghan’s 
speech were heard in innumerable attacks levied against the Conservatives 
throughout March and April. MPs such as Tony Benn, Barbara Castle, John Hatch 
and John Stonehouse, who was earlier deported from Northern Rhodesia by 
Federal immigration authorities at the climax of his fact-finding tour of the region, 
led the Parliamentary campaign, pressing for an immediate inquiry into the cause of 
the disturbances on 25 March.21 Their belief was that the subsequent report would 
‘vindicate long-held anti-colonial criticisms of the Federation’, laying the 
foundations for future progress.22 
Given the distinct shift in emphasis in Britain’s Federal policy after 1959, it is 
not possible to argue conclusively that the criticism arising from anti-colonialists 
had been decisive in pushing the Colonial Office towards a more liberal policy 
course in the Federation. As Philip Murphy has shown, there was every indication 
that doubts over the Federation’s current political trajectory existed within British 
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government circles long before Labour’s opposition rose to the fore.23 What is 
clear, however, is that the actions of Labour and prominent anti-colonial groups 
helped stimulate a wider public consciousness of the African predicament, which, in 
turn, created accountability by proxy to which the government had to respond. 
Whilst anti-colonialists were not necessarily responsible for opening the door for 
constitutional change, therefore, its adherents did shine the spotlight on African 
nationalist development, reinforcing in the minds of British officials at the Colonial 
and Commonwealth Relations offices that African nationalism was not a force that 
could be ‘moderated’ or channelled into more acceptable parameters under the 
existing terms of the Federal constitution.  
 
Sustaining African Nationalism: British Anti-Colonialist Activities in Central Africa  
 
In Central Africa, the response of metropolitan anti-colonialists to the events of 
1959 was to seek where possible to support Africans most deeply affected by the 
discriminatory legislation. The first priority was to secure legal representation for 
Nyasaland Congress members detained without trial.24 With this in mind, the Africa 
Bureau established the Central Africa Crisis Fund to cover the expenses incurred for 
the legal defence of NAC detainees. At the end of March, over £625 was raised and 
a significant proportion of donations set aside to cover the costs of a barrister to 
travel to Nyasaland to act as a public defender.25 It was perhaps a reflection of the 
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international profile of the Bureau’s work that its campaign received substantial 
financial gifts from overseas sympathisers. In April, for instance, the Bureau 
accepted a £5,000 gift from the Government of Ghana which went some way to pay 
the fees of Ghanaian barrister George Mill-Odoi, Thomas Kellock, and Dingle Foot 
QC, a Labour MP and specialist in constitutional and civil liberty cases, to represent 
Hastings Banda and his fellow detainees.26 By June, the Executive Committee of the 
Africa Bureau reported that over £5,900 had been collected for the legal defence 
fund.27  
Soon after the announcement of the Devlin Commission, anti-colonial 
groups intensified efforts to ensure that a ‘fair and just’ perspective of events was 
presented.28 Anxious that all Africans were able to submit evidence to the Devlin 
Commission, African Bureau and MCF affiliates in the region widely publicised the 
Commission’s visit in Nyasaland, enlisting the assistance of ministers from the 
Church of Central Africa Presbyterian [CCAP] missions at Blantyre and Lilongwe. 
Reverend Fergus Macpherson, for instance, spread news of the Commission 
throughout Blantyre, and with members from the Blantyre mission, assembled 
large groups of Africans to give evidence before it.29 As the Nyasaland Intelligence 
Committee was forced to admit, such activities had done much to give Congress 
sympathisers hope and to foster political sentiment. 
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Reaction to the Devlin Commission of Inquiry before its arrival was one of 
distrust ... However, since its arrival representatives of all communities have 
given evidence, Africans in great numbers, and the Congress members 
themselves and their sympathisers have recognised its impartiality in the 
reception of evidence. It has gradually become the focus of considerable 
public attention and hope, and people set great store by its findings. 
Congress sympathisers hope that a finding by the Commission against the 
Government will justify the release of Dr Banda and other leaders at an 
early date.30 
 
Financial assistance was also given by the Africa Bureau to the CCAP’s Detainees 
Welfare Committee, an organisation set-up to aid African detainees. The 
Committee was chaired by former NAC member Willie Chokani, its treasurer was 
Rev. Andrew Doig, and it functioned by receiving appeals from detainees and 
distributing funds for things such as food, the cost of a telegram or the cost of a pair 
glasses. Assistance was also provided for detainees’ families.31  
Dr Banda appeared before the four commissioners in Bulawayo on 16 May. 
Dingle Foot led the examination and attempted to present Banda as a ‘reasonable, 
patient, restrained, highly moral, tolerant person’, and to counter the various 
criticisms of him which had appeared in Governor Armitage’s 18 March despatch 
justifying his actions. Colin Baker suggests that Banda’s performance was well-
rehearsed and planned, but that the overall impression garnered by Devlin was 
eminently favourable, with the commission ‘impressed’ by the doctor’s ‘charm’.32 
Whether this would have been possible without Foot’s legal representation is 
unclear, but it almost certainly exercised a significant bearing on proceedings. 
Providing for the legal defence of detainees was undoubtedly one of the 
most important, and notable, contributions of British anti-colonialists at this time. 
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Not only did it raise the profile of Banda and the NAC by providing party members 
and detainees with a platform on which to air their views, thereby creating the 
basis for a more critical appraisal of the Nyasaland government, but it also helped 
sustain momentum behind the nationalist anti-Federation campaign by indicating 
that African actions before the declaration were not in fact unlawful. The 
framework in which African, and indeed colonial, citizens most acutely felt the 
implications of living under colonial rule was through justice. Being subject to 
ostensibly British forms of justice in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a way in 
which Africans could directly experience the implications of living under British rule. 
Providing representation for Africans was a means by which Nyasaland detainees 
could thus challenge the state. When viewed through this lens, the provision of 
legal aid accrues far greater significance than the historiography had hitherto 
attributed. As Hastings Banda commented in an interview with Fenner Brockway in 
1960, the support of the British anti-colonial movement had been a ‘tremendous 
encouragement’ at the time of the suppression. ‘It gave hope to me and my 
comrades in prison’, he said, and the ‘magnificent fight’ waged against colonialism 
made a ‘deep impression on our people and has helped to retain their confidence in 
justice’.33 As Thomas Fox-Pitt, Director of the Anti-Slavery Society wrote to Orton 
Chirwa soon after the establishment of the Malawi Congress Party, Africans thus 
ought to remain steadfast in their commitment to anti-Federation principles, even if 
cooperation with the Nyasaland government offered politicians a more immediate 
way forward. ‘I know how difficult things are for you and how easy materially they 
would be if you took the path of cooperation now’, wrote Fox-Pitt. ‘I need not 
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remind you that there are very honourable and respected English people here who 
would be willing to help you through a time of difficulty if they were sure that you 
were standing firm’.34  
The campaign conducted on behalf of former NAC activists was soon 
extended to Northern Rhodesia once the details and ramifications of Governor 
Benson’s repressive legislation came to light. Legal assistance was again the initial 
priority and finances collected for the purpose of the Central Africa campaign 
helped to provide representation for Kenneth Kaunda. In May, Secretary of the 
Africa Bureau Jane Symonds wrote to lawyer Colin Cunningham of Cunningham and 
Sons with a donation of over £50 to be used to aid Kaunda in bringing his case 
before the courts of Northern Rhodesia.35 After Kaunda’s arrest and subsequent 
imprisonment for 12 months on charges of holding illegal meetings in Kabompo, 
Kaunda’s supporters in Britain even went so far as to collect £187 to support his 
wife and to contribute to his children’s school fees.36  
Whilst many British bodies admitted to being ‘financially stretched’ at this 
time, the anti-colonial movement continued to receive, and deal with, requests 
from Africans for financial aid, an important symbol of the continuing concern for 
the African predicament in federation. Every effort was made to respond to those 
considered to be most in need.37 In May 1959, for instance, S.C. Nkoma wrote to 
Jane Symonds asking for financial assistance for his six colleagues from the 
Northern Rhodesia African Mine Workers Trade Union [AMWU] who had been 
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restricted to remote areas following the declaration of a state of emergency on the 
Copperbelt in 1956 following an intensification of industrial unrest.38 Their current 
predicament, he said, was ‘beyond miserable’; they were unemployed and their 
families going ‘half naked’ owing to the forced sale of their belongings to pay the 
cost of 10/- for rent. Whilst Symonds replied in August that funds raised for Central 
Africa had been allocated, she wrote to Nkoma again in December stating that the 
Executive Committee of the Africa Bureau had agreed to send the sum of £25 to 
each of the six restrictees and their families.39 
The lending of assistance to political activists in general, however, was 
somewhat problematic. This owed much to the confusion that prevailed following 
ZANC’s banning. As Hilda Selwyn-Clarke of the Fabian Colonial Bureau confessed to 
Pascal Sakota, a founding member of the African National Freedom Party, whilst the 
state of affairs in Nyasaland had been ‘fairly simple to follow’, ZANC’s status as a 
relatively unknown party, and the fact that discriminatory legislation appeared only 
to affect ZANC members rather than the African population as a whole, had 
resulted in much less attention being devoted to Northern Rhodesian affairs in the 
British press.40 As such, it was difficult to know precisely what was going on and 
‘what Africans were striving for’.41 The situation was further complicated by the 
proliferation of several political parties each claiming to inherit ZANC’s legacy. 
Between June and September, leaders of the African National Independence Party, 
the United National Freedom Party, and later Mainza Chona’s break-away African 
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National Congress faction each separately wrote to anti-colonialists in Britain 
condemning their rivals to the political sidelines and declaring that they were the 
true representatives of African political opinion.42 Frank Chitambala’s ‘Special 
Appeal to Friends’ was indicative of the rhetoric emanating from political leaders at 
the time: 
We are convinced that neither the unbanned ANC, nor the newly formed 
United Freedom Party under the leadership of Dixon Konkola are 
representative of African opinion ... All these organisations have no support 
from the mass. The people will never respect the two mentioned leaders 
and their organisations because of their political characters indecisions and 
insincerity in their national duties.43  
 
As Father Patrick Walsh, Secretary to the Archbishop of Lusaka and personal friend 
of Kaunda remarked to Fox-Pitt, there was in 1959 a ‘complete stalemate’ in 
Northern Rhodesian African politics.44  
Until the political situation in Northern Rhodesia showed signs of recovery, 
anti-colonialists were reticent to display preference for any one political party. The 
situation was entirely dissimilar in Nyasaland where it was clear from the outset 
that Banda, the ‘elder statesman’ of African politics, would occupy centre stage in 
any new national framework that was to materialise.45 He was not only a personal 
friend to anti-colonialists in Britain, having been a member of the Anti-Slavery 
Society and the Fabian Colonial Bureau46, but he was also seen to occupy the 
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‘genuine effections [sic.]’ of the Nyasaland people.47 It was only when UNIP was 
formed, with the explicit aim of uniting African political opinion under Kaunda’s 
leadership, that anti-colonialists became proactive in developing links with the new 
party.48 This was reflected in Thomas Fox-Pitt’s plea to UNIP’s Vice President Paul 
Kalichini to specifically tailor the appeal to British sympathisers in order to 
maximise potential benefits. The British people were seemingly ready to throw 
their weight behind UNIP, Fox-Pitt said, and in order harness the full cooperation of 
the British people Kalichini and his party would have to emphasise their 
‘determination in the face of hardship’. Grand requests for ‘landrovers’ and a ‘big 
party press’, he added, were unlikely to yield substantial results. What was needed 
was ‘a modest appeal for a couple of speakers and a duplicator’ which would do 
much to ‘remind us here of the great Indian nationalist movement that began in 
poverty’.49  
That UNIP and Kaunda became the preferred interlocutors of British anti-
colonialists over Nkumbula’s ANC reflected the increasingly political nature of anti-
colonial support. It reflected, above all, the desire to promote nationalists who 
came close to the anti-colonial ideal of what nationalism should be.50 Since the 
ANC-ZANC split in 1958, Nkumbula had become a marginalised figure in British anti-
colonial circles. As chapter three indicated, this owed a great deal to Kaunda’s 
attempts to denigrate his former ally to the ANC’s British supporters. Nkumbula’s 
behaviour in 1959, especially his perceived acquiescence in the inequitable actions 
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of the government in early 1959, and his role in cultivating the second major split in 
the ANC in September did much to substantiate Kaunda’s accusations that 
Nkumbula was a ‘government stooge’, stalling Africans’ progress. This instantly 
placed him at odds with those external sympathisers championing African 
advancement through African unity. As Richard Hall, Editor of the African Mail 
observed, Nkumbula was a divisive figure, preoccupied with ‘venal pleasures’, and 
unlikely to win for Africans their freedom.51 Such sentiments came to be shared by 
prominent African leaders too. Remarking on the first ANC split in October 1958, 
Hastings Banda told Fox-Pitt,  
About the Nkumbula-Kaunda affair, between us, my own sympathies are 
wholly with Kaunda. I share your views entirely as to who is the real leader 
or has the capacity for leadership in Northern Rhodesia. While in Ghana, I 
was asked to help heal the breach between the two men. I refused. Even 
Harry, himself, appealed to me, to help reconciliate [sic.] the two. But I 
evaded the issue. In my view, the split is to the good. If Kaunda can rally 
the majority to his side, it will be a very good thing.52 
   
Kaunda, in contrast, came much closer to embodying the Gandhian, pacifist, 
model seen by British anti-colonialists as the panacea for peaceful progress towards 
self-government in the colonial empire. He was a ‘uniting figure’, Richard Hall 
remarked, who had a ‘powerful hold’ over Africans.53 Other political leaders trying 
to inherit leadership of the new national agenda, such as Dixon Konkola, UNIP’s first 
president, were simply not suitable for the task ahead. Attacked by former ZANC 
luminaries in detention, Konkola was certainly not an individual capable of bringing 
together disaffected nationalists. He was, remarked Simon Kapwepwe, one of 
ZANC’s founding members then in internal exile in Mongu, Barotseland, a ‘waverer’, 
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out only for himself, and fixed on ‘trying to get rid of Ken [Kaunda] who was 
defenceless behind bars’.54 Just weeks after UNIP’s founding, Konkola was removed 
from his position. Contemporary assessments of his replacement, Mainza Chona, 
were not especially complementary either. Writing to the Africa Bureau, 
anthropologist James Chaplin indicated that Chona was a ‘stop-gap’ president, a 
man whose ideas seemed ‘poorly thought out and expressed in little more than 
clichés’.55 The overall impression gained in Britain from reports and connections ‘on 
the spot’, therefore, reinforced the belief that anti-colonialists were backing the 
right man when Kaunda returned to fore after his release from gaol in January 
1960. His ‘sensible’ qualities, and his willingness to work towards radical changes in 
the genuine ‘radical-democratic-liberal tradition’, Fox-Pitt told Chona, distinguished 
him from the rest of the pack.56  
 
Divergence of Nationalist-Anti-colonial Aims: The Decline of British Anti-colonial 
Activity in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
 
By campaigning on behalf of detained nationalist leaders, and by rallying against 
the restrictions imposed upon the expression of political sentiment, anti-colonialists 
raised the profile of UNIP and the MCP, giving both parties and their respective 
anti-Federation campaigns a vital boost at a critical moment. But in many respects, 
1959 represented the zenith of anti-colonial influence. Anti-colonialists did not 
cease in their attempts to act on behalf of Africans in Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia, as Stephen Howe argues, but, after 1959 the attention of the British 
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public shifted away from anti-colonialism, instead coming to focus on much larger, 
all-encompassing, campaigns such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.57 In 
the new circumstances created by the Macmillan-Macleod policies of 1960 which 
saw the release of Hastings Banda and the ending of the Nyasaland emergency, 
momentum was seized from those championing African advancement in the 
metropole and the assumption came to prevail among the British public, upon 
whom anti-colonial bodies relied for funding, that the anti-colonial struggle ‘had 
been won’.58 Thereafter, the Africa Bureau, the MCF and the FCB entered a period 
of relative decline in which their attempts to influence the course of events in the 
Federation were generally frustrated. By late 1961, both the MCF and the Africa 
Bureau admitted to facing ‘difficult financial situations’ and, subsequently, their 
scope for action accordingly narrowed. Between January and September 1961, for 
instance, the MCF’s general fund fell by £705; by October, the Executive Committee 
reported that it was only donations from Ghana’s governing Convention People’s 
Party that was keeping the Movement in operation.59 
At the same time as dealing with domestic difficulties, anti-colonialists were 
also faced with the re-emergence of ideological differences which had coloured 
their relationship with African politicians in the late 1950s. As nationalists became 
more assertive, a corollary of their growing support base and signs that the British 
were beginning to move towards a pro-African settlement in Central Africa from 
1960, anti-colonialists found themselves increasingly at odds with UNIP and the 
MCP, whose leaders became more vociferous in their condemnation of the 
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Federation and calls for immediate self-government. As evidenced by the response 
of the Committee of Africa Organisations to the Monckton Report, many on the 
anti-colonial left felt that some form of closer association might still prove 
beneficial to Africans if the British government assumed a more progressive 
attitude towards African advancement.  
It can be argued that Federation ought never to have taken place, but it 
does not follow that, having taken place and only partially succeeded, it 
ought now to be completely dissolved. To do so would destroy much that is 
good and beneficial to its inhabitants. A marriage may take place between 
people of incompatible temperament and against the advice of their 
friends; it does not follow that, after some years when a home and family 
have been established, the marriage should be dissolved because the 
incompatibilities do not vanish, but remain to chafe the partners. A 
counsellor may be called in to try to make the marriage work by analysing 
and where possible removing the main causes of friction, in the hope that a 
second chance may succeed.60  
 
Both UNIP and the MCP were by this stage, however, vehemently opposed to any 
form of ‘federal’ association whatsoever. Federation was a ‘serious political liability’ 
and only ‘full independence’ would now be sufficient to satisfy the African 
majority.61 Consequently, nationalist leaders gradually began to lose faith in the 
capacity of anti-colonialists to support Africans in achieving their independence 
goals. If their alleged ‘supporters’ would not give their full backing to UNIP and the 
MCP’s objectives, their support was considered dispensable. As Aleke Banda wrote 
in Malawi News in December 1960 following the MCP’s refusal to grant an audience 
to a delegation of Labour MPs visiting the Federation on the basis of the party’s 
stance towards closer association,  
The people of Malawi respect the Labour Party, but their respect for this 
party should not be taken as subservience and preparedness to be dictated 
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by its ill-informed members under the employ of Roy Welensky...They 
should know that we hate Federation and all that it stands for...We 
therefore see no reason why such prejudiced people should waste any 
more of our time by granting them interview.62 
 
Whilst larger anti-colonial bodies and the Labour Party struggled to 
recapture the influence they once held both in Britain and in Central Africa, there 
remained those that shared a personal interest in the fate of the northern 
territories who continued to support African politicians in their goal. In 1960, 
Thomas Fox-Pitt, with Simon Zukas and prominent left-wing commentator, John 
Papworth, who later served as Kaunda’s assistant once Zambia had achieved 
independence, helped to establish the UNIP London Committee, ‘an extension of 
UNIP headquarters in Lusaka’. Funded entirely by its own supporters, the 
Committee met regularly in London to discuss developments in the Federation and 
to ‘unite Zambians in Britain’ by disseminating UNIP material and publishing the 
Voice of Zambia, a pamphlet intended to keep ‘our own people’ informed of events 
that would otherwise not interest the British public.63 Although this marked a 
distinct narrowing of the anti-colonial remit, the Committee’s activities provided a 
valuable counterweight to the Federal government’s abortive, ‘corrupt’, ‘Build-a-
Nation’ campaign intended to publicise the benefits of federation to the British 
public.64 The UNIP London Committee went to great lengths, for instance, to 
counter suggestions put forward by some British newspapers in June 1961 that 
Kaunda’s leadership was under threat. ‘We are happy to debunk such reports’, 
claimed an article in Voice of Zambia,  
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Such reports are frequently published in the settler-owned press in an 
attempt to split our ranks  ...  It has been suggested that Mr. Arthur Wina, 
UNIP Ambassador in the USA, is working against Mr. Kaunda. Yet UNIP 
London office has just received a letter from Mr. Wina to UNIP H.Q. in 
which he denies this; expresses full support for Mr. Kaunda and condemns 
these mischievous reports as without foundation.65 
 
Relations between UNIP, the MCP and British anti-colonialists might have 
diluted after 1960, but connections were not severed entirely. In launching an 
ambitious programme to influence the political situation in Central Africa via links 
with trade unions rather than political parties, MCF leaders envisaged a continuing 
role for the Movement in colonial affairs.66 As the MCF’s General Secretary John 
Eber told the Executive Committee in mid-1960, the situation in the colonies had 
changed beyond recognition since the Movement’s formation six years earlier. 
‘While at first we had to do basic spade-work to mobilise opposition to old-style 
colonialism’, he said, ‘the emphasis is much more now on mobilising opposition to 
the new and indirect methods of colonialism – methods which apply to all under-
developed countries in one form or another – and also to push much harder the 
point of the importance of the struggle against these new methods in the interests 
of the British public’.67 The Movement therefore ought to consider a new approach, 
one that would exploit the MCF’s valuable links with British trade unions whose 
members could, it was hoped, seek to extend the Movement’s activities among 
trade unions within the colonies. This was a reflection, not only of the financial and 
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practical realities facing the anti-colonial movement at this time, but also the extent 
to which nationalists were increasingly looking beyond the traditional anti-colonial-
nationalist axis for new alliances. 
From the perspective of Congress leaders, British anti-colonial support had 
served a vital purpose at a crucial time in their histories. The available documentary 
evidence is not so explicit as to allude directly to the importance of anti-colonial 
support, but when taking a much broader view of the exchange of information 
between the metropole and African politicians in the Federation, it is evident that 
nationalists themselves grew in confidence by virtue of the moral, financial and 
practical assistance given to African detainees and political activists throughout 
1959 and 1960. As Tony Benn, the MCF’s treasurer in the early 1960s, claimed in a 
public lecture on 9 June 2010, the significance of the anti-colonial intervention in 
Central Africa was that it provided a platform upon which African politicians could 
express their grievances, at the same time placing the issue at the fore of the British 
government’s colonial agenda.68 Crucially, it persuaded policy makers that African 
opposition was unlikely to subside, even if attempts were made to isolate 
‘undesirable’ elements. As the Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, was forced to 
admit in December 1959, resentment against the Federation was ‘deeply and 
widely held’, and Britain could no longer afford to underestimate the strength of 
the forces that were speaking out against it.69  
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The Internationalisation of the Independence Struggle: the MCP, UNIP 
and the Expansion of International Relations, 1960-64 
 
Although connections with British anti-colonialists were becoming less important to 
the MCP and UNIP, African leaders, particularly within UNIP, continued to believe 
that the preservation and the extension of collaborative networks would be crucial 
to the success of the anti-Federation campaign. The struggle would not be fought in 
Central Africa alone; it would depend on the capacity to tie the anti-Federation 
campaign into the broader anti-colonial milieu. The intention of the second half of 
this chapter is to fully explore UNIP’s attempts to ‘internationalise’ the anti-colonial 
struggle and its effects upon nationalist politics between 1960 and 1964. 
 
The MCP’s International Campaign, 1960-63 
The stance of the MCP towards international relations, at least before 
independence, stood in stark contrast to that of UNIP. As Zoe Groves has 
demonstrated, Hastings Banda had initially embraced his status as the key figure in 
Central African nationalist politics. Following a brief stay in Salisbury in December 
1958, he spoke in self-congratulatory terms about his impact upon the Southern 
Rhodesian African National Congress.70 Keen to prove his pan-African credentials to 
his British friends, Banda wrote to Fox-Pitt on 30 December claiming that his stay in 
Salisbury proved to be a ‘blessing in disguise’. 
The Africans there received me with such enthusiasm that even the Nyasas 
were jealous. I stayed with Southern Rhodesian Congress leaders. George 
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Nyandoro, the Secretary of the Southern Rhodesian Congress, himself, told 
his people that I was not only the leader of the Africans of Nyasaland but 
also of those of Southern Rhodesia.71  
 
Banda was anxious, nonetheless, to exercise a note of caution to his own followers. 
Nyasaland’s role in pan-African and international affairs would be limited, at least 
until independence had been achieved. Speaking in Blantyre upon his return from 
Salisbury, Banda stated that although Africa was fully behind Nyasaland, ‘we must 
do our own fighting here ourselves ... We cannot expect others to do the fighting 
for us. God helps only those who help themselves’.72 The events of 1959 
consolidated Banda’s approach. The Nyasaland emergency not only gave Banda and 
his followers international exposure, something that Congress members were eager 
to press to their advantage, but it had also created a situation in which African 
political advancement was increasingly regarded as a necessity.73 Within this 
context, it was felt that there was little need to extend the MCP’s collaborative 
networks on anything like the scale envisaged by UNIP leaders. This isolationist 
stance, of sorts, was reflected in the declining interest that the MCP took in the 
affairs of Northern and Southern Rhodesia in the period immediately preceding 
independence. As a case in point, Banda vetoed a suggestion put forward by 
Kaunda in late 1962 that some 18,000 Nyasas in Northern Rhodesia be registered as 
Federal citizens, a move that would mean Kaunda might be able to obtain their vote 
at the forthcoming elections.74 Banda’s attitude was further apparent in his 
rejection of plans for closer cooperation between Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia 
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and East Africa. In 1962, two of the MCP’s senior members, Du and Yatuta Chisiza, 
successfully secured agreement from Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, President of the 
Tanganyikan African National Union [TANU], that some form of federal association 
between Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania might be desirable once independence in 
each territory had been achieved. When Banda was approached with the idea, 
however, he refused adamantly to have anything to do with it.75 Not all within the 
MCP agreed with Banda’s view. As Mkachi Msuku’s desperate plea for UNIP to 
‘mediate’ on the ‘disgracing troubles’ of mid-1964 which had seen Banda expel 
several key MCP members from the Malawian Cabinet demonstrate, some 
individuals remained keen to preserve links with former pan-African allies.76 
 
UNIP’s International Campaign, 1960-63 
Africans in Northern Rhodesia looked across the border in envy at the manner in 
which the emergency had brought tangible signs of constitutional progress for 
Nyasaland. Such changes had been precipitated it was felt, not only by an increase 
in nationalist agitation, but also by an intensification of international interest in the 
region that had forced Britain into taking a proactive approach to Nyasaland’s 
problems. With the Federal Review Conference scheduled for 1960 on the horizon, 
influential figures within UNIP, especially Arthur Wina, UNIP’s recently appointed 
representative in the United States, realised that the party needed to make 
concerted efforts to reach out beyond Northern Rhodesia if UNIP was to emulate 
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the MCP’s success in winning constitutional advancement for the African people.77 
This sentiment was accentuated following the Cha Cha Cha riots in the Summer of 
1961. Having ‘failed to protect’ its African citizens from the suppressive tactics 
deployed by the colonial authorities, wrote UNIP’s Robert Makasa to Indira Gandhi, 
ties with Zambia’s former protectors were now ‘beyond repair’. UNIP subsequently 
had to seek support elsewhere in furtherance of its objectives.78 This would not 
only increase pressure upon Britain to recognise African claims for independence, 
but also create a body of willing allies to whom the party could turn for support in 
the initial phase of ‘nation-building’ after independence.79 
The idea of extending the anti-Federation struggle beyond Northern 
Rhodesia’s borders was almost certainly inspired by the All-African Peoples 
Conference, held in Accra in December 1958. Coming soon after an acrimonious 
split in the African National Congress in October, which saw the establishment of 
the Zambia Congress under Kaunda’s leadership, the Conference impacted 
significantly upon the make-up of nationalist politics in Northern Rhodesia. Having 
initially tried to seek accord with his former ally, ANC President Nkumbula admitted 
to Ghana’s future Trade Minister A.Y.K. Djin that he was ‘genuinely hurt’ to discover 
that Kaunda had become the preferred interlocutor of Ghana’s President Kwame 
Nkrumah and Hastings Banda.80 Marginalising Nkumbula by accusing him of being 
responsible for the split, Kaunda’s ZANC emerged from the Conference with the 
firm backing of the Ghana Government, something that Kaunda felt would ‘put us 
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[ZANC] on the map quite effectively’.81 Such support not only helped win the new 
party vital financial assistance, but it also enhanced ZANC’s reputation within 
influential pan-African circles.82 This helped legitimise Kaunda’s decision to split 
from his rival, going some way to consolidating his own position as the key figure in 
Northern Rhodesian African national politics. 
UNIP’s international campaign began initially by sending senior party 
representatives to set up party branches in key centres abroad with a view to 
raising UNIP’s profile. Mainza Chona, UNIP’s former interim president, was sent to 
London, Arthur Wina continued his activities in Washington, Reuben Kamanga was 
despatched to Cairo, Arnold Mulemba, to Accra and Makasa to Dar-es-Salaam.83 
The locations were specially chosen according to the influence party leaders felt 
particular governments could exert upon Northern Rhodesia’s affairs. The despatch 
of representatives to the United States would yield obvious benefits, not least 
because various events in the US, including President John F. Kennedy’s election 
and the progress of the black Civil Rights Movement, indicated that America was 
undergoing profound shifts in regards to the issue of race relations. In May 1960, 
Kaunda even met with the American Civil Rights Movement leader Martin Luther 
King Jr. at Ebenezer Baptist Church, discussing with him prospects for African 
freedom. Ghana, Egypt and Tanganyika, meanwhile, were at the time the hub of 
African freedom movements and their leaders and governments were, in Robert 
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Makasa’s assessment, ‘among the top Third World champions’.84 Unsurprisingly, in 
regions where it was felt little political advantage could be gained from expanding 
UNIP activities, UNIP assigned lower priority to increasing UNIP’s presence. This was 
reflected, above all, in the numerous calls from UNIP representatives in South 
Africa for UNIP leaders to pay greater attention to branch activities there. In March 
1962, for instance, B.A. Chikuhunibantu, leader UNIP’s Johannesburg branch, wrote 
to Mainza Chona complaining that his branch was ‘badly isolated’:  
Our people are full prepared to give you a hand but as you are silent that 
side, you are WEAKNING [sic.] this branch. If you could keep on writing to 
us – even only 2 times a month, it could help us greatly. People at head 
office should NOT deny us that chance.85 
 
The duties of UNIP representatives were akin to those of an ordinary 
ambassador, though individuals were reminded not to extend their remit beyond 
the country in which they were operating. It was crucial, Chona told UNIP’s 
international representatives in November 1961, that UNIP was able to present a 
‘united front’ to those whose support the party was attempting to win.86 One of 
their most important tasks, Arthur Wina stated, was to establish a ‘solid 
administrative entity’ overseas with a view to uniting all Zambians in the struggle 
for independence.87 As UNIP’s representative in Mwanza, P.B. Jim’s passionate call 
to arms demonstrates, this would provide the party with an important moral 
advantage, a sense that all were marching together in one spirit to achieve 
Zambia’s liberation: 
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Wherever you are, you have a noble job to contribute to the freedom 
struggle at home ... You must not forget in the history of our struggle, we 
have come to a point where weakness is no better than a sin, we are at the 
point whereby courage and determination must be the masters of the day. 
Our country now needs men and women of unshakable will that must bring 
freedom to our motherland ... You are therefore called upon Sons and 
Daughters of Zambia to support our people at home with tools which 
would make them accomplish the work without delay.88 
 
On a practical level, it was felt that bringing together and ‘UNIP-ifying’ 
Zambian migrant workers in east and southern Africa, and Zambian students in the 
US, India and Britain would help transplant UNIP’s campaign elsewhere, creating a 
distinct ‘UNIP’, rather than Zambian, presence in key locations around the world. 
Even in regions where party branches were not established, many supporters of the 
anti-Federation cause were urged to set up unaffiliated bodies to ‘provide a 
communicative medium for ‘interested persons’ through which ‘information, ideas 
and matters of common or special interest’ could be disseminated’.89 Confined 
largely to students from the Rhodesias studying overseas, the establishment of 
politically minded unions reflected UNIP’s wider objectives. The Central African 
Students Union, established in 1960 by Rhodesian students studying in America, for 
example, was established specifically with a view to ‘act as the energetic spearhead 
in the emancipation of the under-privileged in the ‘mother’ continent’.90 
In addition to organising Northern Rhodesian expatriates, UNIP’s 
representatives spent a vast percentage of time arranging bursaries for African 
students to study abroad. This was important not least as a means to ensure that 
there was a strong cohort of loyal and educated Africans upon whom UNIP could 
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rely when independence was achieved, but also because it was a means by which 
UNIP could prove to foreign observers that the party was taking seriously its 
responsibilities for Africans’ futures. In addition, it was also perhaps seen as a way 
of highlighting the failure of the Northern Rhodesian government to provide similar 
opportunities. Writing to the Education Minister in Lusaka, Makasa stated that of 
the 535 students from Northern Rhodesia studying in Britain, only 60 were Africans, 
most of whom were doing ‘tea drinking courses’ that were of little use to Africans 
wishing to educate themselves in the mechanics of modern government.91 Whilst 
the British regarded such means as an important means of transmitting British 
influence around the world, it was ‘absolutely shameful’ in Makasa’s view that such 
inadequate provisions were established for educating the next generation of 
Zambia’s leaders.92  
The most important role of party leaders overseas, however, lay in 
petitioning foreign governments and anti-colonial bodies to lend support to UNIP’s 
anti-Federation campaign. As Arthur Wina wrote to the Ethiopian ambassador in 
New York, it was by such means that UNIP hoped to ‘confer with other nations’, to 
consider joint diplomatic action to meet the developing crisis and to ‘make every 
effort to exert pressure on the British government’.93 It was arguably for this reason 
that on frequent occasions in the early 1960s, UNIP despatched representatives to 
prominent international conferences with a view to presenting the case for African 
majority government. In January 1961, for example, Makasa was nominated to 
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attend the ALOKA International conference on ‘Better Human Relationships’ in 
Karachi, Pakistan. Having successfully forged contacts with fellow participants, 
Makasa issued a joint statement with Ahmen Jaffer, Chairman of the Pakistan 
Council for World Government, and Maina Macharia of the Kikuyu Welfare 
Association condemning the ‘imperial mentality’ of Roy Welensky and the British 
government.94 
Letters similar to Wina’s plea circulated with monotonous regularity 
throughout 1961. Appeals for funds, supplies to fight election campaigns, requests 
for diplomatic assistance and a gentle reminder that people ought not forget the 
African plight in Northern Rhodesia were regular features of UNIP’s 
correspondence.95 An important corollary of the attempt to raise the profile of the 
party internationally was that UNIP succeeded in framing the independence 
struggle in an exclusively UNIP context. The impression projected to international 
observers, therefore, was that UNIP rather than the ANC was the sole 
representative of Africans and, thus, it was to UNIP that crucial financial and moral 
support ought to be directed.  
Whilst Nkumbula’s ANC could rely only on the support of the Katangan 
secessionist leader Moise Tshombe, UNIP received advice and assistance of varying 
sorts from several quarters.96 Statistics vary, but in its formative years UNIP relied 
heavily upon the generosity of external sympathisers to both keep the party 
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financially solvent and to mount effective election campaigns. Before 1961, the bulk 
of UNIP’s financial assistance came from Ghana. The extent of support is difficult to 
gauge, but UNIP sources claimed to have received over £10,000.97 Aid was also 
forthcoming from organisations in America and Britain, whilst some foreign 
governments, most notably Liberia, Ethiopia and Tunisia, provided funds for UNIP 
officials to study abroad.98 It was assistance from Julius Nyerere’s Tanganyika 
African National Union [TANU], however, that became especially important. 
Between 1960 and 1961, TANU provided UNIP with two Land Rovers and over 
£1,500 in contributions to UNIP’s election campaign. In May 1962, TANU also 
offered the facilities of the Tanganyikan Broadcasting Company [TBC] to Kaunda, 
whose speeches were broadcast into Northern Rhodesia at 10.00pm every evening. 
As Special Branch reported, this became an invaluable means by which UNIP was 
able to propagate its message.99 Taking their lead from the centre, TANU branches 
operating in Northern Rhodesia also offered their services to UNIP.100 In September 
1963, Edward Mponda, the Divisional Chairman of TANU’s Chingola branch, wrote 
to UNIP headquarters reminding UNIP leaders that TANU people were ‘difinetly 
[sic.] behind you until the day of independence’, and that national headquarters 
need not delay in asking for assistance, especially in regards to the raising of 
election funds.101 Nine days later Aaron Milner, UNIP’s Afro-European Deputy 
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National Secretary, replied to Mponda thanking him for his offer and informing him 
that Zambia would remain ‘forever indebted’ to President Nyerere for his support, 
both at home and in Tanganyika, where UNIP branch activities had continued to 
flourish.102 
As Paul Bjerk has shown, TANU’s support for UNIP was in part conditioned 
by Nyerere’s own strategy to strengthen Tanganyika’s position in African affairs by 
unifying east and southern Africa.103 The first step to this objective, Nyerere 
believed, was to ensure the rapid devolution of power to Africans in Central Africa 
by any means possible. At the TANU annual meeting in April 1962, Nyerere even 
went so far as to warn that if Britain would not aid African leaders in Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia to achieve independence peacefully, Tanganyika would support 
the violent rebellion that would inevitably follow.104  
Nyerere’s stance played a crucial role in enabling UNIP leaders to expand 
the party’s international activities.105 It was by virtue of Nyerere’s initiatives, 
particularly his championing of Kaunda’s appointment as president of the Pan-
African Freedom Movement of East, Central, and Southern Africa [PAFMECSA], 
established in Addis Ababa in February 1962, for instance, that UNIP was able to 
place the situation in Northern Rhodesia at the fore of the pan-African agenda. At 
the first PAFMECSA conference, the organisation condemned the Federation and 
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claimed that the failure of the British government to settle the constitutional crisis 
in Northern Rhodesia constituted a ‘threat to the peace and security of Central 
Africa’.106 To focus attention on Welensky, the second PAFMECSA conference held 
in May in Mbeya called for the dissolution of the Central African Federation, 
pledging support for UNIP.107 Whilst pronouncements of this nature did not 
necessarily precipitate significant constitutional change, they were an important 
means by which UNIP was able to draw the attention of the wider international 
community, particularly the UN, to Central Africa’s problems.  
 
UNIP, the United Nations and the United States, 1960-63 
 
The timing of the launch of UNIP’s diplomatic offensive was carefully planned to 
coincide with broader ideological shifts in the international sphere. By raising 
awareness of the Northern Rhodesian situation in this context, UNIP hoped to 
engender a ‘sympathetic atmosphere’ among influential international bodies and 
governments which could, in turn, be used to place ‘additional pressure upon the 
British government to accelerate African advancement’.108 That Kaunda felt inclined 
to do so arguably had much to do with the encouragement he received from Sir 
Ronald Prain, Chairman of the Rhodesian Selection Trust [RST], one of the two 
major mining groups operating on the Copperbelt, whose intervention helped 
imbue Kaunda with the belief that attempts to expand UNIP’s network of 
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collaborators would be met with enthusiasm, especially in America.109 Although it is 
unclear precisely when the two first met, Prain approached Governor Evelyn Hone 
about the possibility of meeting with Kaunda as early as September 1959.110 
Believing that Federation was in the best interests for Central Africa’s multiracial 
population, Prain had for many years supported Roy Welensky’s United Federal 
Party [UFP], contributing sums amounting to as much as £5,000 per year.111 In May 
1959, this financial and political support was terminated. By August, Prain was 
convinced that Federation’s future would not be secured by supporting the 
increasingly racialist policies of Welensky and his party. 
That Prain decided to meet with UNIP’s president, rather than the ANC’s, 
was premised on the basis that Kaunda was a ‘much better prospect’ than 
Nkumbula, echoing London’s view that the latter was ‘far less stable’.112 Over the 
course of the next four years, Prain developed close and friendly links with Kaunda, 
bringing him together with influential British, and later, American, officials for talks 
on Northern Rhodesia’s future. Given Prain’s vested interest in the future of the 
Copperbelt, and given his own belief that political power in the Federation was 
likely to shift rapidly from the European to the African in the not too distant future, 
his motives were not entirely altruistic. Nevertheless, as a relative newcomer on the 
political scene in 1959 and 1960, Prain’s advice proved to be an important factor in 
laying the groundwork for UNIP’s international campaign. Kaunda acknowledged as 
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much in an address to RST’s Directors at a lunch they had given in his honour 
shortly after Zambia’s independence. Paying warm personal tribute to Prain, 
Kaunda noted that at a time when he had still been a ‘minor nationalist politician’, 
ignored by the government, Prain had sought him out and discussed major political 
and economic questions with him. It was from Prain, added Kaunda, that he and his 
colleagues had learned the virtue of ‘reasonable negotiation’ and, crucially, the 
value of exploiting the political sensibilities of foreign interest groups in order to 
achieve UNIP’s own political goals.113 
With the crisis in neighbouring Congo continuing to deteriorate, with the 
horrors of apartheid brought to the fore with the massacre of 69 Africans at 
Sharpeville in March, and with less than one year since the Hola Camp revelations 
and the publication of the Devlin Report, 1960 was the year in which settler rule 
came under intense scrutiny. These various crises coincided with the growth of 
former colonial Afro-Asian states in the United Nations, who began to take 
concerted steps to permanently eradicate white rule from Africa.114 This initially 
found expression in Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, passed in December 1960 by a 
unanimous vote of 89-0, which called for ‘the end of colonialism in all its 
manifestations’.115 Pressure applied by the Afro-Asian bloc to colonial powers was 
reinforced during 1961, when the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard 
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to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and People was established under Resolution 1654 (XVI).116 The 
committee was more commonly known as the UN Committee of Seventeen, or 
after December 1962, the UN Committee of Twenty-Four.  
By the beginning of 1962, Africa was thoroughly intertwined with the 
procedure and policy of the UN to the extent that 42 per cent of the sixteenth 
Annual Report of the Secretary General was devoted to African issues.117 In April, 
Kaunda was given the opportunity of focussing the UN’s attention explicitly upon 
Northern Rhodesia’s problems, addressing the UN Committee of Seventeen in New 
York. There, he emphasised UNIP’s ‘peaceful’ credentials, suggesting that UNIP had 
been victims of a programme of ruthless suppression by Welensky’s government. 
This, he said, stood in contravention to the elementary rights guaranteed by the UN 
Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples.118 In the opinion of UNIP’s International and Publicity Bureau, Kaunda’s 
speech had a marked effect on the general climate of opinion in regards to 
Northern Rhodesia’s problems, with representatives from Tanganyika, India, 
Ethiopia, Tunisia, and the USSR unanimous in their support for UNIP’s president. 
Kaunda had given ‘a true picture of the tragic situation of the African population’, 
each delegate recognising ‘the just struggle of the people of Zambia for their 
national liberation’.119 Perhaps the most notable exteriorisation of Kaunda’s 
attempt to influence the UN was seen in the fact that, four weeks later, the UN 
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Special Committee on Colonialism approved a motion in favour of calling for 
immediate independence in Northern Rhodesia by 12 votes to 4.120 This sentiment 
was further expressed in December 1963, when the UN General Assembly 
reaffirmed the ‘inalienable right’ of the people of Northern Rhodesia ‘to self-
determination and independence’, hoping that the territory would ‘achieve its 
independence in the nearest possible future’.121  
The intensification of UN interest in African decolonisation, which coincided 
with John F. Kennedy’s appointment to the Presidency in January 1961, precipitated 
a major reappraisal of American attitudes towards colonialism; the State 
Department could not remain static in its approach.122 Keen to identify with liberal 
causes, and anxious to restrict opportunities for communist encroachment into 
colonies, Kennedy signalled his intentions almost immediately after taking office by 
replacing the moderate Assistant-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Gilbert 
Satterthwaite, with the outspoken liberal governor of Michigan, G. Mennen 
Williams.123 Between 1960 and 1963, Kennedy met with 28 African leaders, 
including Kaunda and Banda, both of whom were given the opportunity of 
discussing the prospects for African self-government in their respective territories 
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in Washington in April 1961.124 Sponsored by the American Committee on Africa 
[ACOA], a small group established in 1953 with the intention of lending support and 
giving public exposure to African peoples struggling for freedom, equality, and 
independence, the trip had a profound effect on Kaunda. Addressing an African 
Freedom Day rally on 19 April, Kaunda referred to Kennedy as taking a ‘definite and 
bold stand’ on Africa, adding that if the American people ‘back President Kennedy 
and his policies, you will have friends not only in Africa but all over the world’.125  
Although the US government continued to support British aims in the 
Federation, the increasing contact with African nationalists suggested that some US 
officials began to appreciate that African majority rule in settler-dominated colonies 
would soon become a reality and, as such, the utmost attention ought to be given 
to cultivating among nationalist leaders a sympathetic, pro-Western attitude.126 By 
December 1962, American officials told their British counterparts that Federation 
was the ‘key’ to southern Africa’s problems. If changes were not made to the 
respective territorial constitutions there would be escalating dissatisfaction from 
Africans which might eventually lead to violent outbreaks.127  
The change in America’s position undoubtedly owed much to the growing 
anti-colonial climate prevailing in the UN, but whether such changes in attitude 
towards Central Africa would have occurred had UNIP not embarked upon its 
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ambitious international programme is highly debatable.128 This was certainly the 
perception among several British officials. As noted by the British colonial attaché in 
Washington in August 1961, UNIP’s approach had yielded tangible results. 
Expression of a willingness to work within parameters conducive to maintaining 
Western-democratic ideals marked Kaunda as a ‘political moderate worthy of 
encouragement’, and there was every indication that the State Department wished 
to be as ‘helpful as possible’ in the present situation.129 Informal enquiries about 
the possibility of minor modifications to the Northern Rhodesian constitution 
reflected the ‘underlying currents’.130  
With signs of a shift in the American position, UNIP became ever more 
cautious to adapt the party’s approach accordingly. The most notable 
exteriorisation of this policy was evidenced in the party’s differing appeals to the 
countries with which it corresponded. Speaking to representatives at the Belgrade 
Conference in September 1961, Rueben Kamanga likened the suppression of the 
Cha Cha Cha disturbances to a ‘planned genocide operation’ and that Africans 
ought not to be blamed if they too responded in kind.131 These were extreme 
words. But given that Kamanga was addressing a group of leaders that included 
Nkrumah, Egypt’s second president Gamel Abdel Nasser and India’s president 
Jawaharlal Nehru, all of whom used the conference to establish the Non-Aligned 
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Movement—an attempt to pave a middle course for states in the developing world 
between the Western and Eastern blocs in the Cold War—it is somewhat easier to 
appreciate his strong rhetoric. In contrast, UNIP went to great lengths to temper its 
appeal to its Western audience, emphasising the party’s ‘non-violent’ credentials.132 
In a desperate plea to Washington for assistance in August 1961, for instance, 
Kaunda not only stopped short of likening the actions of the authorities to a 
‘planned genocide’ operation, but implored US officials to intervene via diplomatic 
channels. ‘The killing of Africans and total uprooting of villages in the Northern 
Province and Luapula Province by so-called security forces of Northern Rhodesia 
continues’, Kaunda wrote. ‘I implore you in the name of God and humanity to 
intervene by raising this matter at United Nations at the emergency session on 
Bizerta and also directly with Prime Minister Macmillan’.133 Strains of a similar 
approach were earlier witnessed in 1960, when Arthur Wina refused to act upon 
the advice of UNIP’s Cairo office and establish a UNIP branch in Cuba. ‘Since Cuba is 
considered a communist country’, he said, ‘moving there will brand our movement 
as part of the International Communist movement’, and as such UNIP’s relations 
with the US would be coloured by an ‘atmosphere of distrust’.134 
It was imperative that party leaders projected an image of ‘responsibility’, 
and this was reflected in Kaunda’s growing sensitivity to the company he kept. He 
was not afraid of taking deliberate steps to jettison contacts regarded by American 
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officials as ‘potentially troublesome’.135 As a case in point, in February 1962 Kaunda 
called off a non-violent civil disobedience campaign organised in conjunction with 
leaders of the World Peace Brigade, Michael Scott, and two African-American 
activists, Bayard Rustin and William Sutherland, men whom the State Department 
suspected of having communist leanings.136 William Wight, an official in the African 
Affairs Bureau, contended that action organised by such individuals would likely 
elicit violence in Northern Rhodesia that would swiftly be followed by communist 
encroachment.137  
Whether UNIP leaders were in fact conscious of British sensitivity to US, and 
indeed UN pressure, is not entirely clear, but it is almost certain that the party’s 
attempts to manipulate international trends to its advantage was a deliberate 
policy objective intended to expedite Northern Rhodesian independence. UNIP was 
undoubtedly reaping some success. Given Britain’s susceptibility to UN dynamics, in 
particular the criticism of her colonial record by former colonies, the increasing 
exposure given to the Northern Rhodesian problem by UNIP presented a ‘very 
worrying’ development.138 Northern Rhodesia was too easily linked to events in 
neighbouring countries, especially the delicate situation materialising in Southern 
Rhodesia, for Britain to have remained unresponsive to pressure applied by former 
colonies and UNIP sympathisers in the UN. Such pressure in itself was hugely 
disconcerting, but it was the ways in which the consistent focus on Britain’s colonial 
record in the Federation affected American attitudes towards British policy in the 
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region that helped legitimise the policies already being followed by Macleod and 
Macmillan in the Federation which, by 1960, suggested that Britain was willing to 
countenance the devolution of power to the African majority. It is not the intention 
of this thesis to discuss in any great detail the extent to which Britain’s relationship 
with the Americans impacted upon British colonial policy. To concur with the views 
of John Kent and Wm. Roger Louis, however, US approval was still absolutely vital 
to the conduct of Britain’s overseas affairs.139 
That Kaunda was experiencing some degree of success in raising UNIP’s 
profile in the US, and in cultivating for himself an image of a moderate politician 
worthy of encouragement, was seen in the ringing endorsement he received from 
sections of the US media. This was surmised in a story in Life magazine in May 1960, 
which portrayed him as a patriotic practitioner of democracy likely to become the 
first leader of an independent Zambia.140 The article, written by Life publisher Henry 
Luce, a strident anti-communist, provided instant credibility for Kaunda among 
American voters and politicians concerned about Third World revolutionaries, and it 
was this image, in conjunction with his connections with prominent figures such as 
Ronald Prain, that won him influential allies who lobbied his cause in the highest 
political circles. It was by virtue of the position of Harold Hochschild, chairman of 
the RST’s parent company, the American Metal Climax, as chairman of the African 
American Institute, for instance, that Kaunda was able to attend several ‘Africa 
Freedom Day’ events in 1960 and 1961 at which he engaged with individuals eager 
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to press for African advancement.141 Hochschild was personally ‘impressed’ by 
Kaunda, and when he visited the US again in April 1961 it was Hochschild who 
arranged for him to meet with President Kennedy via AMEX’s connections in the 
State Department.142  
UNIP’s actions in specifically tailoring its diplomatic offensive not only 
reflected a wider consciousness of the international, and Cold War, context in 
which the party was operating, but also demonstrated a degree of flexibility, a 
willingness to adapt its appeal in line with changes in international political trends 
in order to maximise the potential benefits for the party’s immediate prospects. 
Whilst UNIP was clearly a willing recipient of all support received for its anti-
Federation cause, support from certain anti-colonial bodies and governments was 
undoubtedly more useful than others.  
As has been shown, UNIP’s campaign and its approach was paying off. By 
1963, anxieties pertaining to UNIP’s ‘lack of experience’ came to be replaced by the 
fear that extremist settler nationalism would begin to make the situation in the 
Federation untenable. According to the Federation’s Ambassador in Washington, 
Welensky was considered by the State Department to be ‘congenitally incapable of 
entering into anything approaching a cooperative relationship with persons of 
colour’.143 Within this context, UNIP’s stature grew steadily. Led by a responsible 
and moderate leader, UNIP’s status as a popular, pro-Western, party became ever 
more preferable to American sensibilities. Given the Cold War climate in which the 
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struggle in Central Africa was taking place, diplomatic ‘encouragement’ was given 
to Britain to stimulate constitutional devolution in Northern Rhodesia after 1962. 
Thereafter, as power was gradually transferred to the MCP and UNIP between 1962 
and 1964, the US supported British policy, defending Britain’s actions in the UN and 




This chapter has had a dual purpose. By first outlining the extent to which British 
anti-colonial support helped facilitate the re-emergence of mass African 
nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and by then assessing the ways in 
which nationalists in UNIP looked to extend the metropolitan anti-colonial-
nationalist network of connections thereafter, it is hoped that a case has been 
made for situating the study of nationalism within a much wider context than the 
historiography has hitherto attempted. Exploring the links that existed between 
nationalists in Central Africa, British anti-colonialists and influential international 
governments and organisations keen to accelerate African independence, is 
essential, not only insofar as advancing our understanding of nationalist 
development, but also in bridging the gap between Imperial and Africanist 
historiographies. 
 It is somewhat surprising that comparatively little scholarly attention has 
been devoted to the international dimension of the development of nationalism in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland particularly in African histories. Part of the 
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problem lies in the tendency to produce UNIP or MCP-centric histories, which have 
precluded historians from seeking explanations extraneous to the domestic 
context. The re-emergence of mass nationalism following the upheavals of 1959, 
for instance, has often been regarded by Africanist historians such as Joey Power 
and John McCracken as a consequence of nationalist initiatives.145 Equally, 
historians such as Andrew DeRoche and Andrew Cohen, who allude to the 
international dynamics of decolonisation in the Federation, are only tangentially 
concerned with nationalist politics. The intention of this chapter has been to show 
that there is a strong case to be made for studying the development of nationalism 
in the Federation within a transnational context.  
Many of the conclusions contained here are not the final word on the 
subject; they almost certainly require more in-depth research in the archives of the 
bodies with which nationalists corresponded in order to fully investigate the impact 
of connections with external agencies upon the independence struggle. It is hoped, 
nonetheless, that the arguments posited have emphasised the need for a new field 
of enquiry into nationalist history in Zambia and Malawi. As has been shown, the 
influence of British anti-colonialists proved especially valuable to former ZANC and 
NAC activists in 1959, as their practical, moral and financial assistance played an 
important role in keeping alive nationalist sentiment at a crucial time. Kaunda 
admitted to his friend Fox-Pitt in 1960 that without the support it received, his 
party would have struggled to recapture its previous position in Northern 
Rhodesian politics.146 Whilst anti-colonial activities were not in themselves decisive 
in precipitating constitutional change in Central Africa, they nevertheless created a 
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wider consciousness about African political development, which reinforced among 
British ministers the need for a more proactive, pro-African, policy in the 
Federation.  
The most important legacy left by the British anti-colonial campaign was 
that it left African leaders with no doubt that the independence struggle could not 
be won by the efforts of Africans alone; decisive steps needed to be taken to 
‘internationalise’ the anti-Federation campaign. For the MCP, Britain’s decision to 
engage in discussions over Nyasaland’s future diminished the party’s urgency to 
embark upon such an ambitious crusade. The situation for UNIP, however, stood in 
stark contrast. With African advance gathering pace across the border, and with the 
party’s own ambitions frustrated by the 1961 constitutional proposals, progressive 
party officials such as Arthur Wina realised that UNIP had to take concerted steps to 
bolster the party’s profile internationally in order that pressure be brought to bear 
on the British to resolve the Northern Rhodesian situation in UNIP’s favour.  
As evidenced by the trajectory of Zambia’s foreign policy after 
independence, UNIP’s international activities left an indelible imprint upon the 
minds of party leaders, who developed an ideological commitment to liberate 
Africans living under the oppression of colonial rule. Zambia had a ‘duty’ to help 
Africans engaged in the fight against colonialism elsewhere.147 After 1964, he took 
active steps to make Zambia an ally of freedom fighters, lending them resources 
and providing them with space to conduct their operations.148 ‘This was a difficult 
task’, Kaunda later admitted to Harry Kreisler, creator and host of Conversations 
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with History, an interview programme held in association with the Institute of 
International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, not least because of 
the animosity and sanctions that Zambia would incur from settler regimes in 
Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique, 'but we were committed ... 
God’s children should be free, free from oppression’.149  
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This thesis has endeavoured to trace the development of African nationalism in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 1950 and 1964. Despite the renaissance 
of historiographical interest in African politics in these two territories in recent 
years, evidenced in the work of Giacomo Macola and Joey Power, some key 
questions remain pertaining to the nature of nationalist mobilisation and the rise of 
nationalist sentiment in the Central African Federation.853 What has remained a 
fairly unexplored feature of the historiography is the way in which the national 
message was translated to the people and how African leaders in the United 
National Independence Party [UNIP] and the Malawi Congress Party [MCP] were 
able to weld together different elements in African society, fostering a genuine 
national consciousness among the African masses of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. For instance, in her study Building Kwacha, Power provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the growth of nationalist politics in Nyasaland, but does 
not explicitly allude to methods used by African politicians to translate the 
‘national’ message to the African people, and, crucially, the future ramifications 
that the MCP mobilisation policies had for Malawi’s long-term future.854 Miles 
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Larmer’s Rethinking African Politics is somewhat more successful in this respect, 
though, similarly, little focus is devoted to UNIP’s mobilisation campaign.855 Where 
this thesis hopes to have made an intervention in the debate is by shedding light on 
the respective campaigns fought by UNIP and the MCP, and their predecessors, the 
African National Congress [ANC] and the Nyasaland African Congress [NAC]. It has 
shown how the initial struggle against Federation helped stimulate national 
consciousness and, gradually, how this evolved into a struggle for new nationhood.   
Precisely why so many subscribed to this vision is an issue that continues to 
provoke historical debate. Building upon ideas first advanced by contemporary 
anthropologists such as Peter Harries-Jones, which later found expression in the 
work of scholars such as Owen Kalinga, this thesis has shown that conformity to the 
ANC and NAC, and later UNIP and MCP’s respective agendas was highly subject to 
regional differentiation or individual socio-economic circumstances.856 In certain 
regions, support for UNIP or the MCP came down to the fact that there existed 
highly capable party organisers, active in propagating the nationalist programme. 
For some individuals, the promise of personal advancement was a determining 
factor; for others, it depended upon the stance of local elites, companions or family 
members, whose political sensibilities placed pressure upon individuals to adhere 
to a specific system of political beliefs.857 These were all significant, but crucially 
important was the appeal of new nationhood espoused by UNIP and MCP leaders 
which proved eminently more successful in stimulating national conscious among 
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the people. By drawing close links between freedom and the party, making party 
membership coterminous with the achievement of independence, African political 
leaders instilled the anti-colonial crusade with strong religious overtones that 
emphasised Africans’ destiny to inherit the nation as their own. If the nation was 
‘God-given’858, then bringing it into being was nothing less than a sacred duty. This 
was a message that all could understand; one that could easily be transmitted to 
others. UNIP’s then Secretary General, Munu Sipalo, captured the very essence of 
what nationalist leaders were attempting to do by closely tying the party with the 
achievement of new nationhood in a 1960 pamphlet on ‘solidarity’.   
UNIP is not a faction, not a group, not a wing, it is an institution rooted like 
a tree in the centre around which men group themselves as best they can. It 
is a fundamental and self-evident thing like life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness or like a National Flag ... It is in fact the synonym of patriotism 
(Nationalism) which is another name for UNIP ... On this basis therefore it is 
inconceivable that any self respecting man should not belong to UNIP ... 
UNIP is a political church which requires regular attendance and has a creed 
which epitomises the ‘modernising’ approach.859 
 
By 1960, there was little doubt that many African leaders regarded their actions as 
forming part of a wider struggle for Zambia and Malawi. As demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, however, this transition from local to national protest was 
fraught with difficulties. When division manifested within the Congresses, and later 
UNIP and the MCP—a corollary of the differing views held by locals over the nature 
of the national struggle—it became increasingly difficult to reconcile rival factions 
within each party that  claimed to be ‘united’ and representative of the people.      
The thesis has shown that the development of nationalist politics was, 
undoubtedly, a complex process, dependent upon a series of events and 
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developments that were not always within nationalist leaders’ control. Where this 
thesis has attempted to make an original contribution to the historiography is by 
situating the development of nationalism within an international context, exploring 
nationalist relations with British anti-colonialists, the United States, powerful pan-
African forces and the expanding United Nations. By so doing, the thesis has shown 
that the independence struggle was not fought, and won, exclusively as a result of 
UNIP and the MCP’s domestic campaigns. It is important, also, to consider the 
subsidiary role played by British anti-colonial and influential international 
sympathisers in supporting nationalist leaders at critical moments in their parties’ 
histories. Nationalist development was not a process confined solely to the borders 
of the nations in which it first evolved. It also had a genuine international dimension 
too.    
 
Explaining Nationalist Development in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland  
The Central African Federation was the catalyst for mass African politicisation. It 
was a symbol of African subjection to white supremacy, a poignant reminder to 
Africans of lingering racist attitudes among British imperialists that provided a deep, 
moral relevance to the campaign to win African socio-economic and political 
freedom in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.860 Until 1957 the campaign was 
distinctly anti-Federation. Given the propensity of the British to try to make 
Federation work, the Congress campaign met with little success. Once the decision 
was taken to by-pass the objections of the African Affairs Board to the 
Constitutional Amendment Act, the respective political campaigns of the ANC and 
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NAC began to develop a distinct anti-British rhetoric. Throughout the 1950s, 
nationalism was firmly rooted in the anti-Federation struggle. By agitating for its 
removal, promising better opportunities for Africans under an African-dominated 
government, nationalist politicians helped stimulate a genuine ‘national’ 
consciousness among the people, bringing together for the first time disparate 
ethno-regional groups under an anti-Federation banner. This was not, however, 
sufficient to sustain unity in the long-term. 
To concur with Philip Murphy’s assessment, proscription of the NAC and the 
Zambia African National Congress [ZANC] in March 1959 profoundly altered the 
trajectory of African politics.861 Africans everywhere had experienced the repressive 
policies of the state first-hand; this was a physical manifestation of colonial 
suppression that would continue, African politicians argued, until Africans achieved 
independence. What was needed, therefore, was a change in emphasis. The scaling 
up of political agitation at this juncture owed much to the initiative, foresight and 
organisational skill of several key individuals, who successfully translated the 
complex anti-Federation, and later ‘national’, debate into a usable lexicon of 
protest to awaken the masses. In so doing, nationalist leaders developed a political 
rhetoric to which a wide range of disparate interest groups were able to respond. 
This allowed key nationalist leaders to harness powerful forces bearing down upon 
them, channelling them into winning support for their vision of the nation, a vision 
that embodied equality of individuals, a demand for the abolition of racial privileges 
and the pursuit of a policy based on equitable distribution of property and of social 
and economic burdens.  
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Explaining the Authoritarian Turn in African Politics 
But, although UNIP and the MCP did much to bring together the African people, 
closer scrutiny of the evidence has revealed that both parties were not nationally 
representative bodies at the time of independence. As Sipalo’s statement shows, 
from the very outset the basis on which the anti-Federation campaign was founded 
was not conducive to the preservation of unity in the long-term. By fusing together 
party and nation, ingraining in the minds of their followers the advantages of their 
own group and the deficiencies of another, UNIP and MCP leaders set in motion a 
chain of events that resulted in the entrenchment of an exclusivist national 
programme that precluded the expression of alternative views. When competition 
arose over power and interests, those that believed they subscribed to a more 
authentic version of the national idea subsequently believed that to ensure justice 
for their group they must either bring others to their way of thinking or eradicate 
them completely from the political scene.862 This created a situation in the early 
1960s in which, as UNIP and the MCP grew in popularity, it became ever more 
difficult to accommodate rival political interests. As has been shown in chapters 
four and five, this resulted in the marginalisation of minority groups who became 
the focus for popular agitation. In the case of Northern Rhodesia, Nkumbula’s ANC 
became ‘public enemy number one’; in the case of Nyasaland, the MCP’s 
opponents became the party’s former allies, such as the Church of Central Africa 
Presbyterian. These groups would have no place in the new Zambian and Malawian 
nations.  
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The ever more frequent deployment of violence by party activists gradually 
came to occupy a central platform in the MCP and UNIP’s mobilisation strategies as 
the date for independence drew near. Intimidation of political opponents became a 
visible display of loyalty to the party, a means by which Africans could actively 
participate in the national struggle. In some instances, the very threat of violence 
was sufficient to induce non-members to purchase party cards. The growth of inter-
party violence and the consolidation of a climate in which fear and suspicion thrived 
was not, as some historians have suggested863, solely the manifestation of a handful 
of party extremists. Rather, as illustrated in the aforementioned chapters it was a 
policy that was cultivated and encouraged [in]directly from the top. This was not 
only because it played an important role in bringing together UNIP and the MCP 
during times of great internal upheaval, but also because it often translated into 
tangible constitutional gains. As the Nyasaland emergency had shown, violence did 
pay, convincing many policy makers within Whitehall that opportunities had to be 
provided for advancement lest both territories descend into ‘anarchy’.864 By 1962, 
after the Cha Cha Cha unrest in Northern Rhodesia, British officials and ministers in 
Whitehall were left with little doubt that Federation could not be held together 
without the consent of Africans. Such an assessment obviously took place within 
the wider framework of British reassessments pertaining to its position in world 
affairs, but there is every possibility that the trajectory of nationalist politics served 
to reinforce the belief in British circles that the situation in the Federation would 
become unworkable if immediate and far-reaching constitutional concessions were 
not granted to the African majority. 
                                                 
863
 Rotberg, Nationalism in Central Africa, p.237. 
864
 NA, CO 1015/2527, Macleod to Armitage, 23 Jan., 1960. 
Page | 331  
 
In the short-term then, violence was a useful tactic. In the longer-term, 
however, the emphasis upon unconditional unity to the MCP and UNIP national 
vision soon gave rise to rivalries within the nationalist movements themselves. As 
the Federation began to collapse, and when it became increasingly apparent that 
power would be handed to UNIP and the MCP respectively, the arena of political 
competition began to gradually transfer from outside the two parties to within 
them. Politicians and activists from competing ethnic, regional and socio-economic 
groups vied for supremacy within UNIP and the MCP, seeking to impose their 
interpretation of the ‘national’ ideal upon others. Internal friction manifested in the 
growth of intra-party rivalry involving the open suppression of party ‘opponents’, 
many of whom had been former MCP-UNIP members or allies, by dominant figures 
or influential power bases. As John McCracken indicated in his influential article 
‘Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: the Case of Malawi’, 
authoritarianism was not a new phenomenon. Rather, it was rooted in the tactics 
adopted by the MCP’s predecessor, the NAC, to bring together Africans in 
Nyasaland against Federation during the 1950s.865 As David Gordon later 
demonstrated, McCracken’s theory can be equally applied to the nature of 
nationalism developing in Northern Rhodesia.866  
Whilst the primary intention of the thesis has been to examine nationalist 
mobilisation in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, an attempt has also been made 
to shed light on the ways in which nationalist mobilisation during the independence 
struggle sowed seeds for division and discontent that later contributed to the 
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entrenchment of authoritarianism within Zambian and Malawian polity.867 This has 
been done for several reasons. In the first instance it allows the thesis to address 
the contentious issue that independence didn’t in fact lead to African freedom, at 
least not for all given the growth of repressive tendencies. In the second instance, it 
also permits scope to assess the extent to which the MCP and UNIP were truly 
successful in uniting Africans, enabling the historian to question whether both 
parties were responsible for creating genuine ‘national’ movements or whether 
they had simply created a protest movement that quickly fell apart once the 
Federation had been dismantled. This is not an easy question to answer, not least 
because it comes back to the matter of how one defines ‘nationalism’. Although 
there is a substantial case to argue for the latter—the issue of protest against the 
Federation had, after all, featured heavily in the ANC and NAC’s popular 
mobilisation campaigns— there is little doubt that both parties had by the late 
1950s been able to engender among a bulk of their supporters a deep, personal 
connection to ‘the nation’, even if their supporters did not yet know the form that 
new nationhood would assume.     
 Whilst it is essential to incorporate the ‘authoritarian turn’ and its long-term 
implications for post-independence Zambia and Malawi into assessments of 
national politics, historians ought not to view all too critically the behaviour and 
actions of nationalist leaders in the 1950s and 1960s. Given the circumstances in 
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which nationalist mobilisation strategies were adopted, and when taking into 
consideration the fact that the highly emotional national movements in each 
country comprised widely diverse ethnic, regional and socio-economic divides, it 
was a huge task to forge cohesion. This is not an attempt to justify or excuse the 
use of political violence, but it is not wholly unreasonable to argue that African 
politicians had not at the time regarded such differences as an insuperable barrier 
to national unity. They simply wished to ensure absolute unity at all costs, 
particularly when it became clear that the British were seeking to transfer power in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to Africans.  
The pressures facing African leaders throughout this period were immense. 
With the increasing likelihood that the Federal government would sooner rather 
than later achieve its goal of dominion status, and with the colonial authorities 
conspiring to suppress African political activity, circumstances dictated that African 
independence should become the foremost priority. If this was to be achieved, 
UNIP and the MCP needed to convince the British and colonial authorities that all 
Africans were sincere in their commitment to new nationhood, that all Africans 
were sufficiently prepared for self-government and that all Africans were unlikely to 
accept anything other than full independence. The suppression of distinct ethno-
regional differences by the propagation of a monolithic version of nationalism was 
seen by some nationalist politicians as way in which their respective parties could 
overcome such difficulties.  
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British Anti-colonialism, African Nationalism and the International Dimension to 
the African Independence Struggle 
 
This thesis has not solely restricted its remit to study of Central Africa. By exploring 
the relationship between nationalists, British anti-colonialists and the international 
community sympathetic to the anti-colonial cause, a case has also been made to 
study the development of nationalism within a much broader context than the 
historiography for Zambia and Malawi has done hitherto. British anti-colonialist 
groups played an important role in assisting the NAC and ANC campaign between 
1953 and 1958. Initially with a view to promoting African advancement, groups 
such as the Africa Bureau, the Movement for Colonial Freedom and the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau became the ‘African’ voice in Britain. By propagating African 
objections to instances of discrimination and by acting on behalf of the Congresses 
in Parliament, raising objections to constitutional changes consolidating the 
position of the settler government, anti-colonialists helped create a wider 
consciousness in Britain about the African predicament in Central Africa. Although 
anti-colonial activities generally failed to decisively alter the course of British 
government policy in the region, they had a significant, if indirect, bearing upon 
African politics. Anti-colonialists not only served to legitimise the respective 
Congress anti-Federation campaigns, encouraging leaders to persist in their 
demands for equality, but also gave them status as the principal representatives of 
African opinion in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with whom the British 
government would have to negotiate in future. In addition, the financial and 
practical support given to African nationalists helped the parties to function 
domestically, and the guidance given in regards to tactics and organisation played 
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an important role in ‘moderating’ the Congresses anti-Federation rhetoric. This 
subsequently ensured that when the ANC and NAC directly petitioned the British 
government, they were making ‘reasonable’ demands.  
It is hoped that the analysis of the British left and Central African politics 
contained in chapters three and six help to outline the interaction between 
anticolonial bodies in Britain and nationalism in one region, illuminating the ways in 
which they influenced the trajectory of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. As Nicholas Owen argues with regards to the British left and India, so 
also in relation to Central Africa anti-colonial support was conditioned by the desire 
to cultivate a type of nationalism that conformed closely to the anti-colonial, 
Gandhian, ideal of a responsible, pacifist, movement.868 For a time, Congress 
leaders adhered closely to anti-colonial recommendations, framing their anti-
Federation campaign within constitutional boundaries and playing upon the British 
connection in order to achieve advancement goals. By 1958, both Africans and anti-
colonialists generally agreed that African advancement needed to occur sooner 
rather than later. Crucially, however, there emerged widening ideological 
differences as to how this could best be achieved. As witnessed by Kaunda’s 
attempts to win the backing of several key British anti-colonial groups for his 
Zambia Congress soon after its formation in 1958, however, anti-colonial support 
continued to be valued by nationalist leaders. Although there were no guarantees 
that assistance from external agencies would necessarily translate into tangible 
gains for Africans, approval from British anti-colonialists was regarded as being 
crucial for the success of the anti-Federation struggle. At a time in which the ANC 
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and NAC were searching desperately for recognition and support among their own 
people, endorsement from elsewhere served an important, symbolic role, providing 
the Congresses with the incentive to scale up their campaign against the Federation 
in the late 1950s. In many respects, therefore, the thesis diverges somewhat from 
the views of historians such as Owen and Stephen Howe, who suggest that the 
struggle among anti-colonialists to find accord with nationalist ideals in the later 
1950s subsequently resulted in a decline in the anti-colonialists’ capacity to 
influence developments ‘on the spot’.869 As argued in chapter six, the noticeable 
change in anti-colonial and nationalist relations was most evident following the 
banning of the NAC and ZANC in 1959, when the lending of moral, financial and 
practical assistance to former NAC and ZANC activists served a crucial role in 
maintaining momentum behind the anti-Federation struggle. At a time in which 
African leaders were prevented from returning to the political scene, British anti-
colonialists provided Africans with a lead, of sorts, in persisting with their claims for 
advancement.  
The thesis does not, however, fail to find common ground with Howe and 
Owen’s accounts, for, as has been shown, anti-colonial activities in 1950 and 1960 
represented the highpoint of British anti-colonial influence with regards to the 
Federation. Following the establishment of UNIP and the MCP, and the adoption of 
their respective campaigns for ‘independence now’, the gradualist approach 
advocated by anti-colonialists gave rise to ideological differences that damaged 
anti-colonial relations with UNIP and MCP leaders. Connections between the 
groups were still upheld, but from 1960 onwards nationalists no longer regarded 
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anti-colonialists as being able to alter the course of British policy in the Federation 
decisively on Africans’ behalf. To bring about major change, many African politicians 
believed that greater external pressure needed to be placed upon the British 
Government. For several national leaders, especially within UNIP, who had, unlike 
the MCP, failed to achieve tangible constitutional advance for their supporters, 
attention thus turned to cultivating sympathy for the UNIP cause among influential 
international governments and international anti-colonial organisations who might, 
in turn, lend the party financial, diplomatic or moral assistance that could be used 
to further the national cause. Given the fundamental shifts then taking place in the 
international political climate in regards to colonialism, the time was ripe for UNIP 
to expand its foreign policy. Party activists thereafter embarked upon an ambitious 
campaign to internationalise the anti-Federation struggle.  
Despite a burgeoning literature on the international dimension to 
decolonisation in the Central African Federation, few attempts have previously 
been made to explore the complex and expanding pattern of African nationalist 
relations with international agencies and the ways in which they affected the 
Zambian independence struggle. Although historians such as Andrew Cohen and 
Andrew DeRoche have placed their respective accounts of the break-up of the 
Federation within an international context, little attention is devoted to nationalist 
politics.870 As such, the impression remains that African nationalists were detached 
from developments within the international anti-colonial sphere. It is hoped that 
this thesis has gone some way to rectifying this anomaly. Africans were not only 
integral in shaping international attitudes to Federation, but nationalists were as 
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much part of changing the international context as larger world powers such as the 
US and USSR. The anti-colonial struggle in Malawi, and especially Zambia, possessed 
a strong international dynamic. By feeding into the growing anti-colonial climate 
then taking root in the United Nations and the US, and by winning support of 
powerful pan-African forces between 1960 and 1964, UNIP activities in particular 
helped to focus attention of the international community specifically on Northern 
Rhodesia, convincing international bodies and governments that African 
nationalism was a genuine force, unlikely to subside and unlikely to accept any form 
of ‘closer association’. This later proved an important dimension in improving the 
party’s domestic fortunes, at the same time helping to stimulate awareness 
internationally about the inherent contradictions of ‘partnership’ used by the 
British to justify Federation’s existence. In this way, UNIP was able to win 
acceptance as the voice of Africans in the region at the expense of Nkumbula’s ANC, 
placing pressure upon Britain to concede to UNIP demands for secession and 
independence.871  
Examining nationalist engagement with British and international 
constituencies places the issue of nationalist development within a transnational 
context. Not only does it go some way to bridging the gap between imperial and 
African historiographies by finding common ground between the two schools, but it 
also helps to illuminate the wider implications that the development of nationalism 
had upon the international, as well as British, anti-colonial climate. By placing the 
issue of nationalist development within a much wider context, for instance, the 
thesis has shown that African nationalism did not evolve within an exclusively 
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domestic context. It was equally dependent upon the shifting axis of international 
anti-colonial politics and, as such, held the potential to influence and shape the 
trajectory of these broader, international, developments. UNIP’s diplomatic 
offensive launched in the early 1960s therefore formed part of a cyclical process: 
international bodies, such as the United Nations, provided nationalists with a 
decisive boost by virtue of UN pronouncements against colonialism. As nationalists 
began to grow in stature and confidence as a result, becoming ever more forceful in 
demands for African self-government, so they began to play an ever increasing role 
in international affairs. In turn, this helped to feed the growing number of voices 
advocating full-independence for those nations living under colonial rule in the UN 
and the United States. Ultimately, the clamour to resolve the situation in favour of 
the African majority in the Federation’s northern territories was simply too great 
for the British to ignore. These were not just ‘national’ movements; they also 
formed part of a wider, international, fight against colonialism. 
Precisely where the incentive to ‘internationalise’ the anti-Federation 
struggle originated and how the diplomatic offensive evolved almost certainly 
requires further research. It is hoped, nevertheless, that this thesis establishes the 
potential for further exploration of the connections that existed between 
nationalist and international constituencies, of how these impacted upon the fight 
for independence, and how this continued to shape the trajectory of Zambia and 
Malawi’s foreign policy after 1964. By accounting for the ways in which nationalists 
tapped into, and in some cases helped shape international anti-colonialism in order 
to advance their independence goals, this study offers an interesting perspective 
into the nature of the nationalist struggle in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
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contributing to the expanding body of literature which deals with the growth of 
national consciousness.  
It was once remarked that necessity is the mother of invention. In no 
individual event in British colonial policy is this truer than in the conception of the 
Central African Federation. Facing a multitude of complications in Central Africa, a 
solution had to be found that fulfilled Britain’s long-term policy goals. Federation 
was seemingly the only feasible course. Three Latin words adorned the Federal 
coat-of-arms in 1953, Magni esse Mereamur, ‘let us deserve greatness’; they stood 
beneath an image of a shield upon which a rising sun signalled a new dawn in 
Central Africa. The significance of this gesture as the Federal flag was raised on 4 
September 1953 was not that it signalled a new beginning for Central Africa, but 
that it rather ironically, contrary to British hopes and plans, marked the induction of 
an era of turmoil and racial conflict, the endpoint of which was the break-up of 
Federation and the granting of independence to African majority governments in 
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Feb European settlers hold conference on federation at Victoria Falls  




Apr Appointment of first UK high commissioner to Central Africa 
 
1951 
Jan-Mar Patrick Gordon Walker visits Southern Africa, produces ‘Baxter Report’ 
recommending closer association 
Mar Conference of officials on federation  
Sept Victoria Falls conference on federation 
Oct Conservatives win British general election 
Nov British government announces support in principle for federation 
 
1952 
Mar Geoffrey Colby, the governor of Nyasaland requests that his colony be 
excluded from federal negotiations 
Apr-May London conference on federation 
 
1953 
Jan Final London conference settles federal constitution 
Apr Southern Rhodesian referendum approves federation 
July Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Act received Royal Assent 
Sept Federation formally inaugurated under interim government 
Dec Federal Party wins first federal election 
 
1954 
Feb Opening of federal Parliament 
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Leader of the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress, Harry 
Nkumbula, and his deputy Kenneth Kaunda sentenced to four months’ 
imprisonment for disseminating ‘seditious material’ 
Mar Salisbury is selected as the location of the federal capital 
Nov Rhodesian Selection Trust gives six months’ notice of the termination of 
its agreement with the Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers’ Union 
 
1955 
Mar Federal government announces work will proceed on Kariba hydro-
electric scheme 
Sept Rhodesian Selection Trust and Anglo-American reach a joint agreement 
with the European mine workers 
 
1956 
Mar Lord Malvern (formerly Sir G Huggins) demands full self-government for 
the Federation 
June Sir Arthur Benson writes to London denouncing the policies of the 
federal government 
 Major industrial action by African workers on the Copperbelt 
Sept State of emergency declared in Northern Rhodesia 
Nov Sir Roy Welensky succeeds Malvern as federal premier 
 
1957 
Apr Joint Declaration on future of the Federation 
Sept United Rhodesia Party and Federal Party combined to form United 
Federal Party 
Nov Federal Constitutional Amendment Bill receives Royal Assent 
 
1958 
Feb Sir Edgar Whitehead succeeds Garfield Todd as Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia 
July Return of Hastings Banda to Nyasaland 
Sept 
Oct 
White Paper on Northern Rhodesian Constitution published in London 
Kenneth Kaunda splits from ANC in protest at Nkumbula’s leadership. 
Forms Zambia African National Congress. 
Nov 
Dec 
United Federal Party wins federal general election 
All-Africa Peoples Conference held in Accra, Ghana. Members from 
ANC, NAC and ZANC attend 
 
1959 
Feb Emergency declared in Southern Rhodesia 
Mar Emergency declared in Nyasaland 




Announcement of Monckton Commission and publication of Devlin 
Report 
Malawi Congress Party formed in Nyasaland 
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Oct United National Independence Party formed in Northern Rhodesia 
 
1960 
Jan Harold Macmillan visits Federation 
Apr Release of Hastings Banda 
June Belgian Congo becomes independent 
Aug New constitution agreed for Nyasaland 





Kaunda released from gaol 
Talks in London on Southern Rhodesian constitution 
Feb White Paper on Northern Rhodesian constitution 
Apr Banda and Kaunda meet American President John F. Kennedy in 
Washington 
June Revised white paper on Northern Rhodesian Constitution 
July New constitution for Southern Rhodesia approved in referendum 
UNIP hold Mulungushi Conference. Unrest breaks out in key rural 
centres throughout Northern Rhodesia 
Aug Banda’s Malawi Congress Party wins Nyasaland general election 
Sept British government announces its intention to reopen talks over the 
Northern Rhodesian constitution 
 
1962 
Jan-Feb Revised constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia 
Mar Creation of Central Africa Office under R.A. Butler 
Oct-Dec Elections in Northern Rhodesia place Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP in a 
position to form a government 
Dec Rhodesian Front defeats United Federal Party in Southern Rhodesian 
elections 
Winston Field succeeds Sir Edgar Whitehead as Prime Minister 
Butler announces Nyasaland’s right to secede 
 
1963 
Feb Internal self-government in Nyasaland with Banda as Prime Minister 
Mar Butler announces right of all territories to secede 
Jun-Jul  Winding-up conference at Victoria Falls 
Dec 31  Federation formally dissolved 
 
1964 
Feb Internal self-government in northern Rhodesia with Kaunda as Prime 
Minister 
Apr Ian Smith replaces Winston Field as Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister 
Jul Nyasaland becomes independent as Malawi 
 Northern Rhodesia becomes independent as Zambia 
 








Results of the Nyasaland general election held in August, 1961: 
 
Party Total votes Percentage votes Seats 
Lower roll 
MCP  71,659 98.8 20 
UFP 607 0.8 - 
Independents - - - 
Christian Liberation Party 272 0.4 - 
 72,538 100 20 
Higher roll 
MCP  385 10.3 2 
UFP 2,108 56.6 5 
Independents 1,232 33.0 1 
Christian Liberation Party - - 0 
 3,725 100 8 
There were two voter rolls, a lower roll which elected 20 members, and had 
106,095 registered voters, and a higher roll, which elected eight members, with 
4,337 registered voters. Voter turnout was 91.5% on the lower roll and 85% on the 
higher roll.[1] The result was a victory for the Malawi Congress Party, which won all 
20 lower roll seats (in five of which they were unopposed) and two of the eight 
higher roll seats. 
 
 
Results of the Nyasaland general election held in April 1964: 
 
Party General roll seats Special roll seats Total seats 
MCP 50 - 50 
Nyasaland Constitutional Party - 3 3 
 
50 3 53 
There were two voter rolls, a general roll for the black population that elected 50 
members, and a special roll for white voters that elected three members. 1,871,790 
people were registered on the general roll, whilst only 814 were on the special 
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roll.[1] However, there were no opposition candidates to either the Malawi Congress 
Party in the general roll seats (the Nyasaland Asian Convention had dissolved itself 
declared its support for the MCP), or the Nyasaland Constitutional Party in the 
special roll seats, resulting in all 53 candidates winning without votes being cast. 
MCP leader Hastings Banda remained as Prime Minister, leading it to independence 
on 6 July that year. 
 
Results of the Northern Rhodesian general election held in October 
1962: 
 
Party Total valid votes Percentage valid votes Seats 
Upper roll 
UFP 21,558 70.5 13 
UNIP (and independent candidates with UNIP support) 6,034 19.75 1 
Liberals 1,541 5.0 - 
ANC 1,025 3.4 - 
RRP 65 0.2 - 
Independent (unsupported) 337 1.15 - 
 30,560 100 14 
Lower roll 
UNIP 59,648 78.2 12 
ANC 16,268 21.3 3 
UFP 183 0.2 - 
BNP 136 0.2 - 
Liberals 83 0.1 - 
 76,318 100 15 
 
Results of the Northern Rhodesian general election held on 20 and 21 
January 1964: 
Party Total votes Percentage votes Seats 
Main roll 
UNIP  570,612 69.1 55 
ZANC 1,541 30.5 10 
National Progressive Party - - - 
Independents 3,662 0.4 - 
Invalid/blank votes 4,178 - - 
 830,415 100 65 
Reserved roll 
UNIP  6,177 35.2 - 
ZANC 165 0.9 - 
National Progressive Party 11,157 63.6 10 
Independents 35 0.2 - 
Invalid/blank votes 224 - - 
 17,758 100 10 
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There were two voter rolls for the Legislative Council, a main roll that elected 65 
seats, and a reserved roll that elected 10. Blacks elected the main roll, whilst whites 
elected the reserve roll. Other ethnicities were allowed to choose which roll to be 
part of. The United National Independence Party won the election, taking 55 of the 
common roll seats. Its leader, Kenneth Kaunda became Prime Minister, leading the 
country to independence in October that year, at which point he became President. 


















































Biographical information is provided here for those individuals who feature 
prominently in this thesis. There were, of course, many hundreds of people that 
played a part in the transition from Federation to new nationhood in Zambia and 
Malawi, but the following individuals have been selected based upon what this 
author considers to be a central role in the events leading to independence. People 
in this category include prominent African and British politicians, both in the British 
and colonial administrations, prominent members of anti-colonial groups such as 
the MCF and the Africa Bureau, missionaries, teachers in Christian educational 
institutions, pastors and church workers who ministered in Central Africa and, 
finally, leading settler figures in the Central African Federal government.  
 
Armitage, Robert Perceval (1906 - 1990), was a British colonial administrator who 
held senior positions in Kenya and the Gold Coast, and was Governor of Cyprus and 
then Nyasaland during the period when the former British colonies were gaining 
independence. In 1950, Armitage took up his first senior post in the Colonial Service 
as Minister of Finance of the Gold Coast. His second major position was taken up in 
1954, when he became Governor of Cyprus. He left the post in April 1955 amid 
huge controversy, in part a corollary of the ongoing conflict between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. Armitage arrived in Nyasaland on 9 April 1956 to take over from 
Geoffrey Colby as Governor. In early 1959, faced with reports of growing African 
disorder, Armitage asked for authority to declare a state of emergency on 3 March 
1959 and subsequently arrested Hastings Banda, which led to further disturbances. 
Security forces killed 51 Africans and wounded 71. After the British government had 
implemented measures which saw the release of Banda and the acceleration of 
African constitutional advancement, Armitage went on leave in August 1960, 
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Benson, Sir Arthur GCMG (21 December 1907–1987), Governor of Northern 
Rhodesia. Benson was born in Johannesburg on 21 December 1907. After joining 
the colonial service in 1931, Benson was sent to Northern Rhodesia as a cadet later 
moving on to the Secretariat in Lusaka. After the Second World War he returned to 
Northern Rhodesia and in 1948 became Chief Secretary of the Central African 
Council. In 1954 he was appointed Governor of Northern Rhodesia until he retired 
in 1959. 
 
Boyd, Alan Tindal Lennox-, first Viscount Boyd of Merton (1904–1983), politician, 
was born on 18 November 1904 at Loddington, Bournemouth. In 1954 he became 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, where he oversaw early stages of 
decolonisation, with the granting of independence to Cyprus, Ghana, Iraq, Malaya 
and Sudan. He was in office during the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya and oversaw 
Britain’s highly controversial counter-insurgency campaign. Persuaded by 
Macmillan to fight the 1959 general election in spite of the damaging impact of the 
Nyasaland Emergency and the Hola Camp revelations, Lennox-Boyd was replaced at 
the Colonial Office by Iain Macleod in October 1959. In the summer of 1960, he was 
elevated to the House of Lords as the first Viscount Boyd of Merton. Being opposed 
to the line taken in Harold Macmillan's Wind of Change speech, he subsequently 
became an early patron of the Conservative Monday Club. He died on 8 March 1983 
following a car accident in London.  
 
Brockway, (Archibald) Fenner, Baron Brockway (1888–1988), politician and 
campaigner, was born on 1 November 1888 in Calcutta. He was a prominent 
member of the Independent Labour Party between 1907 and 1945, when he joined 
the Labour Party. From 1942 to 1947 he was chairman of the British Centre for 
Colonial Freedom, and in 1945 he helped establish the Congress of Peoples against 
Imperialism. In February 1950 Brockway returned to the Commons as the member 
for Eton and Slough. His principal fame came from his championing of anti-colonial 
movements. His interest in Indian independence had been long-standing, and from 
1950 he began to visit Africa regularly. From 1954 he was served as chairman of the 
Movement for Colonial Freedom, an anti-colonial organisation which he has 
personally helped to establish and remained a staunch campaigner against racial 
discrimination. He lost his seat in 1964 and, despite misgivings, accepted a life 
peerage in the House of Lords. He nevertheless continued as chairman of the MCF 
and, in 1979, he helped set up the World Disarmament Campaign. Brockway died 
on 28 April 1988, aged 99. 
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Chipembere, Henry Masauko (5 August 1930–24 September 1975) was a key 
member of the Nyasaland African Congress and later the Malawi Congress Party. 
Educated at Fort Hare College in South Africa, he returned to Nyasaland in 1954. In 
December, he attended a meeting of the NAC in Blantyre at which he met Kanyama 
Chiume. In March 1956, aged only 25, he was elected by an overwhelming majority 
to represent the Southern Province in Nyasaland’s Legislative Council. There, he 
waged a popular campaign against the Federation, lambasting the lack of 
opportunities given for African advancement. In April 1955, at the 11th annual 
conference of the NAC, Chipembere and Chiume proposed secession from the 
Federation as official policy. Together with Chiume, he was instrumental in 
persuading Hastings Banda to return to Nyasaland in 1958, and thereafter played a 
key role in building the NAC’s political prestige. He was arrested in March 1959 and 
taken to Gwelo gaol in Southern Rhodesia with his NAC leadership cohorts. 
Released in September 1960, Chipembere became the Malawi Congress Party’s 
Treasurer General. After a series of inflammatory speeches, he was again 
imprisoned in December 1961. He was eventually released in early 1963. 
Chipembere was one of Banda’s key critics in 1964, later attempting to forcibly oust 
Banda in a failed coup which began in Fort Johnson on 21 February 1965. 
Chipembere was thereafter exiled from Malawi, spending the remainder of his life 
in California. 
 
Chisiza, Dunduza (August 1930–3 September 1962), was born in Florence Bay (now 
Chiweta or Chitimba) in the Karonga district of Nyasaland on August 8, 1930. He 
worked as a clerk in the records office of the Tanganyika police in 1949, continuing 
his education at Aggrey Memorial College in Uganda, where he joined and became 
secretary of the Nyasaland Students' Association centered at Makerere College. In 
1955-6, after a stay in the Belgian Congo in 1952-3 and another period in Uganda, 
he returned briefly to Nyasaland before going to work as a clerk interpreter and 
translator in the Indian High Commission in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. In 
Salisbury, Chisiza joined the Mashonaland branch of the Nyasaland African 
Congress and was instrumental in forming the Southern Rhodesia African National 
Congress Youth League. In August 1956, he was declared a prohibited immigrant 
and deported back to Nyasaland, assisting the Nyasaland African Congress in 
constitutional discussions with the colonial administration. After playing an 
instrumental role in orchestrating Hastings Banda’s return to Nyasaland, Dunduza 
was among the high profile NAC members arrested in March 1959. Released from 
gaol in September 1960, he was elected in August 1961 as representative for 
Karonga in the Legislative Council. In the run-up to independence, Chisiza and 
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Banda had severe and sometimes heated disagreements over policy. His premature 
death in a car accident in September 1962 was lamented by several prominent 
western politicians and economists, including his mentor Henry Phillips. 
 
Chiume, Kanyama (22 November 1929–21 November 2007) was born in Nkhata 
Bay District, Nyasaland, where he became a leading figure in the nationalist 
movement in the struggle for Malawi’s independence in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Educated in Dar es Salaam and, later, Makerere College in Kampala, Uganda, 
Chiume was active in African student politics. Upon being approached by the 
Nyasaland African Congress to stand in the country’s first general election in 1956, 
Chiume accepted, and decided not to further pursue a burgeoning interest in law. 
Chiume became a driving force in organizing popular support for Hastings Banda 
and, upon his return in July 1958, was given a senior post in the NAC at the Nkhata 
Bay conference of August 1958. Unlike his NAC colleagues, Chiume avoided arrest 
while he was in London in March 1959, but played a leading role in trying to 
stimulate British public awareness to the African plight. In July 1960 he joined 
Banda, Orton Chirwa, Aleke Banda and other prominent Africans at the Nyasaland 
Constitutional Conference in London at which it was decided that Nyasaland would 
become independent. Chiume was made Minister of Education in 1962 and went 
on to become Foreign Minister in the first government formed after Malawi's 
official independence in July 1964. Chiume was a key leader in the 1964 Malawi 
Cabinet Crisis. He was subsequently driven out of the MCP and exiled to Tanzania 
where he stayed until 1994. He died in New York in November 2007. 
 
Fox-Pitt, Thomas Stanley, (1897–1989) was born on 27 November 1897. Between 
1928 and 1952, Fox-Pitt lived in Northern Rhodesia, serving in the Colonial 
Administrative Service. From 1923 to 1939 he served on the Copperbelt, first as a 
District Officer at Ndola and then at Mpika. He was particularly concerned at the 
conditions of the mineworkers and represented their complaints to the Colonial 
Government. After serving in Navy during the Second World War, Fox-Pitt returned 
to the Copperbelt, this time to Kitwe. In the face of great opposition from the 
Colonial Government he encouraged the emergent trade unions and helped them 
to forge links with the European miners' trade unions. As a result he was 
transferred from the Copperbelt to become acting Provincial Commissioner in 
Barotseland in 1948, and a year later to Fort Jameson in the Eastern Province. In 
1951 he was put on the retired list. He remained in Northern Rhodesia, living on a 
smallholding in Kitwe and working with African organisations in opposition to the 
growing possibility of a Central African Federation. He returned to England in 
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December 1952, where he became the Secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society in 
1953, co-operating closely with other anti-federation movements such as the 
Movement for Colonial Freedom and the nationalist Congress parties in Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. From 1960, Fox-Pitt's energies were channelled largely 
into the London Committee of Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence 
Party (UNIP). Fox-Pitt attended the Zambia Independence celebrations in 1964 at 
which he received the Order of the Freedom of Zambia. For the next two years he 
served in the Local Government Department of the Independent Zambian 
Government and on a commission concerning civil service salaries. In 1966 he 
retired to England. He died in 1989. 
 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda (15 February 1898–25 November 1997) was the leader of 
Malawi and its predecessor state, Nyasaland, from 1961 to 1994. After receiving 
much of his education overseas, including the United States and Scotland, Banda 
returned to Nyasaland in July 1958 to lead the Nyasaland Congress in the struggle 
for independence. On 3 March, Banda, along with hundreds of other Africans, was 
arrested in the course of "Operation Sunrise". He was imprisoned in Gwelo in 
Southern Rhodesia, and the Nyasaland Congress banned. Freed from prison in 
1960, Banda asserted his control over the Nyasaland African Congress's successor, 
the Malawi Congress Party, becoming life president of the party in 1960 and the 
centre of an extravagant personality cult. After the overwhelming success of the 
MCP in the elections of 1961, he was appointed Minister of Natural Resources and 
Local Government, and then Prime Minister in February 1963. Malawi achieved 
independence a little over a year later in July 1964. In 1966 Banda proclaimed 
Malawi a republic with himself as president, becoming President for Life of Malawi 
itself in 1971. For almost thirty years no criticism of the life president or the MCP 
was tolerated, and thousands of victims were gaoled. In 1993, pressurized by a 
growing popular movement inside the country as well as from outside, Banda was 
forced to hold a referendum in which Malawians voted decisively for multi-party 
democracy. In the following May he and the MCP were defeated in Malawi's first 
democratic election. He died of pneumonia at the Garden City Clinic, Johannesburg, 
South Africa, on 25 November 1997 and was given a full state funeral on 3 
December at the capital he had founded at Lilongwe. 
 
Huggins, Godfrey Martin, first Viscount Malvern (1883–1971), Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia, was born on 6 July 1883 in Bexley, Kent. He entered politics in 
1924 and became Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1933 when his Reform 
Party won the general election. (The Reform Party subsequently merged with the 
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Rhodesian Party to form the United Party). Huggins won successive elections and 
was knighted in 1941. An ardent supporter of amalgamation with Northern 
Rhodesia, a belief strengthened by close cooperation between the Rhodesias during 
the Second World War, Huggins played a central role in the negotiations leading to 
the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, which he hoped 
would prove a loyal imperial buffer between African nationalism to the north and 
Afrikaner republicanism and rigid apartheid to the south. He was raised to the 
peerage in 1955 as first Viscount Malvern of Rhodesia and of Bexley, and stepped 
down from his position as Prime Minister of the Federation on 1 November 1956. In 
retirement, Huggins strongly opposed UDI, urging the Southern Rhodesian Premier, 
Ian Smith, to reconsider the logic of his actions. Huggins in Salisbury on 8 May 1971.  
 
Kaunda, Kenneth David (born 28 April 1924), served as the first President of 
Zambia, from 1964 to 1991. After completing his education in the early 1940s, 
Kaunda began teaching at Lubwa in 1943, becoming headmaster there from 1944 
to 1947. He then moved to the copper mining area, where he founded a farmers' 
cooperative, was a mine welfare officer (1948), and became a boarding master at 
Mufulira Upper School from 1948 to 1949. Together with Harry Nkumbula, Kaunda 
helped found the Northern Rhodesian African Congress, serving as Secretary-
General between 1953 and 1958. Increasingly dissatisfied with Nkumbula's 
leadership of the ANC, he founded the Zambian Congress in October 1958, later 
becoming the President of its successor, the United National Independence Party. 
After a protracted struggle, UNIP won independence for the people of Zambia in 
October 1964. As the first president of independent Zambia, Kaunda helped avert a 
civil war in the late 1960s but ended up imposing single-party rule. From the 1970s 
he led other southern African nations in confronting the white-minority 
governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. He increased Zambia's dependence on 
copper exports and on foreign aid. Discontent with his leadership resulted in 
several attempts to remove him from power in the early 1980s, none of which were 
successful. In 1990 he was forced to legalize opposition parties, and in 1991 he was 
voted out of office. 
 
Lyttelton, Oliver, first Viscount Chandos (1893–1972), businessman and politician, 
was born on 15 March 1893. Chandos entered Parliament as Conservative Member 
of Parliament for Aldershot in a wartime by-election in 1940 and was sworn of the 
Privy Council the same year. He entered Winston Churchill's war coalition as 
President of the Board of Trade in 1940, a post he held until 1941, and then served 
as Minister of State in the Middle East from 1941 to 1942 and as Minister of 
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Production from 1942 to 1945. He was again President of the Board of Trade in 
Churchill's brief 1945 caretaker government. After the Conservatives' 1951 election 
victory, he became Secretary of State for the Colonies, overseeing discussions 
which led to the creation of the Central African Federation in 1953. He remained in 
the position until 1954. The latter year he was elevated to the peerage as Viscount 
Chandos, of Aldershot in the County of Southampton. He died in Marylebone, 
London, in January 1972. 
 
Macleod, Iain (1913–1970), was born on 11 November 1913 at Clifford House, 
Skipton, Yorkshire. He entered Parliament in February 1950 as a candidate for 
Enfield. Macleod became Health Minister in 1952. In December 1955 Macleod 
entered the cabinet as Minister of Labour. After the 1959 general election, Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan appointed Macleod Colonial Secretary. Keen to press 
ahead with reform in Africa after the 1959 Nyasaland Emergency, he embarked 
upon a course of action that would open the way for the transfer of power to the 
African majorities in East and Central Africa. In October 1961 Macmillan moved 
Macleod from the Colonial Office appointing him leader of the House of Commons 
in 1962, and later, chairman of the Conservative Party Organization. He left the 
cabinet in 1963 following Macmillan’s resignation and Lord Home’s subsequent 
appointment as Prime Minister. He became editor of The Spectator until 1964 and 
thereafter a member of the Shadow Cabinet responsible for the steel industry. His 
last major appointment was as Shadow Chancellor under Edward Heath’s 
leadership. Macleod died on 20 July 1970.  
 
Nkumbula, Harry Mwaanga (1917–1983), African nationalist leader in Northern 
Rhodesia, was born in the village of Maala, in the Namwala district, an Ila-speaking 
area of the southern province of Northern Rhodesia. He was educated at Methodist 
mission schools and completed standard VI at the Kafue Training Institute in 1934. 
He then taught for several years in Namwala district. During the Second World War 
he became involved in the emerging African nationalist movement, serving as 
secretary of the Mufulira Welfare Association and co-founding of the Kitwe African 
Society. In 1948, Nkumbula enrolled at the London School of Economics to study 
economics. He returned home in 1950 without a degree, but with vast experience 
that would later help the African nationalist cause. 
In 1951 Nkumbula was elected president of the Northern Rhodesian African 
Congress. Having failed to prevent the inauguration of the Central African 
Federation in 1953, Nkumbula stepped up the campaign for greater African 
representation, serving a brief prison sentence in 1955 for distributing subversive 
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literature. Opposition to what was seen as his autocratic leadership of the ANC 
eventually resulted in a split and the establishment of the Zambia African National 
Congress under the leadership of Kaunda in October 1958. Although Nkumbula 
struggled to recapture the influence he once held among the African people, 
especially in urban centres, he and his party participated in the 1962 Northern 
Rhodesian elections. Opting to join a coalition with UNIP, ZANC’s successor, 
Nkumbula became Minister of African Education. The alliance lasted until the pre-
independence elections of January 1964 which were won by UNIP. In the late 
1960s, Nkumbula continued to offer resistance to Kaunda's moves towards the 
formation of a one-party state albeit without unseating Zambia’s president or, 
indeed, making significant inroads in denting his reputation. On 27 June 1973 
Nkumbula announced in the Choma declaration that he was joining UNIP. The ANC 
was wound up following the dissolution of parliament in October 1973. He died on 
8 October 1983. 
 
Scott, (Guthrie) Michael (1907–1983), was an Anglican clergyman and campaigner 
for racial equality, particularly in southern Africa. He was ordained as a deacon in 
1930. In 1943 Scott travelled to South Africa where he served as an assistant priest 
in Johannesburg. Appalled by conditions of life for non-white people he worked for 
the Campaign for Right and Justice. From 1950, having been refused entry to South 
Africa, Scott lived in London. He became honorary director of the non-party-
political Africa Bureau which in 1952 started to focus attention on issues in British 
Africa. Scott also undertook projects outside the bureau's scope, identifying himself 
with passive resistance in Nyasaland against the Federation. In 1959 he took part in 
the peace protests in the Sahara against the French atom bomb and he joined the 
World Peace Brigade in 1962. In 1979 he initiated the organizations Rights and 
Justice and World Wide Research to focus attention on human rights. He was 
honoured by Zambia in 1968 and in 1975 was made an honorary canon of St 
George's Cathedral, Windhoek, Namibia. He died on 14 September 1983 in London. 
 
Welensky, Sir Roland KCMG (20 January 1907 – 5 December 1991), Prime Minister 
of the Central African Federation was born in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, on 20 
January 1907. In 1921 Welensky found employment with Rhodesia Railways later 
becoming leader of the powerful European Railway Workers Union. He was elected 
to the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council in 1938, forming his own party, the 
Northern Rhodesian Labour Party, with the aim of amalgamating the colony with 
Southern Rhodesia under a new constitution, in 1941. Having played a leading role 
in the campaign for amalgamation between the Rhodesias, and later federation, 
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Welensky became Minister for Transport in the Federation upon its inception in 
1953. On 1 November 1956, Welensky became Prime Minister of the Federation, 
securing significant concessions for the Federal Government in 1958, including 
greater devolution in external affairs, under the Constitutional Amendment Act. 
After the advent of African majority rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 
1963, Welensky retired to Salisbury, where he re-entered politics and attempted to 
stop Rhodesia (formerly Southern Rhodesia) from unilaterally declaring itself 
independent. With the end of white rule in 1979, and the independence of 
Rhodesia as Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe in 1980, Welensky moved to England, 
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